Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05DHAKA2666
2005-06-08 08:55:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Dhaka
Cable title:  

OPPOSITION KEEPS DISTANCING ITSELF FROM THE

Tags:  PGOV PHUM KDEM BG BGD 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DHAKA 002666 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2010
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM BG BGD
SUBJECT: OPPOSITION KEEPS DISTANCING ITSELF FROM THE
POLITICAL PROCESS

REF: DHAKA 02610

Classified By: P/E Counselor D.C. McCullough, reason para 1.4 d.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DHAKA 002666

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2010
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM BG BGD
SUBJECT: OPPOSITION KEEPS DISTANCING ITSELF FROM THE
POLITICAL PROCESS

REF: DHAKA 02610

Classified By: P/E Counselor D.C. McCullough, reason para 1.4 d.


1. (C) Summary. The Awami League is systematically opting
out of the political process, a high-risk strategy that could
severely limit its options at election time. End Summary.

Opting Out
--------------


2. (C) Thus far in 2005, the opposition Awami League has
decided to:

A) Boycott by-elections, even in traditionally strong AL
constituencies, to underscore its rejection of the BDG and
the existing electoral system. Following the BNP's
uncontested victory for the seat held by the assassinated
Shah Kibria, 54 local AL activists resigned in protest.

B) Boycott the entire budget session starting June 8. During
the AL's previous boycott of parliament, senior leaders had
returned for budget day to denounce the BDG. AL MPs, but not
Sheikh Hasina, had fitfully attended Parliament since June.

C) Reverse its earlier decision to accept and fill its
allotment of the new reserved seats for women in Parliament.

D) Demand far-reaching changes in the caretaker and electoral
systems, focusing on political consensus for key appointments
and the transfer of presidential powers to the caretaker
chief.

E) Reject the appointment of the new Chief Election
Commissioner, mostly on the principle that the BDG failed to
consult with it.

F) Return, after a lull in the second half of 2004, to
hartals/general strikes as its principal means of political
protest. Since January, the AL has held 11 nationwide
hartals, including one for its slain Dhaka City legal
secretary, even though he is generally considered to have

SIPDIS
been the victim of an intra-party feud.

The AL's Case
--------------


3. (C) The AL insists that the BDG is well on its way to
rigging the national election, and that the AL incumbent in
the Chittagong mayoral election won only because AL people
power in the streets in front of city hall foiled a BNP
attempt to hijack the vote count. On June 8, AL SYG Abdul
Jalil told us that Chittagong had no national implications
because AL leaders would be stretched too thinly to monitor
and marshal popular resistance to irregularities. He took

the point that the national election would be the most
observed, domestically and internationally, election in
Bangladeshi history.


4. (C) Jalil defended the boycott of the budget session by
saying that the AL's participation would legitimize the BDG's
"illegal action" of raising fuel prices several days ago in
advance of the budget. He reiterated AL charges that the BNP
bars the AL from speaking in parliament, thereby leaving the
AL with no alternative to hartals. He rejected the
appointment of the new Chief Election Commissioner, Justice
Aziz, because he was a BNP supporter and the BDG ignored "the
will of the country" by not consulting with opposition
parties. He denied that the AL was effectively opting out of
the political process, asserting that the AL is the most
committed party to democracy in Bangladesh.


5. (C) Asked about reports of recurring contacts between the
AL and dissident leaders of IOJ, the extremist Islamist
member of the ruling coalition, to encourage them to join the
opposition, Jalil paused and then said: "This is a small
country. It's only natural that we meet them at social
functions." He denied, however, that the AL would
contemplate political partnership with Islamist extremists.
He downplayed recent squabbles between Jamaat Islami and IOJ
elements, predicting that at the end of the day IOJ would
remain in the coalition despite its failure to get cabinet
representation.


6. (C) Turning to the soap opera involving Jatiya Party
President Ershad and his now former junior wife Bidisha
(reftel),Jalil said that Ershad's shabby and inept handling
of the affair had seriously undermined the party's position
in northern Bangladesh. (Note: We have heard similar
assessments elsewhere. With dissatisfaction there reportedly
rising over increased prices for fuel and other essentials,
it is ironic that the AL might be the beneficiary of Ershad's
PMO-induced fall.)

7. (C) Regarding the June 4 defection to the BNP of AL MP
Kazi Sirajul Islam, Jalil said that a tearful Islam, a big
businessman from Hasina's home area of Faridpur, had met with
Hasina the day beforehand to explain that BNP people had told
him the BDG would pay the substantial funds owed to him by
several BDG entities only if Islam joined the BNP. Jalil
agreed to provide us with copies of Islam's unpaid BDG bills.

Comment
--------------


8. (C) The AL is systematically opting out of the political
process, sometimes on some pretty flimsy grounds, but its
concerns about BNP hardball politics are well placed.
Central to the AL's hard-line stance is the insistence that
the BNP nearly stole the Chittagong election -- an allegation
that the former and new chief election commissioners have
denied to us with some credibility (septel). There is
growing danger that the AL's confrontationist actions,
including its line in the sand on electoral reforms, will end
up severely constraining the AL's flexibility at election
time and push it towards a potentially disastrous boycott.
THOMAS