ANTI-AMERICANISM IN SYRIA: ON THE RISE BUT NOT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 006066

SIPDIS

PARIS FOR ZEYA; LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL SY
SUBJECT: ANTI-AMERICANISM IN SYRIA: ON THE RISE BUT NOT
OUT OF CONTROL

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Stephen A. Seche, per 1.4 b,d.


1. (C) Summary: Since the mid-October release of the
Mehlis report, the SARG has developed a response strategy
that has included fanning existing anti-American sentiment in
Syria, already evident because of popular perceptions about
the war in Iraq and the global war on terror. Some elements
of the SARG response have been evident in the way the
official media has covered the Mehlis story, while others
have been transmitted via orchestrated protests, through
mosques, and via President Asad's November 10 speech. The
sense that Syria faces an unprecedented crisis and must have
national unity has allowed the SARG to silence its critics
and to make it difficult, for example, for Syrians to speak
up to defend detained dissident Kamal Labwani. The current
level of anti-American sentiment will make it more difficult
for the USG to get much traction with its public message of
support for democratization, human rights and civil society
in Syria. End Summary.


2. (C) BACKDROP TO ANTI-AMERICAN SENTIMENT: Anti-American
sentiment, and in particular, anti-USG sentiment, is not new
in Syria. It has been a constant on the political landscape
since the creation of the state of Israel and the rise of
pan-Arab nationalism in the 1950's. In both the ruling
Ba'ath Party and among the opposition parties of the National
Democratic Coalition, there remain ideological vestiges of
this anti-Americanism. Long-standing sympathy by Syrians for
the Palestinians, reinforced by the widespread perception of
unconditional U.S. support for Israel, has fed this
anti-American sentiment over the years.


3. (C) WAR IN IRAQ AND GWOT ALSO CONTRIBUTING: The war in
Iraq and the U.S.-led war on terrorism have more recently
caused a spike in anti-American sentiment in Syria. The
popular consensus among Syrians is that the U.S. has
unjustifiably occupied Iraq and brought instability, chaos,
and bloodshed, in order to implement a new regional order.
Syrians' fears of such chaos, including the potential
dismemberment of their own country, have also fed this
anti-American sentiment. In addition, many Syrians view the
war on terror as a U.S. crusade against Islam. According to
Dr. Asem Kubtan, an activist in the opposition Democratic
Arab Socialist Union Party, it is common for Syrians and
Arabs to talk about living "in the days of American
colonialism." The U.S.-led campaign to isolate Syria -- in
tandem with unilateral U.S. sanctions and repeated USG
statements threatening further sanctions -- has led to
increased Syrian nationalism and accentuated the sense that
the U.S. has unfairly targeted Syria, according to observers
like Nasri Khoury, SYG of the Syrian Lebanese Higher Council.



4. (C) MEHLIS INVESTIGATION CAUSING NEW SPIKE: Since the
release of the Mehlis report, the SARG has fanned such
sentiments, causing another spike in anti-American sentiment.
The SARG has actively played "the nationalist card,"
primarily to link the fate of the Asad regime with that of
the Syrian nation. By insisting in his November 10 speech,
for example, that he is standing up for Syria's national
dignity, sovereignty, and security by rejecting the demands
of Mehlis, Asad sought repeatedly to persuade Syrians that it
is the homeland that is targeted, and not the regime.
Positive reaction to the speech by ordinary Syrians, as well
as by many in the elites, indicates that Asad largely
succeeded in this objective. (Note: While he was careful
not to point directly to the U.S. very often in the speech,
this connection was understood by Syrians. SARG officials
and others made such links more directly afterwards.)


5. (C) SARG attacks on the credibility of Mehlis by
insisting he is a CIA stooge and in the service of the
Israelis have also fed anti-American sentiments. The Mehlis
investigation has been attacked as an exercise with a
pre-determined outcome, to justify the targeting of Syria and
the implementation of broader sanctions, regardless of the
actions the SARG takes.


6. (C) LACK OF SUPPORT FOR LABWANI ALSO INDICATIVE: The
sense that Syria faces an unprecedented crisis has allowed
the SARG to silence its critics and to make it almost
impossible for Syrians otherwise well-disposed to the U.S. to
speak up. After the arrest of dissident Kamal Labwani, only
a handful of human-rights activists directly involved in his
case dared to voice even limited support. Many in the
opposition, because of residual suspicions about American
intentions, felt betrayed by Labwani. Others were cowed by
the SARG-manufactured nationalist atmosphere and decided it
was more prudent to remain silent. Some friends of the U.S.
have told Polchief that the USG's failure to declare its
intentions clearly (i.e., to change the regime, surmise these
contacts) and the absence pre-Labwani of sustained public
support for democratization, human rights and a vibrant civil
society, have created suspicions that it is insincere about
these concerns and is merely using them to pressure the SARG
to make a deal on external issues.


7. (C) SARG TAKES IT FOOT OFF THE BRAKE: Observers like
liberal Islamic cleric and MP Mohammed Habash also note that
in the past, when there were vocal Syrian critics of the U.S.
on television or in other regional media, SARG officials
often quietly encouraged them to "tone it down," since Syria
needed good relations with the U.S. Now, such admonishments
are more rare, according to Habash, leading to a flood of
anti-American sentiment that is being communicated to Syrians
via local and regional media. Habash's point converges with
that of others who have often insisted privately that the
current regime, and in particular Asad, wanted good bilateral
relations, but has finally become convinced that the U.S.
wants regime change, so there is little to be lost in a
tactical shift to a more anti-American line.


8. (C) SPECIFIC INCIDENTS: Embassy personnel in the past
month have reported a few isolated incidents where Syrians
have uttered anti-American sentiments in a personal,
insulting manner, and there have been a few reports of
anti-American graffiti. At the protest tent erected in early
November one block from the Embassy, there are occasionally a
few signs with anti-American or "anti-Bush" sentiments
expressed, although most speakers have shied away from any
anti-American themes, harping instead on the need for Syrian
national unity. At a November 19 protest at the tent -- the
largest to date -- some 2,500 protesters, mostly university
students, shouted anti-American slogans, including (in
English) "Down, down, USA, we're not afraid of the CIA;" and
(in Arabic) "We don't want to see the U.S. Embassy anymore."


9. (C) In October, during the holy month of Ramadan, the
SARG orchestrated an anti-American campaign in the mosques,
where imams were provided with general anti-American themes
to emphasize, including accusations that the U.S. wanted to
dismember Syria and create chaos, like that in neighboring
Iraq. The campaign was kicked off in the important Ommayyad
Mosque in the Old City, according to contacts, and was
repeated for days afterwards, in mosques throughout the
country. In November, since the end of Ramadan, this
anti-American message used in the mosques has been heard less
frequently.


10. (C) RESTRAINTS ON ANTI-AMERICANISM: There are several
factors that have restrained the rise in anti-American
sentiment. Most observers point to the large population of
Syrians living in the U.S., many of them Amcits. Almost any
Syrian family has some relative living and prospering in the
U.S. Many Syrians dream of following these relatives to the
U.S. and view it as a land of opportunity and freedom,
leading many Syrians to distinguish between USG policies and
the American people. The unanimity of the UNSC vote on
Resolution 1636 has also tempered anti-American sentiment and
made it more difficult (but not impossible) for the SARG to
argue that Mehlis is a USG conspiracy.


11. (C) Finally, influential voices in the SARG that argue
that Syria needs good relations with the U.S. in the future,
and needs to avoid a major confrontation with the lone
superpower have also served to check its fanning of
anti-American sentiment. As a result, the government has
generally opted for coded language, turned off campaigns such
as that in the mosques before they got out of hand, and used
controlled doses of anti-American sentiment as a tool to
foment Syrian nationalist sentiment and to highlight the
common bond between the regime and the nation.
Long-standing, wide-spread Syrian antipathy for the regime
also serves as a limited natural brake on the SARG's effort
to use anti-American sentiment to provoke affection for the
Asad regime.

SECHE