Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05COLOMBO679
2005-04-07 04:43:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Colombo
Cable title:  

GWOT ASSESSMENT: SRI LANKA AND MALDIVES

Tags:  PTER PGOV KJUS KISL MARR ASEC CE MV LTTE 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000679 

SIPDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/2015
TAGS: PTER PGOV KJUS KISL MARR ASEC CE MV LTTE
SUBJECT: GWOT ASSESSMENT: SRI LANKA AND MALDIVES

REF: STATE 60710

Classified By: AMBASSADOR JEFFREY J. LUNSTEAD FOR REASON 1.4 (D).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000679

SIPDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/2015
TAGS: PTER PGOV KJUS KISL MARR ASEC CE MV LTTE
SUBJECT: GWOT ASSESSMENT: SRI LANKA AND MALDIVES

REF: STATE 60710

Classified By: AMBASSADOR JEFFREY J. LUNSTEAD FOR REASON 1.4 (D).


1. (S) We appreciate the opportunity to review the status
of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) in our two countries.
In both countries we experience good counter-terrorism
cooperation but could accomplish a great deal more with a
relatively modest increase in resources.

Sri Lanka
--------------


2. (S) Sri Lanka cooperates well with the U.S. in the
GWOT. In general, Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) officials
are responsive to requests related to the GWOT and seek to
be as helpful as possible. We know that "bad guys" of GWOT
concern have transited Colombo in recent years and the Sri
Lankans have tried to cooperate on such issues. To
buttress their ability to do so, we continue to push
TIP/PISCES on the immigration front as well as the
Container Security Initiative (CSI),Megaports and other
relevant programs of counter-terrorism cooperation. We
enjoy superb cooperation with the GSL in areas like alien
smuggling and visa/passport fraud, all of which have the
potential to reap counter-terrorism benefits. We hope to
soon have expanded consular staffing that would enable us
to participate more fully in airport interdiction efforts
with our diplomatic colleagues, which would add greatly to
our alien smuggling, trafficking in persons and, quite
possibly, counter-terrorism efforts.


3. (S) It is important to note that counter-terrorism
cooperation with the GSL is a two-way street, with Sri
Lanka sharing important lessons learned from its own
indigenous experience with terrorism (more on that below).
For example, the Sri Lankan military has shared with us,
and conducted training of U.S. military forces drawing
from, the lessons they have learned regarding improvised
explosive devices (IEDs) from their years of facing the
U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organization Liberation

Tamils of Tiger Eelam (LTTE),the world masters in IED
technology. American lives in Iraq and Afghanistan are
being saved as a result. We could learn much more from the
Sri Lankan experience with the LTTE. For example, while
the US Navy continues to construct force protection
paradigms for suicide attackers using only one lesson
learned - the bombing of the USS Cole, the Sri Lanka Navy
has endured twenty-three suicide boat attacks since 1990,
each more sophisticated than the zodiac attack on the USS
Cole, and has successfully defeated several attempts. The
US Navy should work more closely with the Sri Lanka Navy to
exchange information and anti-terrorism techniques because
it could help save more American lives.


4. (S) While the LTTE has been and, for the foreseeable
future, will remain on the State Department's list of
foreign terrorist organizations (FTO),it is not listed on
PACOM's priority terrorist organization list. Therefore,
PACOM resources, funding, and manpower dedicated to anti-
and counter-terrorism for Sri Lanka are at minimum levels
in spite of the disturbing facts surrounding the LTTE. For
example, the LTTE maintains a fleet of at least ten
seagoing cargo vessels that traffic the waters in South and
Southeast Asia, carrying weapons, ammunition, explosives
and other terrorism related equipment that is bought and
sold on the gray and black weapons markets. Probable LTTE
ports and many of the LTTE vessels are known to the US
Intelligence community. The U.S. Pacific Command and the
Armed Forces of Sri Lanka are in the process of signing an
intelligence sharing agreement related to the GWOT that
will increase the knowledge base on both sides, but Sri
Lankan officials have already begun to realize that it is
extremely unlikely that that the US would, for example, use
exact positional data of LTTE vessels and/or cadre outside
of Sri Lanka obtained under the agreement to undertake
operations against the LTTE.


5. (S/NF) Although the cease-fire has held for several
years with no return to battlefield combat, LTTE terrorism
continues to be a daily fact of life for Sri Lankans. LTTE
opponents in the Tamil community as well as suspected
police and/or military informers continue to be
assassinated. High-level opponents have been targeted for
suicide bombing (a detained bomber detonated herself in a
police station across from the chancery last July). The
numbers of terrorist attacks are down from the war years,
but evidence of continued LTTE recruitment and training
leaves little doubt that the Tigers remain fully capably of
mounting such attacks. Moreover, the LTTE has used the
cease-fire to move cadres into Colombo, thereby increasing
the likelihood of renewed terrorist attacks if the cease-
fire fails or the peace negotiations falter. Finally, the
LTTE is the only terrorist organization in the world to
have a hard-surface runway, its own aircraft and trained
pilots. The air and air defense wing of the LTTE possesses
MANPADs and has successfully shot down more than a dozen
SLAF aircraft during the war. It is clearly in the U.S.'
interest that the tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP)
of the LTTE air wing not be allowed to spread to other
transnational terrorist groups.


6. (S) Our ability to engender greater Sri Lankan
cooperation in the GWOT and to more fully support the GSL
in its own domestic struggle against terror is hampered by
a lack of U.S. resources. A primary example is the need to
dedicate some ATA funding to Sri Lanka which we have not
had since 2002. (ATA had a history of great success in Sri
Lanka before then: from 1999-2002 ATA trained 138 Sri
Lankan police officers in seven courses for an entire cost
of roughly $1 million.) Renewed ATA funding would enable
us to improve Sri Lankan capabilities in areas like post-
bomb investigation and explosive incident countermeasures,
among other key topics. We note that this would not just
benefit Sri Lanka but also help protect us. (The
previously-mentioned suicide bomber was able to detonate
herself because she had not been properly restrained by the
under-trained police officers.) We have been able to fill
some of this gap with DOJ ICITAP funds which have supported
law enforcement training, some of which has been relevant
to counter-terrorism. We understand that ATA funds are
tight and highly-sought. Nonetheless, a little ATA money
could go a long way in our efforts here. (See notal septel
in separate channel on other GWOT resource needs.)


7. (S) As addressees are aware, the LTTE has a vast,
well-organized fund-raising operation around the world.
Most observers here believe that the LTTE-founded Tamil
Rehabilitation Organization (TRO),while doing much
legitimate relief work in the North and the East, co-
mingles its money and personnel with the LTTE. This puts
the USG in an awkward position since, despite our strong
suspicions about the TRO, it is a registered, ostensibly-
legitimate charitable organization in the United States
(see the website at www.trousa.org). Late last year
(before the tsunami),we laid out for Washington our
concerns regarding the TRO and asked that relevant USG
agencies take a hard look at TRO/USA finances and
activities and form a judgment as to whether its deserved
its charitable status in the U.S. (04 Colombo 2002). We
are not aware if TRO/USA has been examined in this regard
in the wake of our cable. It needs to be if we are to
maintain our counter-terrorism credibility and if our
public commitment to addressing terrorism financing is to
be taken seriously here in Sri Lanka. FYI - We understand
the British are in the process of de-registering the TRO
there since its accounting and other financial procedures
are not in keeping with British charitable regulations
(although the TRO/UK has quickly reconstituted itself under
a new name).


8. (S) Turning to the broader terrorism finance issue, the
US has provided anti-money laundering training in Sri Lanka
and the GSL is in the final stages of proposing
comprehensive anti-money laundering legislation. Once
passed, we expect to begin cooperative efforts between
FINCEN and Sri Lanka's newly constituted Financial
Intelligence Unit, which will likely be housed in the
Central Bank. We need to make sure that Sri Lanka
continues to be included in USG terrorism financing
initiatives, information-sharing and training
opportunities.

Maldives
--------------


9. (S) While Maldives is of little global significance,
it is nonetheless that rare commodity in the GWOT: a
moderate Muslim country that is well-disposed to and seeks
greater cooperation with the United States. We include
relevant Maldivian officials in law enforcement and
military training opportunities. We have also raised with
Maldivian officials the possibility of terrorists
transiting Male' international airport, which would be easy
to do (although there is no credible information to date).
The GoRM, which we are encouraging towards greater openness
and democracy, is fearful of Muslim extremism and eager to
cooperate with us on that issue on a global basis. It is
important to note that during the long process of
negotiating the recent return home of the Maldivian held at
Guantanamo, the Maldivians made clear that they took very
seriously the possibility of one of their nationals being
involved in global terrorist efforts against the United
States.


10. (S) In the same vein, any ATA funds made available by
Washington should cover programming/training for Maldives
as well as Sri Lanka. For example, one ATA couse each year
in Airport security Management, Document Fraud Examination
or Maritime Security would greatly increase our CT
cooperation with Maldives. We should also ensure that
Maldives is included in any public diplomacy/outreach
efforts aimed at young Muslim populations. On the
terrorist financing front, Maldives is working with the IMF
to develop an anti-money laundering effort, and therefore
has not shown keen interest in U.S. Treasury training in
this area, although it would consider training that is
coordinated with, and complementary to, the IMF program.
Nonetheless, we need to continue to include Maldives in all
of our terrorist finance initiatives.

LUNSTEAD