Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05DHAKA4440
2005-09-08 13:32:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Dhaka
Cable title:  

PRESSING THE BDG ON THE AUGUST 17 INVESTIGATION

Tags:  PREL PTER PGOV BG 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DHAKA 004440 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/08/2015
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV BG BG
SUBJECT: PRESSING THE BDG ON THE AUGUST 17 INVESTIGATION

Classified By: A/DCM D.C. McCullough, Reason(s): 1.4 (b)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DHAKA 004440

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/08/2015
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV BG BG
SUBJECT: PRESSING THE BDG ON THE AUGUST 17 INVESTIGATION

Classified By: A/DCM D.C. McCullough, Reason(s): 1.4 (b)


1. (C) Summary. We are pressing the BDG hard to step up its
investigation of the August 17 blasts and to show it
recognizes the blasts are a turning point in the development
of Islamist extremism in Bangladesh. With seven alleged
bombers saying they belong to Jamaat ul-Mujahdin Bangladesh,
there is a link now between a campaign of national terror and
cohorts in sister groups who demand total sharia law, reject
the Bangladesh constitution, attack NGO's working to help
poor rural women, persecute religious minorities, exact
vigilante justice on religious and political grounds, and
encourage terrorism against the U.S. While the Bangladeshi
investigation appears disorganized if earnest, there is a
conspicuous lack of political leadership to drive the case
forward. End Summary.


2. (C) Two weeks after the 500 bomb blasts that rattled
Bangladesh, the BDG's investigation was widely seen as
disorganized and potentially stalled. The military DGFI
appears to be heavily involved in an inter-agency effort that
includes major efforts by the police and the Rapid Action
Battalion (RAB). In our contacts with these and other BDG
elements, it became clear that information and strategy were
highly compartmentalized. There was also confusion about
what assistance the BDG wanted from the USG, though the
final, official version was experts to assist on
interrogation techniques and on analyzing financial
documents. There was conflicting information about the
progress of the investigation.


3. (C) On September 7-8, Charge met with DGFI DG Rumy,
Foreign Minister Khan, and Home Minister of State Babar to
underscore USG concerns and requests for information. She
has meetings with NSI DG Haider and PMO Principal Secretary
Siddiqui scheduled for September 11, and has requested a
meeting with PM Zia before she departs for UNGA on September

12. Charge's key points were:

-- In response to the BDG's request for US technical
assistance, we need a detailed notional schedule to ensure
that US experts would be appropriately engaged upon arrival
and not obliged to cool their heels as on previous occasions.



-- We need an authoritative point of contact on the
investigation who can cut across the different agencies
involved in the investigation.

-- Are there transcripts and/or videotapes of interrogations?
If so, can we see them, along with phone logs and bank
records?

-- Is media reporting accurate that investigators believe the
Kuwait-based NGO Revival of Islamic Heritage Society financed
the blasts?

-- Has the BDG requested Interpol "red notices" for Bangla
Bhai and Abdur Rahman? (Note: According to the FBI liaison
at Interpol, Bangladesh has not submitted a "red notice"
since the year 2000.) When was the last credible sighting of
Bangla Bhai?


4. (C) Charge stressed the importance for Bangladesh and of
Bangladesh's international credibility that it identify and
punish the perpetrators and sponsors of the blasts. She
noted that some foreign governments are citing the blasts as
proof that extremism has sunk deep roots in Bangladesh.
Moreover, since the BDG says alleged bombers in its custody
have confessed to being members of the banned Jamaat
ul-Mujahidin Bangladesh (JMB),which is organizationally
related to Professor Ghalib's Ahle Hadith Movement and Bangla
Bhai's JMJB, there is now a clear linkage between a campaign
of national terror and those extremists who demand the total
imposition of sharia law, reject the Bangladesh constitution,
attack NGO's working to help poor rural women, persecute
religious minorities, exact vigilante justice on religious
and political grounds, and encourage terrorism against the
U.S. Thus, it is no longer tenable to say that extremism is
isolated or absent in Bangladesh.


5. (C) DGFI's General Rumy said that Additional IG Faruk
heads the inter-agency investigative committee comprised of
police, RAB, Special Branch, NSI, and DGFI. (Note: We have
not previously heard of IG Faruk.) He expressed surprise
that Interpol might be helpful in tracking down Bangla Bhai
and Abdur Rahman (Note: For months, the BDG has suggested
they fled to India.) Regarding financing, Rumy stated that
the Kuwaiti and Saudi embassies had ignored his requests for
information on NGO's funneling funds for mosque construction
in Bangladesh.


6. (C) Foreign Minister Khan undertook to pursue our requests
with ministerial colleagues. Bangladesh, he said, has no
intention of hiding anything, there is a first time for
everything, and "the August 17th bombing were a first time
for us."


7. (C) Home Minister of State Babar stated there have been
227 arrests in the case, but only 60 appear to have serious
involvement with the blasts. Seven suspects have confessed
before a magistrate, and 154 cases have been filed. He
promised Charge that we would have a notional schedule for
the US expert by COB September 8, and assured us that the BDG
has seized many bank documents that need to be analyzed.
Regarding interrogations, he stated that the BDG wants
someone who can sit with the 20 BDG interrogators working the
case to provide suggestions on how to improve their
questioning. (Note: We received a very general notional
schedule that will need refinement. RLA will be in touch
with FBI to coordinate travel dates.)


8. (C) On September 8, A/RSO met with Inspector General of
Police Muhammad Abdul Quayyum to seek information on the
August 17 investigation. Quayyum agreed to provide a complete
list of detainees and those released. He stated that a
police and RAB force had raided an apartment in Dhaka on
September 7, arresting four men and one woman, and finding
bomb making material and a laptop.


9. (C) Comment: Based on private and public statements by key
officials, the BDG's emerging position is that the bomb
blasts were executed by JMB members organized and duped by a
"foreign power" (i.e., India). Domestically, the opposition
Awami League and others seem to have moved on from the blasts
to new issues like fuel price hikes. The disorganized and at
times keystone cops nature of the BDG investigation can
easily be attributed to incompetence, but at this point it
appears that the BDG is unable or unwilling to see August 17
as a turning point for Bangladesh and its relationship with
various Islamist groups. PMO leadership -- in the form of
special events or addresses to the nation -- to bring the
bombers to justice is conspicuously absent. When it wants
to, the PMO can act quickly and effectively. Last week, for
example, an outraged PM Zia mobilized the bureaucracy,
police, and judiciary to secure in a matter of hours a stay
on a court judgment declaring that the martial law government
of her husband was unconstitutional. Bangladesh remains a
country where the past overshadows the future.
CHAMMAS