Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05DARESSALAAM532
2005-03-14 12:23:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Cable title:  

CUF, CCM Partisans Clash in Stonetown

Tags:  PGOV PHUM CASC TZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAR ES SALAAM 000532 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF/E AND INR/AA

E.O. 12958: 2/14/15
TAGS: PGOV PHUM CASC TZ
SUBJECT: CUF, CCM Partisans Clash in Stonetown
Environs

Classified by Pol-Econ Chief Judy Buelow for reason
1.4(b)

REF: A) Dar es Salaam 342, B) Dar es Salaam 317 and
previous

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAR ES SALAAM 000532

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF/E AND INR/AA

E.O. 12958: 2/14/15
TAGS: PGOV PHUM CASC TZ
SUBJECT: CUF, CCM Partisans Clash in Stonetown
Environs

Classified by Pol-Econ Chief Judy Buelow for reason
1.4(b)

REF: A) Dar es Salaam 342, B) Dar es Salaam 317 and
previous


1. (U) Summary: CUF and CCM party activists clashed
after the two opposing parties held separate rallies
in the environs of Zanzibar Stonetown March 6.
Various accounts by the press and political party
leaders report that 14-26 people were injured in the
melee, one critically. In addition, mobs torched
several houses and vehicles, and looted shops. The
Embassy Consular section has issued a Warden
Notice describing the March 6 confrontation and
reiterating cautions contained in the Consular
Information Sheet that political demonstrations on
Zanzibar can turn violent with little warning.
Emboffs are urging leaders of both parties to
publicly instruct their followers to refrain from
violence. End Summary


2. (U) On the afternoon of March 6, the ruling CCM
party and the opposition CUF held rallies at
separate locations in the eastern environs of
Zanzibar Stonetown. The Embassy FSN employee who
is stationed on Zanzibar attended the CUF rally,
where CUF Secretary General Seif Sharrif Hamad
shared the platform with other CUF leaders. While
the FSN could not attend the simultaneous CCM rally
held two kilometers away, the FSN had attended other
recent CCM events featuring the CCM Urban District
Chair Borafia as speaker, the same leader who
addressed the CCM March 6 rally. The FSN noted
that, while neither party speakers had advocated
violence, or incited party activists to attack their
rivals, the language used at recent political
rallies has been more confrontational than
conciliatory. Speakers at the CUF rally denounced
alleged incidents of CCM party malfeasance during
the ongoing voter registration exercise, and urged
their followers to be repared to defend
themselves gainst CCM malfeasance. The tone of
the nearby CCM rally was likely very similar n
past rallies, CCM leader Borafia has attacked CUF
party rivals by name.


3. (C) The violence occurred after the rallies ended
and groups of excited, slogan-chanting activists
from both parties began to go their separate ways.
In separate meetings on March 7 and 8, the CCM
Organizing Secretary Kidawa Saleh and CUF Secretary

General Hamad gave symmetrical but contradictory
accounts of what happened next. According to the
CCM version of events, the CUF rally ended first,
and CUF militants, acting on direct instructions
from their leaders, went to the site of the CCM
rally and ambushed CCM activists who where heading
for home. CUF Hamad said that the CCM rally ended
first and that CCM militants, who had received
special training in attack methods from Zanzibar
CCM government, fought
with the activists who were
departing the CUF rally. Hamad said the CCM
militants then torched homes of several CUF leaders
and burned two vehicles parked by the home of one of
Hamad neighbors, apparently because UF Guards
deterred them from attacking Hamad residence
directly. According to various accounts by the
press, party leaders, and Embassy FSN, the toll from
the clashes were: 14-26 people injured, one of them
critically, some shops looted, two to three vehicles
burned, and several homes partially burned.


4. (U) We are attempting to sort through the
contradictory accounts to determine what actually
did happen on March 6. Embassy FSN had followed a
group of CUF activists as they departed the CUF
rally that afternoon. He reported that they were
very agitated, and that they were singing CUF
slogans and insulting the Chairman of the Zanzibar
Electoral Commission. Eventually, however, the
group of CUF activists turned to the right, and
Embassy FSN very prudently turned left, so he did
not view the subsequent violent clashes first hand.
A few days later, Embassy FSN viewed the burned
houses and confirmed that all had had some damage,
some of it substantial, but that no structure had
been burned to the ground. In a March 7 meeting,
the CCM Kidawa said that 14 people had been
hospitalized, all of them CCM supporters. At a
meeting held on March 9, several donor-country
diplomats said that CUF leaders had told them that
CUF activists often avoid the public hospitals if
they have been hurt in a clash with the CCM, and
typically seek treatment privately.

5. (U) The violence occurred in the Stonetown
environs, away from the major tourist sites, and
there is no indication that foreigners were targeted
in any way. As a precaution, CONS issued a warden
notice, informing American visitors to Zanzibar of
the March 6 violence and reiterating the caution,
already contained in the Consular Information Sheet,
that political demonstrations on Zanzibar have
sometimes turned violent with very little advance
warning.


6. (C) By happenstance, AF/E Deskoff Susie Pratt was
visiting Tanzania March 4-9. Poloff accompanied her
to previously-scheduled meetings with leaders of
both the CCM and the CUF in the days immediately
following the March 6 clashes. On March 9, poloff
also attended a previously scheduled meeting of
diplomats from missions that are contributing to
Zanzibar ongoing project to establish a Permanent
Voters Register. Poloff and deskoff urged leaders
of both the CUF and the CCM to instruct their
followers, unambiguously and often, to refrain from
violence during the electoral campaign. Deskoff
asked leaders of both parties to consider making a
joint statement against violence. (The Secretaries
General of the CCM and CUF have met periodically,
although not recently, and their joint statements
were a calming influence during the 2003 Pemba by-
elections.) Poloff also exchanged information on
the March 6 clashes with the diplomatic group, and
asked that the diplomatic community continue to urge
all sides to refrain from violence.


7. (C) Comment: We believe that the violent
incidents of March 6 were spontaneous, and not
planned by any party leadership. The violence may
have resulted simply from the unfortunate decision
to grant the rival parties permission to hold
simultaneous rallies at sites separated by a mere
two kilometers. It is likely there were many
separate clashes, beginning soon after the two
rallies ended and continuing into the night, which
involved relatively small groups of party activists
who sought out targets of opportunity, such as
Hamad house, or each other. In her discussions
with the diplomatic group, Poloff noted that we
could waste many unproductive hours attempting to
determine which party activists attacked first,
and who was most to blame for the violence of March

6. Clearly, each party would like the diplomatic
missions to make a statement condemning the other.
Given the ambiguity of the situation, the diplomatic
community would do best to avoid taking sides, and
to continue to urge both the CCM and the CUF to
condemn violence unequivocally. End comment.

Owen