Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05DARESSALAAM151
2005-01-25 13:53:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Cable title:  

Zanzibar's Voter Registration on Track after

Tags:  PGOV PHUM EAID TZ 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DAR ES SALAAM 000151 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF/E

E.O. 12958: 1/24/15
TAGS: PGOV PHUM EAID TZ
SUBJECT: Zanzibar's Voter Registration on Track after
Rocky Start


Classified by Pol-Econ Chief Judy Buelow for reason
1.4(b)

REF: A) Dar es Salaam 57, B) 03 Dar es Salaam 2633,
C)03 Dar es Salaam 2602, D) 03 Dar es Salaam 2341

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DAR ES SALAAM 000151

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF/E

E.O. 12958: 1/24/15
TAGS: PGOV PHUM EAID TZ
SUBJECT: Zanzibar's Voter Registration on Track after
Rocky Start


Classified by Pol-Econ Chief Judy Buelow for reason
1.4(b)

REF: A) Dar es Salaam 57, B) 03 Dar es Salaam 2633,
C)03 Dar es Salaam 2602, D) 03 Dar es Salaam 2341


1. (C) Summary: Voter registration is now proceeding
on schedule, after an initial spate of violent
confrontations that had forced the temporary closure
of several South Pemba voter registration centers in
early December. Teams from the Zanzibar Electoral
Commission (ZEC) completed their work on Pemba, where
they registered a high percentage of eligible voters,
and moved on to the north of Unguja Island on January

15. While registration process is now running
smoothly, partisan tensions persist, and each passing
week brings a new rumor about plots to manipulate the
voters' register. Donor-country diplomats are
exploring how to support the process, in the light of
strong governmental signals from President Mkapa,
Zanzibari President Karume and others, that foreign
observation is not wanted. The current consensus
among the diplomats: they will observe registration
in small, inconspicuous groups for now; they will
maintain dialogue with leaders of both major parties,
making a special effort to reach out to the CCM; they
will seek ways to support civic education and domestic
observation missions. End Summary

On Schedule and According to Procedure
--------------


2. (U) Despite the considerable challenges, Zanzibar's
voter registration process has maintained its
integrity and its schedule. Although sporadic
violence during the first days of registration had
forced the temporary closure of several registration
centers (See reftel D),the ZEC's teams finished
registering voters on the southern half of Pemba
Island as planned on Dec. 21. On Jan 14, they
completed registration in northern Pemba, and moved to
the Northern region of Ungunja (Zanzibar's "main
island.") Next, the teams register voters in Unguja's
South region, before completing registration in
Ungunja's Urban West region sometime in April.


3. To date, the process has generally been credible
and orderly. A high percentage of eligible voters,
whose number have been estimated from 2002 Census
data, are registering. TEMCO, a Tanzanian voter
observation NGO, reports that 83 percent of eligible

voters registered in South Pemba. Observers from
TEMCO and elsewhere nonetheless noted some problems,
especially the controversial, but completely legal,
registration of newly-transferred members of
government militias. In some districts, the local
shehas (the generally pro-CCM ward heelers) still
exercise undue influence in determining which
individuals meet residency requirements, even though
the Muafaka reforms limit the shehas to an advisory
role. The opposition CUF, for its part, reportedly
encouraged Pemban voters living on the mainland to
come home to register, even though many had difficulty
meeting the three-year residency requirement. The
Norwegian academic and longtime observer of the
Zanzibari scene, Dr. Kjetil Tronvoll, opined that
while such tactics undoubtedly aggravated partisan
tension, they were unlikely to affect any electoral
outcomes in the CUF party's Pemba stronghold. Dr.
Tronvoll, TEMCO and other observers believe that the
ZEC has generally handled these controversies with
fairness and professionalism.

Flashpoints and the Conspiracy du Jour
--------------


4. (C) Zanzibar is nonetheless highly partisan, and
its political tensions will only increase as election
day approaches. Already, rumors of plots and
conspiracies abound. As registration proceeds, the
ZEC will be constantly challenged to respond to
legitimate complaints as well as to quell irrational
fears about the fairness of the process. In his
remarks to a group of donor country diplomats, Dr.
Tronvoll outlined potential flashpoints for voter
registration on Zanzibar. He noted that Ungunja is
more politically mixed than the solidly pro-CUF Pemba,
and that registration shenanigans on Ungunja are
therefore more likely to influence electoral outcomes.
Competition between the Karume faction of Zanzibar's
CCM party and the Bilal/Salim Amour faction could yet
split the CCM, which would have the greatest impact in
Amour's North Ungunja stronghold. A CCM split could
even tilt North Ungunja to the opposition CUF. Some
Ungunja shehas may try to rely on the unofficial
census they conducted in mid 2004 to determine
eligibility for registration, inevitably sparking
protests from CUF partisans who consider the sheha
census illegitimate and skewed to CCM. Registration
in Urban West region may pose the biggest risk of
confrontation, and the one most likely to affect
international tourism, since Stonetown and its
environs are the CUF's most important stronghold on
CCM-leaning Ungunja.

Warning Signs from the Government
--------------


5. (C) The government and the ruling CCM party,
meanwhile, may be less than fully supportive of
Zanzibar's voter registration; at the very least, they
seem increasingly wary of any kind of foreign
assistance or observation. Dr. Tronvoll concluded
that a faction of Zanzibar's CCM loyalists simply
wanted to disrupt the voter registration process. In
the January 20 discussion, Tronvoll remarked that the
widely documented efforts to register short-term
transferees from the government security forces were
blunt, blatant, and unlikely to influence electoral
outcomes in any case. He thought that the only
logical objective of such tactics was to provoke
confrontation and provide an excuse to suspend voter
registration. A month earlier, CUF Secretary General
Seif Sharrif Hamad had voice essentially the same
suspicion.


6. (U) More worrisome have been the recent signals,
strong, unambiguous and emanating from the highest
levels of the government, warning non-Africans to keep
their distance from the upcoming elections. Zanzibar
President Karume opened the New Year by inaugurating
the ZEC's new headquarters and lecturing the assembled
donors for assuming that an election is only
democratic if an opposition party wins it (ref A).
Days later, at his annual sherry party, President
Mkapa cast his lot with the CCM hardliners with his
pointed comment that the CCM was strong, and didn't
need to cheat to win. On January 12, President Karume
welcomed Zimbabwean President Mugabe as his official
guest at Zanzibar Day ceremonies, sending a none-too
subtle signal that African ruling parties might stand
in solidarity to support their vision of "democracy."
(See Septel.) Karume also reiterated the discredited
account of the foreign diplomat who had interfered in
voter registration without the knowledge of Zanzibar's
government. (In fact, almost a dozen diplomats had
observed registration December 2 at the invitation of
the ZEC and the Foreign Ministry, as reported in
Reftel D.) This sudden skittishness about the foreign
presence in Zanzibar extends to the working level:
Dr. Tronvoll reported that his most recent request for
an extension of Zanzibari research permit had been
denied.

Next Steps for Donors and Diplomats
--------------


7. (C) A group of donor country diplomats, invited to
the Norwegian Embassy January 20 to hear Dr.
Tronvoll's remarks on his Zanzibar research, discussed
their next steps. In addition to the Norwegian hosts,
the group included representatives from the US, UK,
the Netherlands, Sweden, Finland, the EU, and the
UNDP. The gathering provided an opportunity for the
USAID Democracy and Governance officer to present the
first newsletter from the Tanzanian voter observation
consortium TEMCO, which receives ESF funding through
the NGO REDET to observe voter registration on
Zanzibar. After discussion, the group arrived at the
following consensus:

-- Donor country diplomats should lower their profile
for near term. While it is important that they
continue to observe voter registration on Zanzibar,
they should do so in smaller, more inconspicuous
groups.

-- Diplomats should continue to maintain a dialogue
with both major parties. They should make a special
effort to reach out to an embattled and defensive CCM.

-- The donors should seek additional sources of
funding and technical support to expand TEMCO
observation project, as well as to support other
domestic NGOs involved in observing elections or in
conducting voter education.

-- The UNDP should convene regular meetings so donor
country diplomats can monitor the situation as it
develops, and readjust their strategy as necessary.
The situation may merit particular attention in late
March, when the ZEC registration teams prepare to move
from Ungunja's solidly CCM North and South regions to
the pro-CUF Urban West.


8. (C) Comment: Zanzibar's voter registration is
going well for now, but the situation bears constant
monitoring. Renewed disputes and even violence could
break out at any time. The informal diplomats' group
provides a useful tool for building consensus, and for
supporting voter registration. The group nonetheless
recognizes it has a fundamental problem: it is too
white, too European. An embattled CCM could easily
play the anti-colonial card and rally Africa's less
democratic elements in response to international
criticism about Zanzibar's conduct of its elections.
In past discussions, members of this informal group
have sought to support the Tanzanian NGOs that promote
democracy and to reach out to African diplomats. It
is proving difficult, however, to find many Tanzanian
democracy NGOs with sufficient capacity, or to
persuade African diplomats here to take a public stand
on the democracy issue. End Comment.

STILLMAN