Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05DAMASCUS6325
2005-12-05 14:52:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Damascus
Cable title:  

A NERVOUS LULL IN DAMASCUS BEFORE THE NEXT MEHLIS

Tags:  PGOV PREL SY 
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VZCZCXYZ0007
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHDM #6325/01 3391452
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 051452Z DEC 05
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5930
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0518
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L DAMASCUS 006325 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PARIS FOR ZEYA; LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL SY
SUBJECT: A NERVOUS LULL IN DAMASCUS BEFORE THE NEXT MEHLIS
REPORT


Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Stephen A. Seche, per 1.4 b,d.

C O N F I D E N T I A L DAMASCUS 006325

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PARIS FOR ZEYA; LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL SY
SUBJECT: A NERVOUS LULL IN DAMASCUS BEFORE THE NEXT MEHLIS
REPORT


Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Stephen A. Seche, per 1.4 b,d.


1. (C) Summary and Comment: As five Syrian suspects arrive
in Vienna for questioning set to begin on December 5, Syrians
remain suspended in a nervous lull that ensued with President
Bashar al-Asad's strident but generally well-received speech
on November 10. With the perceived brinkmanship with UNIIIC
head Detlev Mehlis having yielded Vienna as a venue, rather
than Beirut, the success for the moment in shielding SMI
chief Asif Shawkat from questioning, the widely bruited
assurances from the Russians, and the (by Syrian standards)
near-spectacular unveiling of the recanting witness Husam
Husam, the Asad regime is perceived to have some momentum
going its way. The highly nationalistic, marginally
anti-American PR campaign centered in Damascus, emphasizing
the need to protect Syrian dignity and interests, has
reinforced public perceptions that the regime has at least
temporarily regained the initiative.


2. (C) Summary and Comment continued: This lull, like the
one that occurred in late September and early October, after
the perceived SARG success in the interrogations in Damascus
and before the issuance of Mehlis' hard-hitting report, is
likely to end suddenly in mid-December. Conversations with
contacts December 2-3 indicate that many Syrians believe the
regime has bought some time, possibly several months, with
its latest maneuvers. While the SARG is cooperating for the
moment, many key contacts continue to insist that Asad, if
required, will not -- some say "cannot" -- send Shawkat
abroad for interrogation. Even among the five currently
slated to be interrogated, the SARG is apparently concerned
about their loyalties and morale. Contacts remain curious
about USG intentions for Syria in the post-December 15
environment, questioning in particular if the U.S. wants to
see a Sunni-led regime replace Asad and his family. End
Summary.


3. (C) THE CURRENT LULL: The Syrians have "bought" three
to four months time, with their recent maneuverings, since
Mehlis will likely need an extension post-December 15,
according to Riyad Abrash. He described the level of Syrian

cooperation to date as "typical, begrudging, but effective."
They continue to play for time, in the hope that they can
outlast Bush's political influence, given his troubles in
Washington.


4. (C) CAN BASHAR DEAL WITH HIS SHAWKAT PROBLEM? Contacts
remain divided about whether Asad is strong enough to move
against SMI head Asif Shawkat. Abrash, All4Syria website
founder Ayman Abdul Noor, and former MP and businessman Ihsan
Sankar all insisted to PolChief in early December that the
President will refuse to send Shawkat abroad for questioning.
Abrash pointed to personal characteristics signifying
weakness to make his point, saying Bashar is hesitant, lacks
political acumen, and loves the superficial trappings of
power. He remains loyal to powerful people around him,
despite any personal reservations he harbors, but will not
protect those who are without powerful allies, if the
pressure against them become too great, said Abrash. (Note:
Abrash knows Asad from having briefed him periodically on his
semi-official trips to Washington. An economist, Abrash
harbors some bitterness that Asad in 2001 did not offer him a
promised Cabinet position, after opposition expressed by a
senior official in one of the security services, thought to
be Bahjat Sulayman.)


5. (C) Abdul Noor attributed the anticipated Asad refusal
to send Shawkat for questioning to regime adherence to its
real strategy, which is to opt for confrontation, although
for the moment it is going through the motions of
cooperating. Sankar viewed Asad's inability to turn Shawkat
over to Mehlis for questioning in Vienna as a function of
family politics, where Shawkat's wife and mother-in-law
(Asad's sister and mother) have pre-emptively attacked Bashar
and warned him that "he will be next" if he does not protect
Shawkat.


6. (C) THE OTHER WITNESSES: Regarding the other witnesses,
Sankar described Dafer Yusuf and Rustom Ghazaleh as
potentially dangerous to the regime, because of the regime
secrets they know about, and because their loyalty to the

SIPDIS
regime is now shaky. (According to Sankar, Yusuf does not
feel that the regime has showed him the respect he deserves.)
Abdul Noor made a similar point, noting that the regime was
concerned and had done everything possible to shore up the
confidence of the suspects that the regime would protect them
(and get them back to Syria after the interrogations). Both
Sankar and Abdul Noor said that the regime would "lose the
street and its support" if Mehlis offers persuasive proof of
Syrian complicity and the regime then refuses to cooperate.
Previous refrains asserting that Syria as a nation should not
be sacrificed for the (often corrupt) interests of a
half-dozen regime members are likely to be heard again, say
these contacts.


7. (C) A SUNNI REGIME IN THE FUTURE? Sankar and Abrash both
probed on the issue of whether the U.S. wanted to see a
Sunni-dominated regime eventually assume power. While Abrash
acknowledged that the USG had not made its intentions clear,
he speculated that the U.S. would like to see such a regime
in Syria, as a bulwark against ascendant Shiite influence in
Iraq. Abrash, like Sankar, from a prominent Damascene
family, also noted that U.S. allies in the region (generally
Sunni regimes) were also likely to be supportive. In the
past, western powers had generally supported regimes with
"contrasting tones" in Iraq and Syria, for example an Alawite
minority regime in Syria paired with a Sunni regime in Iraq,
explained Abrash. Without some kind of an external push,
however, there would be no regime change in Syria, said
Abrash, noting that the regime is in complete control.
Sankar mused about whether it was time for him to begin
reaching out to potentially disaffected, retired Alawite
chieftains like Ali Duba, Ali Zeyout, Mohammed Khouli, and
Ali Haydar, as well as to GID deputy chief Mohammed Nassif
(whom Sankar says now has a travel ban imposed on him.)


8. (C) On a separate issue, Sankar offered a refreshingly
supportive view on Kamal Labwani, saying that the views he
expressed publicly during his trip to the U.S. had been "very
good, very helpful" and echoed many of the things Sankar
himself has said publicly in the past. Sankar denied that
Syrians who knew of Labwani had turned against him. In fact,
many agreed with Labwani but were fearful to say anything
publicly. Labwani has a political future in Syria, not as a
solo actor, but as one of a group of nascent opposition
figures, said Sankar.



SECHE