Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05COLOMBO844
2005-05-05 12:21:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Colombo
Cable title:  

COLOMBO CO-CHAIR REPS MULL OVER ISSUING STATEMENT

Tags:  PREL PTER EAID PGOV CE NO LTTE 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000844 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/05/2015
TAGS: PREL PTER EAID PGOV CE NO LTTE
SUBJECT: COLOMBO CO-CHAIR REPS MULL OVER ISSUING STATEMENT
IN SUPPORT OF JOINT RELIEF MECHANISM

REF: (A) COLOMBO 834 (B) COLOMBO 741 (C) 04 COLOMBO

1997

Classified By: Charge' d'Affaires, a.i. James F. Entwistle
for reason 1.4 (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000844

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/05/2015
TAGS: PREL PTER EAID PGOV CE NO LTTE
SUBJECT: COLOMBO CO-CHAIR REPS MULL OVER ISSUING STATEMENT
IN SUPPORT OF JOINT RELIEF MECHANISM

REF: (A) COLOMBO 834 (B) COLOMBO 741 (C) 04 COLOMBO

1997

Classified By: Charge' d'Affaires, a.i. James F. Entwistle
for reason 1.4 (d).


1. (C) Summary. After May 5 discussion of
whether to issue a statement in support of the
joint mechanism for tsunami relief in the North
and East, Colombo co-chair representatives agreed
that such a statement would be most useful after
the joint mechanism is agreed upon (assuming that
happens within the next week). All agreed that
the potential pitfalls of issuing a statement
before the deal is done outweighed the potential
benefits. Charge' said it was imperative that
nothing be done that would inadvertently weaken
the President's apparent determination to move
ahead on the mechanism. Charge' agreed to prepare
and circulate a draft "after signing" statement to
the other co-chair representatives over the next
few days. In separate conversations, GSL peace
secretariat head Dhanapala told Charge' a co-chair

SIPDIS
statement now would be extremely unhelpful.
Presidential spokesman Peiris said a statement
might be useful but the timing and wording would
be crucial. CBK appears determined to move ahead
on the joint mechanism. End Summary

Better to Wait
--------------


2. (C) Colombo representatives of the Tokyo co-
chairs (Japanese Ambassador Suda, Norwegian
Ambassador Brattskar, Dutch Ambassador Blankhart,
EU Charge' Wilton and Charge') met at Ambassador
Suda's residence May 5 to discuss whether to issue
a co-chairs' statement commending President
Kumaratunga's (CBK) recent public statements in
support of concluding with the Liberation Tigers
of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and with the Muslim
community a joint mechanism on tsunami relief in
the North and East. (In discussion with Norwegian
envoy Eric Solheim April 19, co-chair reps had
agreed to consider at a later date whether to
issue a co-chair statement on the joint
mechanism.) Suda opened by noting that he had
previously been in favor of a co-chair statement

as soon as possible to support CBK's strong public
statements and apparent determination to move
ahead on the joint mechanism, come what may.
After discussions with CBK confidants that made
clear that CBK will be in delicate discussions
between now and early next week, Suda said he had
changed his view and now felt it best to wait to
put out a supportive, laudatory co-chair statement
after the joint mechanism is a done deal.


3. (C) Charge' concurred with Suda, noting that
it was crucial that nothing, however well-
intentioned, be said or done by the co-chairs that
might give ammunition to the argument that the
joint mechanism is being imposed by donors rather
an indigenous Sri Lankan effort. After additional
discussion, all present agreed that the co-chairs
should work to have a "post signing" statement
ready to go the moment that CBK and the LTTE
closed the joint mechanism deal. Charge' agreed
to prepare and circulate a draft to other Colombo
co-chair reps in the next few days. Blankhart
cautioned that if, a week from now, it looks like
the joint mechanism will not be concluded before
the May 17-18 Kandy Development Forum, then
perhaps the co-chairs should reconsider the issue
of statement timing. The other co-chair
representatives agreed.


4. (C) Brattskar advised the other co-chair reps
that, once CBK is on board, he will seek to have a
joint signing ceremony or will travel back and
forth between Colombo and Kilinochchi in order to
have a "same day" signing. The Norwegian said he
is "quite certain" that the LTTE remains firm in
its willingness to sign on to the joint mechanism
once CBK is ready, although the Tigers will not so
signal in advance for fear of having the rug
pulled out from under them.

Views of Two CBK Confidants: No/Maybe
--------------


5. (C) Earlier on May 5, Charge' held separate
conversations with GSL Peace Secretariat chief
Jayantha Dhanapala and President spokesman Harim
Peiris to gauge their views on whether a co-chairs
statement on the joint mechanism before both sides
agreed to the mechanism would be helpful or
harmful to CBK's efforts. Dhanapala
was adamant that a statement would be very
counterproductive at this point in the process.
He feared it would sustain the (erroneous) public
and editorial page view that the joint mechanism
is something being imposed by donors rather than
the result of negotiations between Sri Lankans.
"The President has had some success in rebutting
that view. We can't undercut her now," Dhanapala
said. He also commented that CBK held lengthy
discussions with Muslim politicians Ferial Ashraff
and Rauff Hakeem May 4 and will go behind
closed doors with coalition partner Janatha
Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) on the mechanism May 6.
Dhanapala said he was optimistic that CBK, as
illustrated by the personal capital and energy she
is devoting to selling the joint mechanism, will
sign the mechanism but "things are very delicate
right now."


6. (C) Peiris took a slightly different view in
Charge's discussion with him. He said a co-
chairs' statement now would be "fine in principle,
maybe even advantageous for the President." Such
a co-chairs' statement might also provide a "safety
net" for "reluctant stakeholders" like the Muslims
and some in the political opposition, Peiris
commented. But, Peiris stressed, the timing and
the exact wording of such a statement would be
crucial. On the wording, Peiris said that, in his
view, any co-chairs statement should avoid any
implied or explicit reference to a link between
agreement on the mechanism and future development
or tsunami aid. "That would cement the view that
we are kowtowing to foreigners in exchange for
money." In the same vein, Peiris opined, there
should be no reference to the upcoming Development
Forum in Kandy in a "pre-signing" statement.


7. (C) On timing, Peiris said he hoped no co-
chair statement would appear before early next
week. This would give CBK time to continue her
rounds of quiet consultations. Moreover, not
coming out with a statement until early next week
would avoid having the Sunday editorial pages
"rant about more foreign interference, which would
be very unhelpful to our efforts," Peiris
concluded. (Peiris called Charge' back later on
May 5 to advise that CBK would be holding a joint
mechanism "strategy session" over the weekend at
which he would raise with CBK the utility of a co-
chair statement. He noted that after the first
conversation with the Charge' he had bounced the
idea of a co-chair statement off of several other
CBK insiders. All agreed a statement "on day two
after the mechanism is signed on day one" would be
extremely useful; opinions varied on whether a
statement beforehand would be helpful.)


8. (C) Turning to the JVP, Peiris confided that a
"mole" privy to the inner discussions of the party
had told him that the JVP strategy, in the event
CBK goes ahead with the joint mechanism, will be
to "oppose us on the street" but not to leave the
coalition. Peiris said CBK's view is that she can
withstand anything the JVP has to do to maintain
its domestic political base short of a collapse of
the coalition. "We can ride it out," Peiris
concluded. He also commented that a co-chairs'
statement might also help with the JVP, although
the leftist party would never admit to being
"influenced by foreigners." In Peiris' view, the
JVP in fact does care about international opinion
and does not want to be perceived as a "pariah."
He attributed much of this JVP sensitivity to the
joint U.S./EU/Japan statement in December 2004
(Ref C) which had condemned the party for its role
in stirring up public sentiments against the
Norwegian facilitators. "That made an impact on
them."


9. (C) Comment. We earlier had indications that
Japan and the EU strongly favored a joint
statement and we had been prepared to argue
against the idea. Fortunately, that wasn't
necessary. It appears that CBK is in for a long
weekend of consultation and negotiation (there is
a rumor she may call in the co-chairs as part of
that; we just received a diplomatic note asking
Charge' to come in the evening of May 9 for a
"briefing" on the joint mechanism by CBK). All
indications remain, however, that she is
determined to move forward on the joint mechanism.
End Comment
ENTWISTLE