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IdentifierCreatedClassificationOrigin
05DJIBOUTI530 2005-06-05 13:07:00 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Djibouti
Cable title:  

DJIBOUTI: EAC 06/05/2005

Tags:   ASEC AEMR 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
					S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 DJIBOUTI 000530 

SIPDIS

NOFORN

DEPT FOR DS/CC, DS/DSS, DS/DSS/IP, DS/IP/AF, DS/IP/ITA,
AF/E, AF/EX, S/CT, CA/OCS, S/ES-O/CMS, INR
EMBASSIES ADDIS ABABA, ASMARA, NAIROBI AND SANAA FOR RSO
EMBASSIES LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER
CJTF HOA FOR CG, J2, J2X, J3, ATFP, MARCENT CO, ATFP, S-2
AND JSOTF S-2

E.O. 12958: DECL: 25X1
TAGS: ASEC AEMR
SUBJECT: DJIBOUTI: EAC 06/05/2005

REF: TDX-315/33604-05

Classified By: RSO MARC RAMOS FOR REASON 1.4 (G)



1. (C) Post convened a meeting of the Emergency Action
Committee (EAC) on 05 June, 2005 to review recent threat
reporting in REFTEL. The EAC discussed the potential of
attacks on U.S. government interests and the addition of
needed security measures to mitigate the threat. Potential
targets in Djibouti include the Embassy, the U.S. Military
Base Camp Lemonier, residential compounds and USAID contract
facilities. In addition, the EAC addressed the potential
risk of personal attacks to American and other Western
civilians.



2. (S/NF) Due to the highly classified nature of the
information (TS/SCI), the core EAC met prior to holding a
regular EAC meeting to discuss releasable information. The
core EAC was composed of the Ambassador, RSO, COS, USLO,
NCIS/FPO and U.S. Military representatives. Due to the
sensitivity of HUMINT controlled and third party sources, the
EAC cannot reference particular information, but the report
notes that attack planning is being carried out by terrorist
cells in Somalia and that the focus of the attack could be
against U.S. and Djiboutian government interests. Djiboutian
and French authorities have been notified of the potential
for attacks, but the methods, personnel, resources and
operational planning is unknown at this time. The EAC
believes that this report serves to strengthen recent threat
reporting from the region and shows a continual and
legitimate desire on behalf of terrorists to conduct attacks
on U.S. interests. Furthermore, the EAC agreed that
information outlined in the report could indicate the Embassy
facility as a potential target.



3. (C) Mission personnel have been at a heightened level for
a period of time and are carrying out appropriate personal
security measures. Military representatives from Camp
Lemonier are aware of the current threat and will take
measures IAW their SOPs. RSO will engage the Host Nation in
an effort to increase Police presence around the Embassy
perimeter and to modify shift schedules to vary times.
Unfortunately, the added cost to feed the Police, per
existing MOA, will increase. RSO will forward the cost
estimates per SEPTEL to DS/OPO. The EAC agreed that the
information was not specific enough to impact the U.S.
civilian community and believes that the public announcement
and travel warning remain sufficient. The EAC discussed
using sporadic closings as a random countermeasure, but
agreed that further Departmental consultation is required.
Members of the EAC will discuss this countermeasure with
Executive Bureau offices via separate channels.



4. (C) As the result of a DS/OBO vulnerability survey
conducted in February 2005, Post has been actively fortifying
the Embassy facilities with recommended field expedient
security measures that would provide a greater degree of
protection for personnel located in buildings other than the
Chancery. Although current attempts to enhance physical
security measures at the Embassy are notable, the speed by
which the countermeasures are implemented is too slow and
would not be effective if an attack would be carried out in
the near future. Post's GSO section has made a valiant
effort to accomplish many of the enhancements, but the
reality is that the GSO section has neither the fiscal or
manpower resources to complete all the tasks in a timely
fashion. Two of the greatest vulnerabilities, a man-trap
gate for the sally port and safe areas for three buildings
remain untouched. Post requests that emergency funding be
allocated in the amount of 15,000USD to obtain local contract
companies that could accomplish the task quickly.



5. (C) The EAC also requests that a DS/MSD team be deployed
at the earliest possible time to provide security support in
the form of emergency action training. RSO is due to depart
Post in approximately 30 days and along with the report
deadlines, existing counter terrorism projects, security
force reductions, transition preparations, physical security
enhancements and numerous other responsibilities, RSO
Djibouti is stretched too thin to dedicate the proper amount
of attention needed to effectively prepare Embassy personnel
to respond to a terrorist attack. The last MTT conducted by
DS/MSD was in December 2003 and Post has gone through several
personnel and facility changes since then.



6. (U) POC is RSO Marc Ramos at 253-35-39-95 ext. 2307 or
253-35-09-49 (secure).
RAGSDALE