Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05DHAKA3408
2005-07-18 10:52:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Dhaka
Cable title:  

OPPOSITION UPS THE STAKES WITH AGGRESSIVE REFORM

Tags:  PREL PGOV BG BGD 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DHAKA 003408 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/18/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV BG BGD
SUBJECT: OPPOSITION UPS THE STAKES WITH AGGRESSIVE REFORM
ULTIMATUM

Classified By: A/DCM D.C. McCullough, Reason(s): 1.4 (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DHAKA 003408

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/18/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV BG BGD
SUBJECT: OPPOSITION UPS THE STAKES WITH AGGRESSIVE REFORM
ULTIMATUM

Classified By: A/DCM D.C. McCullough, Reason(s): 1.4 (d)


1. (C) Summary: The Awami League's 31-point electoral
"reform" program proposes major changes to the caretaker
government system, the Election Commission, and general
election procedures and qualifications. The BNP criticized
the proposals as unnecessary and divisive, and suggested the
AL take to parliament its case for legal and constitutional
changes. The AL responded that it would only end its
parliamentary boycott if passage of the proposals was
guaranteed. Demanding consensus on caretaker regime
appointments and banning war criminals from elections appears
geared more to solidifying opposition ranks and ratcheting up
political pressure than promoting a serious reform agenda.
The BDG might compromise on enhanced Election Commission
capabilities, but Hasina, by making core demands she knows
the BNP cannot accept, is laying the groundwork for an
election boycott and, it seems, a campaign to replicate the
1996 protests that led to the de-masting the first BNP
government. End Summary.


2. (SBU) On July 15, the Awami League (AL) and its 11-party
coalition announced a 31-point "reform" package addressing
the formation and powers of the caretaker government and the
Election Commission (EC). In presenting the package, Dr.
Kamal Hossain, president of the Gono Forum and an eminent
constitutional lawyer recently reconciled with the AL,
declared that implementation of the proposals would "bring
genuine people's representation in parliament and help it get
rid of the clutches of black money and muscle power." AL
president Sheikh Hasina and the leaders of several of the
AL's leftist partners were also present. Hasina said reforms
are an essential remedy for the politicization of the
caretaker government system by the BNP.


3. (SBU) Key caretaker system changes include:

-- Requiring the President, as the Head of State, to consult
and achieve consensus with all political parties in selecting
the leader and advisers of the caretaker government;
-- Prohibiting the appointment of any advisor ever affiliated
with any political party (Note: This targets the Chief
Adviser presumptive for the next election, who once was
international relations secretary for the BNP);

-- Putting the defense ministry (i.e., the armed forces)
under the caretaker government instead of the president; and
-- Limiting the authority of the caretaker government to
non-policy actions and assisting the Election Commission with
holding general elections.


4. (SBU) Key EC changes include:

-- Appointing the chief election commissioner and other
election commissioners in consultation with political
parties, with majority rule deciding any differences (Note:
consultation, not consensus).
-- Creating a politically and financially independent
secretariat with sufficient manpower to provide coverage down

SIPDIS
to the local level; and
-- Granting the Election Commission control over the
appointment of presiding and returning officers and the
authority to discipline them as needed.
-- Granting the Commission the power to schedule and postpone
elections and to set time limits for the resolution of any
election related litigation.


5. (SBU) Key electoral procedural changes include:

-- Campaign spending limits, financial disclosure
requirements, and equal access to radio and television
airtime;
-- Prohibitions against physical intimidation and religious
and fundamentalist campaigns;
-- Procedural transparency, including prior public listing of
presiding and polling officers;
-- Increasing the number of and providing for direct election
of women's reserved seats; and
-- Stricter eligibility requirements to disqualify candidates
in default on a loan, in possession of illegally obtained
funds, who obtain their nomination through bribery, or who
opposed the Liberation War and were war criminals.


6. (SBU) BNP Secretary General Abdul Mannan Bhuyian
criticized the reforms at a press conference, saying they are
unnecessary, divisive, and aim to hinder the electoral
process. They are also, he said, illogical since with so
many political parties it would be impossible to achieve
consensus on any political matter. Nevertheless, he asserted
the BNP is open to dialogue, and suggested parliament as the
proper forum for pursuing reforms.


7. (C) On July 17, Jamaat Islami Assistant Secretary General
Abdul Quader Molla told poloff that the banning of candidates
who opposed the 1971 Liberation War is not a barrier to his
party members because "we were not opposed to the Liberation
War, we thought we could better solve the situation without
civil war." When asked about the proposal banning "religious
based politics" and barring the use of religion in vote
seeking, Molla said, "It's against international human
rights" to prevent someone from talking about their religion.
Echoing Bhuyian, Molla said that "parliament is the main
place to reform any system" and that the Awami League's
proposals are "not for the benefit of the common people."


8. (C) Awami League Parliament Whip Muhumad Faruk Khan told
poloff that the AL would continue to pressure the government,
threatening increased popular "movements" if they do not
accept the proposals. When asked about the BNP's stance that
the reforms should be discussed in parliament, Khan said that
they plan to have initial discussions outside parliament and
return there once the BNP agrees to accept the proposals. He
maintained that the AL is already discussing these proposals
at the standing committee level but can't discuss them in
general sessions because "when we go to parliament, they
don't allow us to speak."


9. (C) PMO Principal Secretary Kamaluddin Siddiqui
characterized the post-package political climate to CDA as a
"gathering storm" over the "stiffening" positions of both the
AL and the BNP. The BNP, he said, is open to dialogue and
possible compromise on minor points such as enhanced
capabilities for the EC, but the idea of consensus on an
important matter like caretaker adviser appointments in a
land of hundreds of political parties is "stupid." He urged
the USG, in partnership with the UK, to mediate the AL-BNP
gulf and promote free and fair elections as it did
sensitively and successfully in the last general election.


10. (C) Comment: When we asked the AL two months ago if its
pending proposal would allow minor parties to veto consensus
decisions for caretaker regime appointments, we were told
that perhaps the proposal could be limited to parties in
parliament. The AL, however, has apparently subordinated
practicality to solidifying opposition ranks and setting the
bar high enough for the BNP to ensure continued political
stalemate. Banning religion-based politics would require a
constitutional amendment, is opposed by every parliamentary
party except the AL, and is another apparent sop to the AL's
leftist allies; Hasina, ironically, several days ago urged
Islamic scholars to help un-seat the BNP-JI government. The
"war criminals" exclusion clearly targets JI leaders,
including its two serving ministers, whom the AL has
repeatedly denounced as war criminals. While the BNP might
accept EC reforms, it cannot accept the core demands related
to the caretaker system or that would effectively rob it, on
nebulous extra-judicial grounds, of its key coalition partner.


11. (C) The AL is laying the groundwork for an election
boycott and a challenge to the legitimacy of a re-elected
BNP. More ominously and more immediately, however, Hasina
may be trying to foment a confrontational climate to
replicate the popular protests in 1996 that ended up
de-masting the first BNP government. Confrontation seems
like a risky strategy for a party that has failed to find an
issue to rally popular support, especially since the AL
today, unlike 1996, does not have JI or Ershad's Jatiya party
as partners. The BNP's retort that the AL should pursue its
agenda in parliament seems hard to challenge, while the AL's
refusal to end its boycott without preemptive BNP
capitulation leaves it sounding increasingly strident and
undemocratic.
CHAMMAS