LEVERAGING A NEW OPENING TO ENCOURAGE BDG ACTION

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DHAKA 005652

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV KISL PTER BG BG
SUBJECT: LEVERAGING A NEW OPENING TO ENCOURAGE BDG ACTION
AGAINST EXTREMISTS

REF: A. DHAKA 05627

B. DHAKA EXDIS 04867

C. DHAKA 05650 (NOTAL)

Classified By: A/DCM D.C. McCullough, reasons para 1.4 b, d.


1. (S) Summary. There is dawning BDG recognition that its
normal strategy for dealing with terrorism -- denial and
procrastination -- is cracking in the face of JMB's
continuing campaign of violence. We therefore have a new
opening to press the BDG to combat extremism by delivering
directly and authoritatively to PM Zia a stark message that
states our concerns about extremist violence, explains our
benchmarks for measuring BDG performance and the situation in
Bangladesh, cites the benefits of taking on the extremists,
and convinces her that she can do this without sacrificing
her political alliance with Jamaat Islami and her party's
prospects in the 2007 election. Since Zia would give us
virtually any assurance we want, the message would be just
the start of a long and sometimes difficult process of
engagement. End Summary.

The BDG Terrorism Template
--------------


2. (S) Whether it is an act of political or extremist
violence, the BDG response is basic and predictable:

A) It condemns the incident, affirms its commitment to bring
the perpetrators to justice, and, perhaps a few days later,
speculates that the attackers' motive was to embarrass
Bangladesh and the BDG. Someone, sometimes the PM herself,
will say an Indian or opposition political party hand was
behind the attack.

B) Low-level suspects are quickly rounded up. Often, whether
it is the stabbing of a prominent poet or an attack on a
cultural event viewed by Islamists as pagan, detainees are
released within weeks, and there is no subsequent movement in
the investigation. In a few high-profile cases, people are
detained for long periods without trial. The exception to
the rule was the conviction of two dozen mostly BNP-linked
activists for the 2004 murder of opposition Awami League (AL)
MP Ahsanullah Master. However, in that and other incidents,
no "masterminds" are ever identified.

C) The BDG characterizes the incidents as violations of the
criminal code without broader implications for the mainstream
political process, the orientation and objectives of Islamist
agenda, or the BNP's political alliance with, Jamaat Islami
(JI) and IOJ.

D) Most importantly, the BDG waits for the uproar at home and
abroad to blow over, while blaming others -- like alleged
non-cooperation by a victim's family -- for the stalled
investigation. This strategy was particularly successful
after the massive 2004 Chittagong arms haul, which implicated
a senior figure in the PMO and his long-standing relationship
with the Pakistani ISI. Although court proceedings have
recently begun against several low-level suspects,
procrastination ended up defusing external demands that the
BDG identify and punish the culprits. The same approach
succeeded in outlasting pressure to solve the August 21
attack on the AL leadership, the May 2004 attack on the
British High Commissioner in Sylhet, and, thus far, the
assassination of former AL finance minister Kibria.


3. (S) This template, however, is cracking as it tries to
deal with Jamaat ulMjahidhin Bangladesh (JMB),the group
blamed for a series of bombings, killings, and threats across
the country (reftels). The August 17 bomb blasts are now
recognized as having been the opening salvo, and the BDG's
failure to "solve" the case is constantly apparent. In
addition, the JMB's target list has expanded from judges to
reporters, government officials, at least one minister,
police officers, and various public and government
facilities. Some of these threats are probably hoaxes with
no real connection to JMB, but they fuel the anxiety of many
Bangladeshis who are normally complacent about corruption and
political violence as accepted features of Bangladeshi life.
The widespread Bangladeshi belief, right or wrong, that the
assassination of the two provincial judges was a bungled
suicide attack has fanned press speculation about other JMB
suicide squads allegedly trained and waiting in the wings for
action.

Cracks in the Facade
--------------

4. (C) On November 21, local papers pictured new x-ray
machines and other security equipment installed at the BDG
secretariat in Dhaka response to fears of a JMB attack.

SIPDIS
Rajshahi BNP MP Nadim Mostapha, who along with two junior
ministers is widely believed to have patronized Bangla Bhai,
indirectly denied the allegations in a November 20 meeting
with journalists, when he asserted that Islamist extremists
took root during the Awami League government and Bangla
Bhai's rise was due to the coordinated desire by a broad
cross-section of local political and religious leaders for
relief from criminals. At least two backbench BNP MP's have
publicly charged the BDG with complicity in Islamist
violence, with one saying the attacks on judges reminds him
of the onslaught on intellectuals in the run-up to
Independence War against Pakistan. Several ministers,
including Finance Minister Saifur Rahman, have reportedly
voiced concerns about their personal security.

5. (C) The most striking remarks, however, came from the BNP
loyalist mayor of Rajshahi, Mizanur Rahman Minu, who on
November 19 told reporters that the BDG had under-estimated
the Islamist threat. Minu, who has been embarrassed by the
certificate of good character he issued in 2004 to detained
Ahle Hadith spiritual leader Prof. Galib, may have been
engaged in some authorized spin control, as he also stressed
his confidence that the BDG would defeat extremism. On
November 21, judges from across Bangladesh are meeting in
Dhaka to assess BDG security for them and their courthouses.
It is unclear of courtroom boycotts will end, and how the
broader civil service -- already displeased by BNP promotion
and assignment polices -- will react if attacks on government
targets intensify. .

Suggested Approach
--------------


6. (S) At the end of September (ref b),we assessed our top
challenge as waking up the BDG from its state of denial about
the profile and threat of Islamist extremism in Bangladesh.
We continue to believe that Bangladesh is at a turning point,
but the JMB's expanding campaign of violence is changing the
domestic political calculus. The BDG is being forced to
traverse uncharted territory as it deals with this challenge,
but it still remains reluctant to elevate its response
against JMB attacks from a tactical, law enforcement-oriented
approach to a more strategic undertaking that recognizes that
religious extremism is a core problem. We continue to
believe that PM Zia is the key decision-maker, that she is
subject to bad advice and selective information, and that we
must engage with her directly and with authority to
concentrate her focus in a positive manner.


7. (S) The USG message include:

A) In clear terms, our great concern about growing extremism
in Bangladesh and the BDG's response to political and
religious violence.

B) Our benchmarks for measuring the success and credibility
of the BDG's campaign against extremism, ranging from holding
senior BNP figures accountable for their links to extremists
to elevating DGFI's CT wing to a CT bureau. Also important
is a more direct and open defense of Ahamdiya rights.

C) Our commitment for a calibrated program of USG support
pegged to BDG's performance in key areas (see below).


8. (S) Someone probably other than the USG should make the
political argument to Zia that the greatest threat to her
re-election now is not losing the electoral support of Jamaat
Islami, which needs the BNP at least as much as the BNP needs
it, but the eroding credibility of her own party. While some
of the detained JMB bombers have past or current ties to JI,
there is no compelling evidence that JI leaders condone the
attacks or that explains why they would think the attacks
would work to their advantage. Instead it is BNP leaders who
have been convincingly linked, in the case of Bangla Bhai and
HUJIB's Mufti Hannan, to Islamist terrorists.


9. (S) As she has when we discussed previous terrorist
incidents with her, Zia will seek to disarm us by insisting
that her government is totally committed to fighting
terrorism, that the root causes of these incidents lie
largely outside of Bangladesh, that the USG should provide
more CT and other support to Bangladesh, that Bangladeshis
are moderate people, and that the JI and IOJ are committed to
the political process and effectively constrained by their
inclusion
in the ruling coalition.

Carrots and Sticks
--------------


10. (S) We know there are significant obstacles to offering
BDG the juiciest carrots, such as duty-free access to the
U.S. garment market or MCA membership, as well as to some of
the most effective sticks, like limiting Bangladeshi
participation in UN peacekeeping operations. However, this
is largely irrelevant since PM Zia and her clique are not
driven by constituency groups or interests, which is one
reason they seem isolated from mainstream political opinion.
Instead, they rely on back-room maneuvering with other
politicians for advancing their twin goals of retaining power
and making money.


11. (S) In that context, image is everything. The BDG wants
MCA status not to boost its development efforts but because
they could sell it domestically as USG validation of their
governance. Also, it wants duty-free access to the U.S.
garment market at least in part because many senior
politicians have garment factories. Image is why PM Zia
badly wants an Oval Office visit, and image -- in the
aftermath of the Kibria killing and negative international
press coverage of Bangla Bhai -- is why the BDG arrested
Prof. Galib and banned two extremist groups, including JMB,
in February.


12. (S) The "shame card" has always been our best card
against the BDG, provided it is deftly played, but it has a
new potency today because of the JMB onslaught. If the USG
were a visible, satisfied, and active partner with the BDG in
the war on terrorism and extremism, that would be a
significant electoral asset to the BNP in the run-up to the
next election. The converse is also true, however. Either
way, an energized USG-BDG CT partnership would run a strong
risk of being caught up in the zero-sum world of Bangladeshi
politics.


13. (U) This is the third of a three part assessment of
Bangladesh 100 days after August 17.
CHAMMAS