Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05COLOMBO94
2005-01-12 14:27:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Colombo
Cable title:  

TFXO01: GOVERNMENT/LTTE RELIEF COORDINATION

Tags:  PTER PGOV AEMR EAID CE LTTE 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 000094 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SA/INS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/10/2015
TAGS: PTER PGOV AEMR EAID CE LTTE
SUBJECT: TFXO01: GOVERNMENT/LTTE RELIEF COORDINATION
REPORTEDLY GOOD, DESPITE BAD PRESS

REF: COLOMBO 0017 (NOTAL)

Classified By: DCM JAMES F. ENTWISTLE. REASON: 1.4 (B,D).

-------
SUMMARY
--------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 000094

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SA/INS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/10/2015
TAGS: PTER PGOV AEMR EAID CE LTTE
SUBJECT: TFXO01: GOVERNMENT/LTTE RELIEF COORDINATION
REPORTEDLY GOOD, DESPITE BAD PRESS

REF: COLOMBO 0017 (NOTAL)

Classified By: DCM JAMES F. ENTWISTLE. REASON: 1.4 (B,D).

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Coordination between Government and Liberation Tigers
of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) relief efforts on the ground,
especially in the east, remains adequate, according to UN and
foreign diplomatic sources, despite recent allegations and
counter-allegations in the local press of obstructionism
and/or mismanagement. Reports of uneven aid distribution
seem more likely to be attributable to Government
inefficiency and logistical constraints, or to deliberate
misinformation, than to a calculated effort to target relief
to a particular community. Tamil radio broadcasts on January
11 reported the LTTE had no objection to U.S. military
participation in relief work in Sri Lanka. The Embassy has
been unable to verify speculation in the local press that the
December 26 tsunami killed Tiger leader Prabhakaran. End
summary.

--------------
MUDSLINGING, BICKERING FOLLOWS
POST-TSUNAMI GOODWILL
--------------


2. (U) The devastation of the December 26 tsunami evoked
rare expressions of camaraderie and communal harmony in a
country torn by 21 years of ethnic insurgency. In a public
address on December 28 Chandrika Kumaratunga underscored the
need for all ethnic groups to work together, saying, "We must
all stand together. It is not possible for any one community
alone to rebuild this country." Not to be outdone,
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) chief Prabhakaran
sounded a similarly high-minded note when he was quoted on
the LTTE Peace Secretariat website the following day offering
condolences to "our Muslim and Sinhala brethren in the
Sinhala coastal areas . . . who have lost kith and kin and
are in deep sorrow." A January 2 interview on the pro-LTTE
website TamilNet with Bhanu, the LTTE Eastern military
commander, carried unconfirmed reports of Sri Lanka Army
soldiers who had been dragged into the sea by the tidal wave
being saved by LTTE cadres, as well as uncharacteristic words

of praise for Special Task Force (STF) aid to civilians and
coordination with the LTTE.


3. (SBU) These initial calls for amity seem to be wearing
thin, as more customary accusations and counter-allegations
of malfeasance are beginning to surface more frequently in
the local press. By the second week after the disaster,
local English and Sinhala media were carrying largely
unconfirmed stories of LTTE interference in relief efforts in
the north and east, while the Tamil media were alleging
Government mishandling/rerouting of relief supplies intended
for Tamil communities in the north and east. Pro-LTTE
sources have also claimed that the Marxist Sinhalese Janatha
Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP),the Government's largest coalition
partner, has commandeered supplies for Tamil communities and
redirected them to Sinhalese communities in the south and
Trincomalee. Representatives of Muslim communities in the
east, on the other hand, have complained to emboffs of spotty
and unreliable aid distribution in their constituencies. As
usual, the truth behind these much-hyped stories is difficult
to determine. In response, the Human Rights Commission has
appointed a panel, headed by Ceylon Bank Director Lionel
Fernando, to monitor distribution of relief in the north and
east.

--------------
COORDINATION IN EAST SEEMS ALIVE AND WELL
--------------

4. (C) Despite the grousing in the media, contacts in the
INGO and diplomatic community indicate that coordination
between the Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) and the LTTE, at
least in the east, is adequate, although some jockeying for
authority/credit/responsibility still occurs. In Trincomalee
(where the Sinhalese, Muslim and Tamil populations are
roughly equal),for example, the pro-LTTE Tamil
Rehabilitation Organization (TRO) and the Tamil National
Alliance (TNA) participate side by side with the JVP in the
GSL-appointed district coordinating committee, which is
headed by the Government Agent. According to USAID/OTI staff
in the district, the coordinating committee appears to be
working well, and assistance is reportedly flowing well, even
into LTTE-controlled areas. (Indeed, since much of the
LTTE-controlled area in Trincomalee lies along the coast,
Tiger territory is reportedly getting a substantial amount of
the aid available.) While there have been no significant
complaints of GSL or LTTE malfeasance or obstructionism at
the district level, there have been some reports of
bottlenecks in distributing aid to individual
communities--snafus that seem more likely attributed to
systemic GSL inefficiencies and logistical constraints than
to any intentional design to bypass particular groups.
(Note: One exception appears to be the Sinhalese nationalist
JVP. An aid worker in Trincomalee recounted stories of the
JVP diverting aid intended for Tamil communities, which are
concentrated along the coast, to Sinhalese Buddhist
communities farther inland. End note.) The World Food
Program representative reported attending a recent meeting in
Batticaloa in which he observed the Government Agent and an
LTTE representative working out the details of delivering and
distributing aid in Tiger-controlled areas. Diplomatic
colleagues in several European missions reported similar
stories.


5. (C) In an effort to reduce pilferage and improve
security, control of camps for people displaced by the
tsunami was recently turned over to the Sri Lankan

SIPDIS
military--a move that routed the TRO from its secure position
within camps in the east and ruffled LTTE feathers. The TRO,
local government officials and other NGOs had been working
together well in the camps, an INGO representative declared.
Another source in the aid community reported that the LTTE
had been carrying on active recruiting in the camps, which
house a number of orphaned children who could be particularly
vulnerable to such pressure. While the TRO has not been
banned from the camps, Major General Sumit Balasuriya, the
Sri Lanka Army General Officer Commanding in Trincomalee, has
set new ground rules for TRO operation, e.g., the
organization may not show pro-LTTE films, distribute
propaganda or spend the night in the camps.

--------------
SOME COOPERATION AT CENTER;
SITUATION IN NORTH STILL HAZY
--------------


6. (C) The extent of destruction and the number of
casualties in LTTE-controlled areas in the north remain
difficult to assess. Accounts on the LTTE website likely
underreport the degree of destruction and numbers of deaths
among Tiger cadres. In the tsunami-affected northern
districts of Mullaitivu and Kilinochchi, where the LTTE
wields complete control, the opportunities for interaction
and coordination between the GSL and Tigers are minimal.
Wallaya Pura, UNHCR Representative, a.i., said her
organization has asked the Sri Lankan Air Force to allow an
aircraft provided by a foreign donor to fly relief supplies
into LTTE-controlled territory in the north. So far, Pura
said, the GSL has not responded. (Note: The Director of
Operations for the Air Force told DATT on January 12 that he
was not aware of such a request. End note.) A positive
reply would be a true litmus test of the GSL's
much-reiterated willingness to cooperate, in Pura's view.

7. (C) The LTTE's monolithic authority, if nothing else,
streamlines relief operations. According to UNDP Resident
Representative Miguel Bermeo, LTTE-run relief efforts are
more efficient than their GSL-run counterparts. However
efficient these operations may be, that the LTTE has made
overtures to the GSL to improve coordination at the central
level, as President Chandrika Kumaratunga told the Ambassador
in a January 6 conversation, suggests that the task of
reconstruction is too great for the LTTE to handle alone. On
January 12 Peace Secretariat head Jayantha Dhanapala told the
Ambassador and DCM that the government began reaching out to
the LTTE immediately after the disaster. Dhanapala said that
he had participated in several working-level meetings with
the LTTE on relief coordination, which he described as
progressing well, on such subjects as rehabilitation of the
coastal area.


8. (C) Amid much speculation in the local media that the
LTTE would protest U.S. military participation in relief
efforts, a Tamil-language radio broadcast on January 11
reported Tiger sources asserting that the LTTE has no
objection to U.S. forces' presence in Sri Lanka for relief
purposes. In an interview with AFP on January 11, Tiger
political chief Thamilchelvan expressed similar sentiments,
stating that U.S. military participation is "understandable
in a situation of human disaster." (These statements track
closely with Reftel comments made by the LTTE Peace
Secretariat head last week.) Local Sinhala media have also

SIPDIS
recently begun speculating that LTTE chief Prabhakaran might
have been killed when the tidal wave hit Mullaitivu. (Note:
Prabhakaran is habitually reclusive; his absence from the
public scene over the past two weeks does not necessarily
indicate death or injury. On the other hand, Sri Lankan
military sources have told DATT that Prabhakaran was known to
have been in Mullaitivu, which suffered extensive damage from
the tsunami, on December 25. End note.)

--------------
ANNAN ASKED NOT TO GO NORTH?
--------------


9. (C) The January 7-8 visit of UN Secretary General Kofi
Annan spurred a minor brouhaha after the GSL turned down a UN
suggestion that he visit Tiger "headquarters" to review
relief efforts in the north. President Kumaratunga indicated
to the Ambassador on January 6 that the GSL, worried that the
visit would give the Tigers legitimacy as a quasi-separate
state, was working actively to discourage the request. Peace
Secretariat head Dhanapala told the Ambassador and DCM on

SIPDIS
January 12 that a UNSYG visit to LTTE territory was a
fundamental sovereignty issue on which the GSL would not
waver. He was quite critical of UN efforts to make it
happen. Publicly, however, the GSL has denied reports that
it scotched the request, asserting instead that the UN
decided on Annan's itinerary independently. UNDP's Bermeo
told emboffs privately that he viewed the GSL's rejection as
a "lost opportunity."

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


10. (C) The unprecedented magnitude of the natural
catastrophe elicited unprecedented expressions of mutual good
will and pledges of cooperation from the GSL and LTTE. Now
that the initial shock is over, a sense of normalcy is slowly
returning--and with it, unfortunately, the usual bickering,
accusations and recriminations that characterize Sri Lankan
political discourse. For the Tigers, accusing the GSL of
mismanagement makes financial, as well as political, sense.
The humanitarian disaster--and the (unproven) claim that the
GSL is not providing for Tamils--will likely prove a better
fundraising theme among the Tamil diaspora than the peace
process, and the Tigers have every reason to continue harping
on it. Behind the rhetoric, however, coordination appears
largely to be working well at the local level. This--along
with the LTTE/GSL quiet effort to improve communication at
the central level--indicate that the Tigers may have been
harder hit by the tsunami than they are willing to admit
publicly. Before the disaster, the peace process had been
stalled for so long and the parties had adopted such
uncompromising positions that many observers were beginning
to look for signs of rigor mortis. If nothing else, the
tsunami, despite its dreadful human toll, could provide a

SIPDIS
face-saving pretext for a fresh start back to the peace
table, but it will not happen anytime soon. The modest yet
successful collaboration reported between the GSL and LTTE at
the local level, if steadily continued, could offer a useful
foothold from which to make the first step.

LUNSTEAD