CHITTAGONG HILL TRACTS UPDATE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 DHAKA 001558

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM PREL PTER BG
SUBJECT: CHITTAGONG HILL TRACTS UPDATE


1. (SBU) Summary: Poloff recently visited the Chittagong Hill
Tracts to meet with military/civilian officials and a broad
range of civil society leaders. Eight years after the
signing of the CHT peace accord, significant dissatisfaction
persists among both the indigenous tribal groups and the
surging ethnic Bengali community. Development is lagging,
and security remains a key concern, though UNDP is pushing
for more donor engagement in the area. End Summary.

BACKGROUND
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2. (U) The roots of the problem date to partition, when the
primarily non-Muslim CHT, which had enjoyed its own laws
under British rule, wanted to join India but ended up with
East Pakistan. Friction increased in the 1950s when
construction started on the Kaptai dam, which flooded a
significant part of the area's little arable land and
displaced a large section of the indigenous population. In
the 1990s, successive Bangladesh governments promoted the
settling of ethnic Bengalis in the CHT and thereby changed
its demographics from three percent Bengalis in 1940 to
nearly 50 percent Bengali in 2001. The indigenous peoples,
composed of 12 tribal groups, saw their traditional
livelihood, particularly slash-and-burn agriculture,
threatened by the incoming settlers. After several years of
violent conflict, the Sheikh Hasina government in 1997 signed
the so-called CHT Accords, whose stipulations included:
re-integrating tribal refugees into the CHT; restructuring
local government to allow for stronger representation of
indigeous peoples and increased local authority of land
management, local police, and tribal law; no new Bengali
settlers; creation of a land commission to resolve disputed
land titles; and increased development assistance to the
three districts of Khagrachhari, Rangamati, and Bandarban
that comprise the CHT.


3. (U) One indigenous group later known as the United Peoples
Democratic Force, (UPDF) refused to accept the accords
because they fell short of full autonomy for the CHT. The
political wing of one of the pro-accords militant groups, the
Parbatya Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samity (PCJSS),was led by
Jotirindra Bodhipriya Larma, aka, Shantu Larma, who became
head of the Regional Council of the CHT. Other former
guerrilla fighters who joined government ministries include
Moni Swapan Dewan, who became Deputy Minister of the
Chittagong Hill Tracts. According to Mike Heyn, UNDP
Director of the Chittagong Hill Tracts Development Facility,
bitter disagreements between the UDPF and the PCJSS continue,
with each faction violently targeting the other. The UPDF
and some other tribal leaders complain that the BDG has
failed to implement the accords at virtually any level,
including the withdrawal of the large military forces still
in the CHT.

SECURITY
--------------


4. (SBU) Security remains an issue for many potential donors.
In February 2001, foreign engineers working for a Danish NGO
were abducted and held for a month before being rescued by
the Bangladesh Army. Bangladeshi NGO staff have also been
threatened or attacked, usually over money. In March 2004,
seven vacationing Peace Corps volunteers were briefly held
against their will at a hotel during an attempted robbery or
shakedown of the hotel management. The UDPF and PCJSS both
collect "tolls" from trucks and boats passing through their
territory. In the name of law and order, the Bangladesh Army
maintains in the CHT five brigades of at least 6000 men each.
The Brigade Commander for Khagachari estimated the numbers
at under 200 for the UPDF and 400 for the PCJSS, but said
that capturing them is difficult since "when they have
weapons, they are insurgents, but if they hide their weapons,
they are simply farmers." In Rangamati, the Army has two
brigades and boats to patrol Kaptai lake. When asked if the
area was safe for foreign NGOs and even tourism, every person
poloff asked, except for an Awami League politician,
responded that foreigners are safe in the Hill Tracts.


5. (U) UNDP argues that security in the CHT is not that bad,
especially compared to the rest of Bangladesh. In 2002, it
conducted a detailed study that concluded that 22 zones pose
a minimal risk to development activities, four zones require
enhanced security precautions, and one zone which was too
dangerous for development activities.

ARGUING OVER RESOURCES
--------------


6. (SBU) Indigenous civil society leaders focus on the BDG's
failure to implement nearly all aspects of the peace accords:
elections of the regional council have not occurred, land
disputes between Bengali and indigenous peoples remain
unresolved, economic assistance has not been forthcoming, the
Army presence and related Army violence towards indigenous
peoples have not diminished, ethnic Bengalis continue to
migrate to CHT, and illegal logging in the CHT has not been
stopped. Bengali residents complain that the BDG has not
fulfilled pledges to give them land, that the infrastructure
in settler villages is woeful, that Bengalis do not get their
share of development aid, and that aid agencies do not hire
ethnic Bengalis. Politicians, reporters, the local Brigade
Commanders, and an advocacy group for Bengali rights asserted
that aid should be divided equally between Bengalis and the
indigenous groups. UNDP and the Ministry of the CHT are
dominated by indigenous peoples, they said, and, therefore,
Bengalis are systematically excluded from the development
process.


7. (SBU) Indigenous representatives argued that many of the
Bengali settlers are illegal, arriving in contravention of
the prohibition against new Bengali immigration, and came
only for the free rice ration given by the BDG. Bengalis
deny immigration continues, and say that the legal status of
settlers cannot be determined since no land records exist in
indigenous tribal law.


8. (SBU) Experienced CHT observers suggest the reality is
somewhere in the middle. Basic education, controlled by
mostly indigenous district councils, is a success with a
literacy rate for all students, including Bengalis,
approaching 80 percent, the highest in Bangladesh. According
to UNDP's Heyn, basic sanitation in the region is the best in
Bangladesh, with every local village, whether Bengali or
indigenous, having its own well and privies. Heyn says that
donors and development bodies deliberately provided for
shared resources to discourage, largely successfully,
allegations of favoritism.

DEVELOPMENT
--------------


9. (SBU) After the peace accords, development assistance was
slow to return to the CHT, in part due to perceived security
risks, ministerial organizational problems, and continued
mistrust between Bengalis and indigenous peoples. However,
starting in 2003, UNDP began mitigating Bengali-indigenous
mistrust by initiating projects in 600 remote rural locations
with $3.2 million in USAID Quick Impact Funds (QIF). Deputy
CHT Minister Dewan praised QIF for making a very positive
impact in 2004 and welcomed additional projects. The QIF
projects aimed to develop the economy beyond the traditional
marketing of surplus crops by promoting large-scale chicken
production, ginger as a cash crop, cashew nut processing, and
penned fish acquaculture.


10. (SBU) Last March, UNDP sponsored a visit to the southern
CHT by diplomatic representatives from Norway, Australia,
Sweden, and the EU. UNDP says that, as a result, Norway
plans a $1.4 million donation, the EU $9.2 million, and
Australia and Japan plan $85,000 towards a planned $50
million UNDP development program. UNDP says that on March
24, Planning Minister Shifar Rahman signed a five-year, $50
million economic development agreement with UNDP and is
expected to sign the agreement as Finance Minister in the
second week of April. UNDP hopes that this agreement will
set the stage for increased international involvement in the
CHT.

COMMENT
--------------


11. (SBU) The CHT merit careful watching. While the overall
situation may not be as grim as some opposition and human
rights activists contend, the region has a deserved
reputation for arms and narcotics smuggling, militancy, and
violence. Our understanding is that Islamist groups are not
rpt not active in the Bengali settler community, in part
because most of the settlers are dirt poor and resistant to
any type of organization. However, this situation could
change if ethnic tensions flare up, the Bengali settlers are
radicalized, and the resulting violence spills over into the
rest of Bangladesh.
THOMAS