Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05DAMASCUS6579
2005-12-19 15:17:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Damascus
Cable title:  

THE KILLING OF GEBRAN TUENI: WHAT WAS THE SARG

Tags:  PGOV PREL SY 
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VZCZCXYZ0013
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHDM #6579/01 3531517
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 191517Z DEC 05
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6245
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0555
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L DAMASCUS 006579 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PARIS FOR ZEYA; LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL SY
SUBJECT: THE KILLING OF GEBRAN TUENI: WHAT WAS THE SARG
THINKING?

REF: DAMASCUS 6444

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Kathy Johnson-Casares, per 1.4 b,d.

C O N F I D E N T I A L DAMASCUS 006579

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PARIS FOR ZEYA; LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL SY
SUBJECT: THE KILLING OF GEBRAN TUENI: WHAT WAS THE SARG
THINKING?

REF: DAMASCUS 6444

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Kathy Johnson-Casares, per 1.4 b,d.


1. (C) Summary: A minority view in Syria of the December
12 assassination of an-Nahar publisher Gebran Tueni argues
that careful scrutiny of events in Syria leading up to the
assassination, and close examination of the messages that the
killing sends, and of the costs and benefits accruing after
the killing, point to SARG involvement. These elements paint
a compelling picture of the powerful motivations and apparent
benefits that accrued to the SARG. It is therefore
reasonable to examine the reasons that might have propelled
the Syrian regime to order the killing of Tueni.


2. (C) Summary continued: The point in the assessment
provided below is to see what that working assumption can
tell us about the Syrian regime and its perceptions about the
current crisis. A SARG decision to kill Tueni paints this
regime as ruthless, calculating, and relatively unified or at
least still capable of decisive, pre-emptive action. It
would also indicate that President Bashar al-Asad is either
in charge or helplessly implicated and dragged along by a
thuggish regime that he cannot control. If Syria was behind
the assassination, it would mean that the SARG is prepared to
play very dirty to retain its hold over Lebanon and that it
is determined to wait out the Bush Administration, in the
conviction that the pressure will abate in the next 18
months. End Summary.


3. (C) With the investigation into the December 12 killing
of An-Nahar publisher and Lebanese opposition figure Gebran
Tueni still in its initial phase, there is likely to be no
definitive word on his killers for months, if ever. The
Syrian regime is suspected of ordering the hit on Tueni, to
silence his biting criticisms, to send a threatening warning
to the Lebanese opposition that no one can protect them, to
deal a body blow to the intellectual leadership of that
opposition, and possibly to delay the return to Lebanon of
Sa'ad Hariri. The point in the assessment provided below is
not to prove that the SARG killed Tueni, but to see what that
working assumption tells us about the Syrian regime and its

current situation.


4. (C) WHY NOW? In the two-three weeks before the
assassination of Tueni, the Syrian regime seemed to sense
that pressure against it had eased and that the crisis, at
least for the moment, had passed. The arrival in
mid-November of Saudi Prince Bandar for a series of visits to
consult with President Bashar al-Asad was a critical sign to
the Syrians of this change in the international environment.
According to foreign relations expert Marwan Kabalan, it was
assumed that Bandar, who is seen as very close to the
American administration, would not have come to Damascus
without a green light from the U.S. The absence of critical
USG statements during this period, except for statements on
Kamal Labwani and Syria's human rights situation, apparently
reinforced the widely-shared perception that the pressure on
the regime had eased (even if prospects for a deal on Iraq
and other issues remained remote.) Bandar's visits also
communicated to the regime that the Saudis had finally gotten
over their intense anger about the Hariri assassination and
were willing to re-engage on the basis of a cold calculation
of their interests. Finally, there was a sense here that the
USG was preoccupied with the upcoming elections in Iraq.


5. (C) MEHLIS TIMING, OTHER FACTORS PROVIDE DENIABILITY FOR
SARG: At the same time, the regime assessed that it had
fought UNIIIC head Detlev Mehlis to a draw of sorts, had
delivered the suspects for questioning in Vienna, and felt
confident that it had avoided a finding of non-cooperation,
avoided for the time being any arrests of the returned
suspects, and succeeded in gaining more time, as it assumed
the inquiry would be extended for six months. More
importantly, the regime felt that the immediate threat of
sanctions had eased. Those realities underpinned the
regime's perfect excuse to deny involvement in a
controversial assassination like Tueni's: with the scheduled
release of the second Mehlis report imminent, the regime
could not possibly have been so stupid as to mount such as
operation. But, according to observers like Kabalan, the
regime had already "digested" the anticipated hit from the
second Mehlis report, and felt relieved, even euphoric in
some quarters, that it had dodged a bullet. Kabalan
speculated that the failed assassination attempt on the
Hizballah official in Ba'albaak, Lebanon a few days before
the killing of Tueni was a feint, meant to create more

deniability for the Syrian regime by showing that
"pro-Syrian" targets were also being hit by "these mysterious
killers."


6. (C) WHY?: Some Syrian contacts, while reluctant to
accuse the SARG -- or in some cases, Bashar -- of killing
Tueni, were less reserved about pointing out the benefits
that accrued to the SARG. They were relatively open in
saying that in strategic terms, this killing, unlike the
killing of Hariri (or the extension of Lahoud),"was not a
mistake." According to attorney Salahideen al-Khateeb, Syria
will "pay for forty days" for the killing of Tueni, but in
the longer-term, the absence of Tueni would devastate the
Lebanese opposition since "he was the intellectual force"
behind it. The regional impact of the killing of Tueni is
also likely to be much more short-lived than that of former
PM Hariri because, for the Saudis and others, Tueni is not a
powerful Sunni political figure and ally.


7. (C) THE PERFECT THREAT TO THE LEBANESE OPPOSITION:
Kabalan noted that the killing of Tueni allowed the SARG to
communicate to all the Lebanese opposition that "we are still
here, despite all the pressure, and can reach you; your new
friends cannot protect you." If Tueni's killing was not a
sufficiently powerful message, even more threatening messages
are likely, added Kabalan, indicating that Druze leader Walid
Jumblatt, or Marwan Hamade (with a second attempt on his
life) could be next. Al-Khateeb went even further,
describing Jumblatt's days as numbered, especially after the
harsh remarks he had directed at Asad after the killing of
Tueni.


8. (C) LAYING DOWN MARKERS ON HARIRI, HIZBALLAH? Tueni's
killing made clear that it is very dangerous for Sa'ad Hariri
to return to Lebanon and attempt to increase his political
influence. It also effectively laid down a marker that any
further cornering of Hizballah on the disarmament issue
should be put off, according to Kabalan. Inside Syria, the
killing sent fear and trembling through the opposition, many
of whom believe the Tueni killing is a harbinger of
widespread arrests and a further crackdown.


9. (C) WHAT IT MEANS: The killing of Tueni also seems to
send a message over the heads of the Lebanese, to the U.S.
and the French, communicating that the SARG regime considers
Lebanon a critical strategic interest and that it is willing
to take huge risks and to "play very dirty" to protect that
interest. The killing of Tueni, according to Kabalan,
indicates that Syria is "insisting that 'our interests there
will not be ignored.'" With Iraq closed off by the American
military presence, and the peace process in a deep freeze,
Lebanon is Syria's only remaining venue for exercising its
regional influence. The regime also seems to be
communicating, if it is responsible for Tueni's death, that
"we can get away with it." Finally, the killing indicates
that there are murderous, highly competent actors in Lebanon
that the SARG regime can call upon, capable of hitting
hard-to-reach targets, without leaving much evidence behind.


10. (C) WHAT IT SAYS ABOUT THE SYRIAN REGIME? A SARG
decision to kill Tueni at such a sensitive moment would paint
this regime as ruthless, capable of decisive, pre-emptive
action (regardless in internal divisions),tough and brazenly
calculating. Many long-term observers of the regime, like
Michel Kilo and Riyad Turk, have long argued that the regime
has used criminal violence and political assassination for
decades, both internally and abroad, to maintain its power
and regional influence, and that it is incapable of changing
or of engaging in meaningful political reform. According to
Kabalan, the killing of Tueni reinforces that assessment,
shows that the regime is more or less united -- including
Asad at the top -- and is "addicted" to violence. It also
shows how dangerous it is to corner such a regime and then
allow the pressure to ease, even if temporarily. In
Kabalan's view, if the regime gets away with the Tueni
killing, more violence in Lebanon will follow.


11. (C) WHO IS LEADING THE POLICY? Some contacts are less
convinced than Kabalan that Asad could be in charge of such a
ruthless regime. They allow that elements inside the regime,
centered in the security services, are probably involved in
the killing of Tueni, but insist that Asad was not the
decision-maker. They use the killing to argue that Asad is
not in complete control of the regime. However, for civil
society activist Amr al-Azm, that may be a distinction
without a difference. In his view, the regime is "a runaway
train," and Asad is trapped as engineer, more fearful of

jumping off than of maintaining nominal control. For al-Azm,
"the oligarchy running things has made sure Asad's hands are
dirty," making him further hesitate about jumping ship.


12. (C) For others, the killing of Tueni provokes
contradictory responses, often woven into -- according to
al-Amr -- a tissue of fear, denial, and shame that such a
regime could be running their country. The contradictory
response usually emerges in these contacts' attitudes about
Asad. They will assert in general terms that Asad is a
stronger leader and more in control than many assume, but
then deny, usually on the basis of his personal
characteristics, that he could be involved in ordering or
countenancing such violence. According to al-Khateeb, for
example, the President is not in control of the country to
the extent of ordering the killing of Tueni. Khateeb and
others who know him well insist that Asad does not have the
personal decisiveness, ruthlessness, and combative
personality to have ordered such action. Khateeb argues that
the intense struggles going on in the inner circles of power,
about how to respond to the crisis provoked by Mehlis,
clearly indicate that the President is struggling -- and
sometimes failing -- to control SMI chief Asif Shawkat and
his allies in the regime. Nonetheless, Khateeb argues,
without any discomfort over the apparent contradiction, that
Asad is strong enough to order Shawkat to Vienna or elsewhere
for questioning.


13. (C) HAMLET WITH A MEAN STREAK: Dr. Samir al-Taki issued
a similarly hedged assessment to defend Asad, saying that the
SARG as a government had not killed Tueni, but that elements
within the SARG may have been involved. He mentioned SMI
chief Asif Shawkat and Ba'ath Party Regional Command Security
Office chief Hisham Ikhtiyar as two who represented a camp
inside the regime that wanted to destabilize Lebanon and
likely supported a program of assassination there, using
proxies in Lebanon. He added that they would be careful not
to leave any evidence about their involvement in the
assassinations "lying around," but that it was implicit in
aggressive policy recommendations on Lebanon which they
supported in inner regime circles. Al-Taki pointed to them
as opponents of Asad's efforts to cooperate on Mehlis who
were attempting to use whatever was available, including
instability in Lebanon, to sabotage the President's efforts.
Nonetheless, it is clear that Asad has surrounded himself
with -- and is heavily influenced by -- these hard-liners,
and family members like sister Bushra and brother Maher who
support them. It should also be noted that there is a
powerful perception among some regime observers that Asad may
be indecisive in many respects, but on Lebanon, he seems to
have very strong views and has shown himself willing to
impose them.


14. (C) As reported reftel, many of our other contacts
believe, or say they believe, that the SARG was not involved
in killing Tueni because Syria is the party most damaged by
assassination. Repeating arguments made after the killing of
Hariri, they insist -- without providing enough evidence so
that their scenarios collapse into implausibility -- that
some undetermined party such as Israel or the U.S. itself is
engaged in massive conspiracy to harm Syria's interests and
internationalize the issues in Lebanon. The problem with the
argument this time, in addition to its implausibility, is
that Syria's interests thus far have not sustained much
tangible damage from the Tueni killing. As if to illustrate
the point, cries by SARG officials about the damage caused by
the Tueni assassination subsided just a day or so after the
killing.


15. (C) CONCLUSION: WHAT DOES IT MEAN FOR US?: If Syria
was behind the Tueni assassination, it would mean that the
SARG is prepared to play very dirty to retain its Lebanon
card and prevent Lebanon from falling into a pro-Western
orbit. A decision to kill Tueni points toward regime
calculations that U.S. pressure on Syria will abate in the
next year or so and that the SARG has determined that it can
-- or must try to -- wait out the Bush Administration,
believing that it has allies capable of defending it against
UN sanctions and fearful of instability here if the regime
were to collapse. In the meantime, the regime will test the
outer limits of that pressure (while keeping Lebanon in line)
but continue to send out feelers indicating that it
"desperately" wants a deal with the U.S. Tueni's demise
seems to indicate that any Syrian offer of a deal will be
limited to Iraq issues and not include Lebanon. Such private
signals from the SARG are likely to be mixed with public
shows of defiance and threats (coupled with demonstrations on
the ground) regarding instability in Lebanon (and elsewhere).
If the SARG killed Tueni, that signals a near-reckless
brazenness and seems to promise, in the absence of changes or
deterrent reaction, that more killings in Lebanon are likely
to occur. It also would indicate that the SARG believes the
international will is sufficiently fractured so as to allow
it to carry on with a ruthless campaign to maintain its
dominating influence in Lebanon without suffering any
consequences or real retribution.



JOHNSON-CASARES