NORWEGIAN FACILITATOR SOLHEIM THINKS JOINT RELIEF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 000741

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/20/2015
TAGS: PREL PTER EAID PGOV CE NO LTTE
SUBJECT: NORWEGIAN FACILITATOR SOLHEIM THINKS JOINT RELIEF
MECHANISM IS IMMINENT, SEEKS LATE MAY CO-CHAIRS MEETING


Classified By: AMBASSADOR JEFFREY J. LUNSTEAD FOR REASON 1.4 (D).


1. (C) Summary. Solheim is optimistic that a joint
GSL/LTTE/Muslim mechanism for tsunami relief in the north
and east will be signed soon but quite emphatic that,
absent the mechanism, there will be no progress on peace
for a long time. How the mechanism, if signed, would play
out on the ground and how it would be linked to the mid-May
Development Forum in Kandy remain vague. Colombo co-chairs
representatives agreed a mechanism signing should be
followed by a supportive co-chair statement. Solheim and
A/S Rocca agreed to pursue the possibility of a late
May/early June co-chairs meeting in Washington. End
Summary


2. (C) Norwegian peace facilitator Eric Solheim reviewed
the status of his efforts with Colombo co-chair
representatives (DCM represented the U.S.) over dinner at
Norwegian Ambassador Brattskar's residence April 19.
Solheim and Brattskar also met with visiting A/S for South
Asian Affairs Christina Rocca April 20. Key points from
the two meetings follow.

Making the Rounds
--------------


3. (C) Solheim met with the GSL Peace Secretariat, FM
Kadirgamar, PM Rajapakse, Opposition leader Wickremesinghe,
Muslim leaders Rauff Hakeem and Ferial Ashraff, as well as
senior police and military leaders. He will not meet with
President Kumaratunga since she has postponed her return to
Sri Lanka until April 26 or 27. On the LTTE side, Solheim
and Brattskar met political chief Thamilchelvan at Colombo
airport April 20 upon his return from the LTTE jaunt to
Europe and South Africa. They also met LTTE officials in
the east, including eastern military commander Bhanu,
during an April 19 trip to the Batticaloa area. Solheim
did not go to Kilinocchi this time.

Agreement on Interim Mechanism Imminent (Maybe)
-------------- --


4. (C) Solheim said the GSL and the LTTE are very close to
agreement on a joint tsunami relief mechanism. The
remaining stumbling block is the "off shore provision" and
even on that the "differences are very small." "It will be
unbelievable if they don't agree," Solheim concluded.
Solheim confirmed press reports, however, that the GSL
almost certainly will not agree to a signing until after
May 1 to avoid giving their JVP coalition "partner" a
football to kick around during May Day celebrations.
Solheim said he had noted with interest that Foreign
Minister Kadirgamar had been more "mechanism friendly" of
late.


5. (C) (Note: In a separate April 19 discussion with A/S
Rocca and the Ambassador, GSL Peace Secretariat head
Jayantha Dhanapala confided that a mutually satisfactory,
feasible agreement on the joint mechanism had been reached
at the working level. It is now up to President
Kumaratunga to make "the political decision" to sell it to
others--including her coalition partner. He indicated that
he was not entirely sure that she had made that decision
yet, but suggested that the President's political savvy
will likely guide her in the right direction. A joint
mechanism is not needed to facilitate relief efforts at the
working level, Dhanapala said; the GSL and LTTE are already
cooperating at the local level. The real value of the
joint mechanism would be political. The two sides have
"painted ourselves into corners," he acknowledged; the
joint mechanism provides a fresh opportunity, outside the
boundaries of the politically-charged ISGA controversy, for
dialogue and confidence building. The LTTE wants the joint
mechanism for two reasons, Dhanapala said: money (e.g.,
increased access to aid) and legitimacy. End Note)


6. (C) On the LTTE side, Solheim said he and assistant
Lisa Golden (also present at both Colombo meetings) had
presented Thamilchelvan with some new ideas on the
mechanism in a Dublin meeting (after his return to Europe
from South Africa) last week. Solheim and Brattskar
reinforced this effort in their April 20 "very brief"
airport chat with Thamilchelvan. Moreover, Norwegian FM
Peterson had called both Thamilchelvan and London-based
LTTE luminary Balasingham April 18 to urge that the LTTE
not drag its heels on the mechanism. Solheim said he was
confident that, as a result of these Norwegian efforts,
both Balasingham and Thamilchelvan would push LTTE leader
Prabhakaran to sign. "We hope to have further news from
the LTTE in a few days," Solheim commented.


7. (C) Solheim reiterated that there is agreement on
almost all of the "slightly less than eight page"
document. Solheim noted (and co-chairs representatives,
especially Dutch ambassador Blankhart, agreed) that
ideally the mechanism should ideally be signed well
before the May 16-17 Development Forum in Kandy.
Brattskar joked that he would make sure it was
signed on May 2. Solheim said the implications
of the LTTE signing the mechanism were very
significant since it would be the first time the
group had "committed to something at the national
level" and they would be conceding that "the center
must be worked with." Brattskar emphasized that
the mechanism would be positive for Muslims, since
they would participate as a separate entity rather
than being represented by the GSL as was the
case in the peace talks.


8. (C) Solheim and the co-chair representatives then had
a detailed exchange on exactly how a signed mechanism would
be implemented and what it would mean on the ground.
Solheim said the mechanism was needed if there is to be any
tsunami relief in the north and east. Japanese Ambassador

SIPDIS
Suda demurred sharply, commenting that extensive relief is
already being carried out. While the mechanism would help
on that front, Suda stated, the Japanese view is that the
main value of a signed joint mechanism would be as a way to
maintain some semblance of an ongoing peace process.
Solheim said he didn't disagree with the Japanese view but
that the mechanism would help on the tsunami front,
especially during the transition into reconstruction. In
particular it would make life easier for GSL officials in
the North and East, who are appointed by the GSL but in
fact must clear everything they do with local LTTE
representatives. "This will give them cover," Solheim
said.

Next Steps/Co-Chair Statement on Joint Mechanism
-------------- ---


9. (C) DCM asked what the first steps in the field would
be when/if the mechanism is signed. Solheim said "joint
bodies" would have to be set up (GSL, LTTE, Muslims) at the
local level with a central policy organ in Colombo. Solheim
said the LTTE was "smart enough" not to appoint "hard
liners" or military figures to these bodies and might
appoint Tamils who were not LTTE members. According to the
terms of the mechanism, "international observers" would be
present at every level to make sure the mechanism was
working, although Solheim admitted that details on the
international observer issue (and many other provisions)
were purposely left vague to increase the chances of
agreement. Blankhart opined that perhaps the co-chairs
should take the lead on the "international observer"
question. Others said it should be a broader donor effort.
No conclusions were reached. Co-chair representatives
agreed that there probably should be either a joint co-
chair statement or individual statements from co-chairs
once the mechanism is signed. Any statement(s) should
congratulate both sides but also lay down a marker that
implementation would be followed closely.

Donor Forum
--------------


10. (C) Co-chair conversation then turned to the
relationship between the joint mechanism process and the
mid-May Donor Forum in Kandy, with it quickly becoming
clear that questions outnumbered answers. Assuming the
mechanism is signed beforehand, should the GSL officially
present it at the forum? Should the other two mechanism
partners (LTTE and Muslims) be present at the Kandy event?
If not, should there be a separate meeting with them before
or after the forum? Co-chairs agreed that further
discussion on these issues was necessary. DCM noted that
the U.S. would have to carefully examine potential
participation in any meetings that might include the LTTE,
in either the context of the development forum or
implementation of the joint mechanism.

Beyond the Mechanism
--------------


11. (C) Asked for his perspective on the broader peace
process, beyond the immediate effort to get both sides to
ink the joint mechanism, Solheim said he was pessimistic.
"There is no chance of a return to the table unless there
is a change in government, either as the result of an
election or as the result of President Kumaratunga feeling
stronger in her political position," the Norwegian stated.
Therefore, he continued, the focus must be on "securing the
peace process" until this happens. "It is important that
the peace boat keeps floating." Brattskar observed that,
absent the joint mechanism or other significant
developments, it will be very difficult to keep the peace
process "limping along" under the end of the President's
tenure at the end of 2006. A/S Rocca, the Ambassador and
Solheim all agreed that if President Kumaratunga were to
announce a bold initiative to move the peace process
forward, most of the Sinhalese polity would follow her.
But, beyond periodic speeches, she seems uninterested in or
oblivious to the need to do so.


12. (C) Solheim told A/S Rocca and the co-chair
representatives that he was trying to implement a "track
two" of "significant personalities" from both sides that
would meet periodically to discuss broader issues, a "talk
fest" that would at least keep some sort of discussion
going while the leadership on both sides "wandered back" to
the table. FM Kadirgamar and LTTE political chief
Thamilchelvan both are enthusiastic. Solheim asked that
this possible initiative be kept strictly confidential for
the moment.


13. (C) Solheim said it is essential that both sides
avoid provocative acts that would lead to retaliation and a
cycle of violence. He had told the LTTE that killings must
stop. He also planned to tell the GSL that support for the
Karuna faction also must stop. Solheim said the recent
"discovery" of a Karuna camp near a GSL army camp left "no
doubt" that such support was taking place (in obvious
contradiction of President Kumaratunga's repeated
assurances to him on previous visits that such support had
not and would not occur). Brattskar commented that some in
the Peace Secretariat were taking the "lawyerly" position
that such support to Karuna did not violate the cease-fire
agreement, completely missing the broader political and
peace process implications of such support.


14. (C) On the brighter side, Solheim said it is clear
that neither the GSL nor the LTTE wants to return to the
battlefield. He noted that there have been plenty of
"excuses for fighting," like the recent LTTE firing on a
GSL naval vessel but it is encouraging that both sides are
bending over backwards to prevent such incidents from
setting off "something much bigger."

Co-Chairs Meeting
--------------


15. (C) During dinner with Solheim, Colombo co-chairs
representatives agreed that a "capitals" co-chair meeting
would be useful not too long after the mid-May Development
Forum (assuming that the joint mechanism is signed) and
that this should be passed back to capitals. Suda said he
would discuss this with Japanese envoy Akashi (who,
according to Suda, might visit Sri Lanka in the first half
of May but would not stay for the Development Forum).
Solheim said he thought it might be useful for the next co-
chairs meeting to be in Washington and that this idea was
behind FM Peterson's recent discussions with the Deputy
Secretary in Oslo and recent efforts by the Norwegian

SIPDIS
ambassador in Washington to seek a meeting with
UnderSecretary Burns.


16. (C) Following up on co-chairs meeting scenarios April
20, Solheim and A/S Rocca agreed to pursue a late May/early
June meeting in Washington. Both agreed that a co-chairs
meeting in that timeframe would send a useful message in
the wake of a joint mechanism signing (or be an opportunity
for essential coordination on the future of the peace
process if the mechanism is not signed). A/S Rocca
undertook to look at dates and then get in touch with the
other co-chairs once she was back in Washington early next
week.

Comment
--------------


17. (C) There seem to be grounds for cautious optimism
that the joint tsunami relief mechanism for the north and
the east will be signed in early May. The primary benefit
would be to the ailing peace process rather than a marked
improvement in tsunami coordination. Solheim and Brattskar
are quite eloquent, however, that if the parties do not
find the political courage to sign, it will make progress
on the peace process even less likely than it is now and
that the co-chairs need to be thinking about that scenario.
End Comment


18. (U) A/S Rocca cleared this cable.
LUNSTEAD