Identifier | Created | Classification | Origin |
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05DAMASCUS6342 | 2005-12-06 15:17:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Damascus |
VZCZCXYZ0018 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHDM #6342/01 3401517 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 061517Z DEC 05 FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5951 INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0523 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC |
C O N F I D E N T I A L DAMASCUS 006342 |
1. (C) Summary: Developments in Syria over the past 18 months have focused fresh attention on the need for USG support for democratization and efforts to strengthen civil society in Syria. As Post begins mapping out the different players in civil society and the opposition for use in identifying future interlocutors and programs to support, we believe it is important to raise some of the challenges that will face us in our dealings with Syrian civil society. These include intense, ongoing SARG intimidation and surveillance; ideological cleavages, especially between secularists and Islamic groups; divisions over whether to accept USG support and concerns with losing credibility if viewed as too close to the U.S.; personal jealousies and top-down management culture, as well as divisions between civil society and the political opposition in Syria. Given these factors, Post advocates an enhanced USG program of assistance to Syrian civil society that would emphasize sustained public expressions of support for fundamental political and economic reform, even as we identify new groups or individuals who could benefit from ramped up funding for existing programs. Post would also like to see a more ambitious use of regional projects with neighboring Arab countries. Embassy Damascus looks forward to the input and insights that Senior Advisor Denehy will provide as he begins his meetings with local activists. Post's suggested mapping exercise will be forwarded by email to relevant parties. End Summary. 2. (C) In recent months, as dissatisfaction with the SARG's repression of basic civil rights has grown, Post has intensified efforts to identify key civil society and opposition players who are likely to play a role in democratization efforts in Syria. Part of that experience has made it clear that there are real problems to be confronted in any effort to increase our outreach to Syrian civil society dramatically, or in proposing more ambitious collaborative efforts among groups in civil society. 3. (C) SARG CONTROL OVER CIVIL SOCIETY: As our reporting has indicated over the past two years, civil society in Syria is very weak, suffering from years of systematic repression by the SARG and its security services. The government closely controls which fledgling organizations are granted licenses to organize. Only organizations that toe the party line are allowed any sort of political role or voice. Others who aspire to such a role are refused licenses. The government more routinely licenses organizations that stick to anodyne activities divorced from anything distinctly political (with the SARG using a very broad definition about what constitutes political activity). There is, for example, an active NGO focused on the environment that has unofficial SARG blessing. (Note: The NGO's president consciously chose an environmental mission as a way to develop civic activism, knowing the subject matter would not /not alarm the SARG. End Note.) A few SARG-licensed NGO's, like FIRDOS, which focuses on micro-enterprise, are blessed with the official patronage of First Lady Asma Asad. The number of independent NGO's and civil society players with the capacity -- putting aside for the moment the issue of willingness -- to develop new projects that the USG could fund is very limited. 4. (C) ASKING FOR PERMISSION TO ORGANIZE: There is a two-track system for controlling the licensing of new NGO's, one controlled by the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, which has nominal control over the licensing of NGO's, and the other controlled by the security services. Both Political Security Directorate (PSD) and General Intelligence Directorate (GID), as well as Syrian Military Intelligence (SMI) seem to exercise overlapping, sometimes unpredictably enforced authority over civil-society activities. When the activities of XXXXXXXXXXXX, the head of XXXXXXXXXXXX, for example, became an irritant to the SARG, he was called in on several occasions and interrogated by SMI head Asif Shawkat himself. (Note: XXXXXXXXXXXX subsequently left Syria and is now in the U.S., trying to run his organization long-distance.) 5. (C) THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: Those activists who dare to organize and pursue activities without SARG authorization are acting illegally. Under the Emergency Law, in force since 1963, any legal right to assembly is suspended. Some gatherings are tolerated by the government, for a variety of complicated reasons (not seen as overly threatening; identified as valuable window-dressing for a repressive regime; or possessing some level of behind-the-scenes "shelter" from a senior figure in the regime, often from one of the security services). Some civil society activists get around the strict laws by identifying themselves as a publishing house, for which more malleable rules apply, rather than as an NGO (e.g. XXXXXXXXXXXX, run by XXXXXXXXXXXX). Others, like women's activist XXXXXXXXXXXX, try to stay beneath the radar screen, by restricting meetings to very small groups and holding them in private homes. 6. (C) There are also laws restricting NGO's from receiving funds from foreign government sources. While organizations use a variety of financial subterfuges, and the SARG sometimes looks the other way, the government can at any moment use these laws, or threaten to use them, to shut down an organization or intimidate its supporters Sometimes the mere suggestion from "a friend" of the regime that the current environment is not right for a USG-sponsored project is enough to frighten already-cowed NGO leaders into returning USG funds. This happened recently when acting XXXXXXXXXXXX head XXXXXXXXXXXX notified PD that he would be returning nearly USD 20,000 in unused MEPI funding after being told by SARG proxies that the project -- XXXXXXXXXXXX -- was ill-timed and unacceptable with respect to content. XXXXXXXXXXXX, another recipient of a MEPI grant, decided not to proceed with the parts of his project relating to the publication of essays and exhibition of photographs, after the SARG interfered to heavily censor content. The source of the funding was not raised, but this may have been an additional irritant to the SARG. 7. (C) INTERNALIZING THE REPRESSION: Because of the level of SARG suppression and surveillance, there is tremendous suspicion and paranoia among civil society activists about the independence of others in the movement. Activists fear being reported by colleagues to the security services, which can threaten imprisonment or closure of their organizations. These internalized fears also keep civil society weak and fractured. 8. (C) SECULARISTS VERSUS ISLAMIC GROUPS: Among civil society activists and NGO's, there are profound ideological cleavages, for example between Islamists and secularists. (There are other more arcane ideological disagreements, some factional in nature, for example, between different communists groups in Syria.) Much of the driving force behind the modern development of civil society in Syria has come from the left, with many former communists and a range of other leftists -- nearly all of them very secular -- channeling their energies away from a direct focus on politics and towards building civil society. The most glaring weakness in civil society on the left side of the equation is the lack of any significant grass roots support. (It is this recognition that drove many of the most perceptive leftists to guardedly embrace a re-tooled, moderate Muslim Brotherhood, over the past few years.) Because the SARG has long feared any secular alternatives to Ba'athism, it has generally demonstrated tremendous hostility to such groups. 9. (C) SARG SUPPORT FOR ISLAMIC GROUPS: To counterbalance these secular groups (and to counter the influence of Islamic fundamentalists, both the traditional Muslim Brothers and the upstart Wahabi/Salafists), the Alawite-dominated regime has provided funding and encouragement for moderate Islamic institutions, many of them civil society organizations. These Sunni organizations include Salah Kuftaro's Abu Noor Institute (founded by his deceased father, the former Grand Mufti of Syria) and MP Mohammed Habash's Islamic Studies Center. There are also civil society activists, either former Islamists, or those sympathetic to Islamist perspectives, like Haithem Maleh, one of the most important human rights activists in Syria. 10. (C) DAMASCUS DECLARATION A CEASE-FIRE DOCUMENT: Between the secularists and the Islamic activists, there are powerful suspicions, resentments, and differences about approaches, priorities, and future political and social objectives. In the middle are a key group of moderates -- those who brokered the Damascus Declaration in October -- who seek common cause so as to strengthen their efforts and ability to resist SARG repression. While the Declaration is a powerful bridging device, whose influence will continue to play itself out, many of the differences between these two groups remain, and will complicate any effort to forge a civil society consensus in the future. 11. (C) A DIVIDE OVER USG SUPPORT: A completely different, somewhat ragged, cleavage exists between those who endorse working with the U.S. and those who are suspicious of USG intentions and do not want to be associated with American policy or projects. For every XXXXXXXXXXXX or XXXXXXXXXXXX , who harbor some reservations about U.S. policies but are generally well disposed to the U.S., there are others who are more hostile and deeply skeptical about any benefits that could accrue to Syrian civil society (and to a better future in Syria) from cooperating with the U.S. Some of these, like XXXXXXXXXXXX, are much more pro-European. 12. (C) While some attribute the cold shoulder XXXXXXXXXXXX got from civil society and the opposition upon his return from the U.S. to the nationalist political climate that the regime stirred up in Syria post-UNSCR 1636, a lot of it resulted from this long-standing suspicion of U.S. intentions and skepticism about the benefits of cooperating with Washington. Some activists like MP XXXXXXXXXXXX assert that there is no problem in accepting USG help, but the U.S. needs to work with the SARG in a transparent way in any effort to assist civil society. Otherwise, such efforts will endanger civil society and will not work. 13. (C) RAGING JEALOUSIES; DYSFUNCTIONAL MANAGEMENT CULTURE: Certainly, XXXXXXXXXXXX also provoked intense jealousies among rivals struggling for influence. That reality, however, also highlights yet another divisive element in Syrian civil society. Leaders of these organizations tend to be one-man-bands, whose powerful egos dominate weak organizations, and they do not "play well with others." Many accused XXXXXXXXXXXX of opportunism in portraying himself -- they believe unfairly -- as a prime mover behind the Damascus Declaration. Few demonstrated any ability to look beyond that arguable proposition and recognize that XXXXXXXXXXXX's powerful articulation of their cause with senior USG officials, based to some degree on fortuitous circumstances, could be beneficial. Ethnic, sectarian, class, and family divides often exacerbate personal or organizational jealousies and make it more difficult to make common cause in Syria. An institutional culture that emphasizes leadership and initiative only at the top of an organization, rather than network-building and delegation, also contributes to this weakness. In addition, there is often an astonishing lack of networking or even familiarity among civil society leaders. At Embassy social gatherings, influential figures sometimes meet each other for the first time. 14. (C) PARTIES OF ONE: Many who are identified as active in civil society tend to be independent intellectuals like Michel Kilo or artists like film director Nabil Maleh, for example. They have no followers, in an organizational sense, just readers or viewers. (And they often clash in private and in print about their views.) 15. (C) CIVIL SOCIETY VERSUS THE OPPOSITION: Finally, there is a divide of sorts between civil society and the political opposition in Syria. Political activists like Hassan Abdul-Azim and Riyad Turk, who are leaders in a five-party opposition coalition (tolerated by the SARG), are directly involved in politics, while many civil society activists focus on more parochial activities. There are lots of overlaps, of course, with many activists wearing different hats, either political, intellectual, or operational, and banding together to sign each others' petitions, or to promote common action. Nonetheless, it is a mistake to lump together many of these people in any common USG approach to "civil society and the opposition," since they define their interests and perceive their roles in Syria very differently. 16. (C) Economic reformers are a distinct category, separate from other elements of civil society. Though there are subcategories, most share the common characteristic of having been educated in the West and have work experience in Europe or the US. All are advocates of some variety of a market-based economy and are uniformly critical of the pace and scope of economic reform in Syria. The most influential subset collaborates actively with the SARG in developing new economic policy, but they do so as private citizens. They believe that affecting economic change is best done from within the existing system, but keep a careful distance from a regime they view as corrupt. They fear public collaboration with the SARG would discredit them internally. They are even more wary of being perceived as too close to the West in general and the US in particular. This group would view attending any outside USG-sponsored activity or accepting any USG funds NGOs they are affiliated with as potentially seriously compromising their ability to advance reform. Advocates of economic reform who work outside of the system have a much lower profile and smaller base of support. This group would be most open to anything resulting from the mapping exercise but have far fewer levers to affect change. A final group of economic reformers have accepted formal positions within the SARG and have subsequently been compromised in the eyes of many Syrians. 17. (C) CONCLUSIONS: The ideological fissures, the personal jealousies, and SARG repression have all contributed to the divided, weak state in which Syrian civil society finds itself. An enhanced, sustained USG program of assistance to Syrian civil society would emphasize identifying groups or individuals who could benefit from ramped up funding for existing programs, as well as an aggressive, creative attempt to develop new USG programs, and identify promising NGO's and innovative strategies for delivering funding. 18. (C) There are already strong private interests in developing greater freedom for private-sector commercial concerns. Programs to promote emerging and SARG-tolerated entrepreneurial activity may be more successful than supporting well-meaning civil society voices crying in the desert. In addition to promoting a small publisher who doubles as a civil society proponent (like XXXXXXXXXXXX ), we might be able to identify a for-profit human resources development organization that could conduct training programs for civil society activists. Any kind of training for civil society actors, including English language training, brings people together on a regular basis and develops critical skills. Success will hinge on our ability to harness and influence individuals and groups with already existing concrete interests in a more open society and economy. 19. (C) Post would also like to see a more ambitious use of regional projects and training, where Syrian civil society players could interact with peers from neighboring Arab countries. Sending individual Syrians, or small groups made up of carefully screened, compatible individuals to the U,S., for IV-type programs is also an option, although anything more high-profile in the U.S. at this point might prove problematic. Embassy Damascus looks forward to the input and insights that Senior Advisor Denehy will provide as he begins his meetings with local activists. SECHE |