SALIM SALIM SOUNDS OFF ON ELECTIONS, POLITICAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DAR ES SALAAM 000972

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/15/15
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM TZ
SUBJECT: SALIM SALIM SOUNDS OFF ON ELECTIONS, POLITICAL
MACHINATIONS, PROSPECTS FOR VIOLENCE IN ZANZIBAR

REF: DAR ES SALAAM 0908 and previous

Classified by Charge d'Affaires Michael S. Owen for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: In a wide-ranging two-hour lunch
meeting, former OAU Secretary General Salim Salim told us
he had failed to capture the CCM presidential nomination
because of strong opposition from the Zanzibari faction of
the CCM. Salim, who is a Zanzibari of Arab heritage,
accused some party members of "reverse racism" because they
had considered him "insufficiently African" to become
President. Salim acknowledged that Foreign Minister Jakaya
Kikwete had run a strong campaign to capture the
nomination, but charged that "lots of money" had changed
hands and lots of promises had been made, many of which are
unlikely to be kept. Salim blasted Zanzibari President
Karume as a "lightweight," and said in a free vote he would
not even have captured the party's nomination. Mohammed
Bilal, who had also been vying for the Zanzibari
presidential nomination, had been "heavily pressured" to
withdraw, Salim said, but this could backfire in the
general election by further weakening Karume's support
among CCM party faithful. If a free and fair election were
held today, he said, CUF would almost certainly win the
Zanzibari presidency. Die-hards in the CCM are fighting to
ensure that does not happen, Salim said, and violence
during and after the elections in Zanzibar is almost
certain unless Karume can exercise strong leadership in the
weeks ahead. End Summary.


2. (U) Charge joined the Belgian Ambassador and UK and
Canadian High Commissioners for a March 12 lunch meeting
with former OAU Secretary General and recently defeated
presidential aspirant Salim Salim. Salim, who is also a
former Foreign Minister, had been considered a strong
candidate but ultimately finished second to current Foreign
Minister Jakaya Kikwete in the ruling CCM party's
presidential nominating convention (ref).

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Party Heavyweights Maneuver Behind the Scenes
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3. (C) Salim provided a detailed accounting of the
machinations undertaken during the CCM's nominating party
convention, leading to Kikwete's nomination. Although much
debate and the final vote were public, he said, the real
decisions were made in closed-door meetings chaired by
President and party chairman Mkapa. Candidates were not
allowed in some of these meetings, Salim said, so even
though the public events gave the impression of open-ness
and transparency, there was in fact considerable opacity to
many of the decisions.


4. (C) Salim was particularly incensed over one such
closed-door meeting in which his own candidacy was debated
by the party's Central Committee. Salim was not allowed
into the meeting, but had heard details of the proceedings
from one of his supporters. Salim said his candidacy had
been attacked by the Zanzibari contingent of the CCM, who
complained that Salim was "an Arab," and "insufficiently
African" to become president. He claimed that one delegate
said that "Salim's skin is not black enough" ever to become
president of Tanzania. Salim expressed considerable
bitterness over this episode, particularly the fact that
Mkapa let it continue and did not try to intervene or rebut
these arguments.


5. (C) Salim also told us that in the weeks leading up to
the party convention, the CCM leadership had repeatedly
said that strong anti-corruption credentials would be a
requirement to obtain the party's nomination. During the
initial Central Committee meeting however, Mkapa had
downplayed corruption as a factor, saying at one point that
"nobody's completely clean." When party Vice-chairman John
Malacela was unexpectedly eliminated in the first round by
the Central Committee, Mkapa could have sent a strong
message by using Malacela's dubious record on corruption as
a justification for his elimination; instead, Mkapa simply
said that Malacela was "too old" and "not electable."
According to Salim, this was a clear signal that corruption
would not be a determining factor in selection of the
nominee, and took the wind out of the sails of the CCM's
anti-corruption contingent.

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Kikwete: Lots of Money, Lots of Promises
--------------


6. (C) Salim acknowledged that Kikwete had run an
energetic and skillful campaign, and deserved to win the
nomination. Kikwete had done a particularly good job of
traveling throughout the countryside and enlisting the
support of youth groups. On the other hand, Salim said, a
lot of money had changed hands and a lot of promises had
been made by Kikwete in the process, and many such promises
would be next to impossible to keep. Once Kikwete takes
office and begins making appointments, he said, there will
be "a mad scramble" with many disappointed supporters left
with nothing. Salim also said - with a certain degree of
admiration - that Kikwete had "done a good job" of paying
off the press to ensure nothing but a steady stream of
favorable press reporting.

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Karume's Nomination Heightens Tensions Within CCM
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7. (C) Turning to Zanzibar, Salim admitted that the
process for re-nominating current Zanzibari President
Karume once again was "not very democratic." Karume faced
a very tough challenge from Mohammed Bilal, a protege of
former Zanzibari president Salmin Amour; in a free and fair
vote in the CCM Central Committee or on the floor of the
party convention, Bilal would almost certainly have
trounced Karume, according to Salim. Mkapa and Kikwete had
both placed "extremely heavy pressure" on Bilal, and in the
end he had crumbled and dropped out of the race, handing
the nomination to Karume. This could ultimately backfire,
Salim said, because many Bilal supporters were now
embittered and would find it difficult to support Karume.
Although they would be unlikely to support the opposition
party CUF, they could well stay at home on election day,
thus weakening Karume's vote count.


8. (C) Salim was particularly critical of Karume, terming
him a "political lightweight" who had achieved his position
only because of his historic name. Salim explained a key
Kikwete/Karume nexus: Kikwete had supported Karume's
nomination over former president Amour in 2000, which was
the critical boost Karume needed to catapult into the
Zanzibar presidency. Karume thus was obliged to support
Kikwete's candidacy over fellow Zanzibari Salim. According
to Salim, Karume's popularity in Zanzibar had steadily
waned since 2005, and if a free and fair election were held
today, Karume would almost certainly lose to CUF candidate
Sharif Seif Hamad.

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Crisis looms in Zanzibar
--------------


9. (C) Salim expressed grave concern over the prospects
for electoral violence on Zanzibar. Die-hards in the
Zanzibari CCM recognize Karume's weakness, and will pull
out all the stops to assure his victory, he said.
Similarly, the CUF rank and file believes they were robbed
of victory in 1995 and 2000, and are vowing never to let
this happen again. Both sides will "do everything
possible" to win, and each will erupt if it feels it has
been cheated at the polls. Salim said that the Zanzibari
wings of both parties have "too many hot-heads" who are
only concerned about victory, and are not looking at the
possible consequences of another questionable election.


10. (C) The next three months will be critical, said
Salim, and will above all require strong leadership and
statesmanship from Karume. If Karume can reach out to
Bilal supporters and bring them back into the fold, this
will strengthen his position and make it more likely he can
negotiate some sort of power-sharing arrangement with CUF.
Conversely, failure to reach out to Bilal will make it even
more likely Karume's supporters will resort to
intimidation, violence, and fraud to win the election, thus
making post-election chaos almost inevitable. Salim
reiterated the crucial importance of leadership from
Karume, but his skepticism on this front was all too clear.

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Comment
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11. (C) Comment: Although Salim's remarks were no doubt
influenced to some extent by his disappointment at not
capturing the presidential nomination, they ring generally
true. In particular, the approaching train wreck in
Zanzibar is of growing general concern, and Salim's
analysis tracks very closely with ours. We also share his
skepticism over President Karume's ability - or inclination
- to exert strong leadership and avoid a crisis. We have
discussed these concerns with several like-minded
diplomatic missions here and are planning a series of
meetings with both Karume and Kikwete to ensure they fully
understand the consequences of another fraudulent election
in Zanzibar, and to encourage them to take action now to
calm tensions and avert a crisis. End Comment.

OWEN