Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05COLOMBO326
2005-02-10 12:26:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Colombo
Cable title:  

COLOMBO PLAN: CONSENSUS MINUS ONE TOWARD THAI

Tags:  PREL SNAR AORC IR CE 
pdf how-to read a cable
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000326 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, IO, IO/T, INL/C/CJ

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2015
TAGS: PREL SNAR AORC IR CE
SUBJECT: COLOMBO PLAN: CONSENSUS MINUS ONE TOWARD THAI
AMENDMENT PROPOSAL IN WORKING GROUP

REF: A. 04 BANGKOK 8118 (NOTAL)

B. 04 COLOMBO 1597

Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead. Reasons 1.4(b,d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000326

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, IO, IO/T, INL/C/CJ

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2015
TAGS: PREL SNAR AORC IR CE
SUBJECT: COLOMBO PLAN: CONSENSUS MINUS ONE TOWARD THAI
AMENDMENT PROPOSAL IN WORKING GROUP

REF: A. 04 BANGKOK 8118 (NOTAL)

B. 04 COLOMBO 1597

Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead. Reasons 1.4(b,d).


1. (C) Summary: During the February 15 Colombo Plan Working
Group meeting, all other member states present expressed
their support for the Thai constitutional amendment proposal
to address arrears. Among the several concerns voiced about
the U.S. proposal, representatives from member states
singularly focused on the U.S. language prohibiting a country
from having a voice in decision-taking. Despite
clarifications and explanations from poloff, member countries
remained supportive of the Thai proposal. The meeting
concluded with a request to the U.S. from the Working Group
Chair to revisit the U.S. proposal in light of the comments
expressed during the meeting. Without a revamped U.S.
proposal or consideration of a compromise (see Para 8),this
issue will remain stalemated. End Summary.


2. (C) On February 15, the Colombo Plan Working Group met
for the second time to discuss proposals to amend the
organization's constitution to address penalties for members
states in arrears (see Ref B). Maldivian High Commissioner
Mohamed Asif, the current Colombo Plan Council President,
chaired the Working Group meeting. In addition to the U.S.
presence, representatives from Indonesia, Iran, Japan,
Malaysia, MALDIVES, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and
Thailand attended.

Concerns regarding the U.S. proposed amendment
-------------- -


3. (C) The Pakistani representative, who had earlier
expressed his support for the U.S. proposal, reversed his
support to the Thai proposal. Notably, he agreed that
barring citizens from training opportunities because their
governments had not paid dues was not just, but felt that the
U.S. proposal exceeded the limits of what an organization
should be required to do toward the greater good of every
member. The Colombo Plan would quickly go bankrupt, he said,
if other states stopped paying dues but were still allowed to
send citizens to the organization's programs.


4. (C) Throughout the meeting, the representatives also
focused on allowing consideration for the reasons a member
country was in arrears. The Secretary-General said the
constitution permitted a member country to apply for a waiver
of arrears and highlighted the back dues write-off that was
granted to Cambodia. (Note: Chapter VI, Article 6 of the
Constitution covers this provision.) He added that
Afghanistan was currently in arrears but anticipated that the
Council would recognize the country's difficulties in paying
dues and agree to writing off that debt. He stressed,
however, that Afghanistan had not applied to the Council for
such a waiver as of yet. Poloff assured representatives at
the Working Group that the U.S. proposal did not supersede
the organization's constitutional ability to address
extenuating circumstances related to arrears.


5. (C) Representatives from almost every member country
present remained fixated on the U.S. language that a country
would "lose its right to participate in decision-taking" and
felt that it violated the consensus spirit of the
organization. They also had difficulty deciding how and when
a member would be barred from voicing an opinion, especially
since the constitution does not allow a country any other
status than "member" at Council meetings and there are no
formal rules of procedure to reach consensus. (Note: The
constitutional reference may be found in Chapter VI, Articles
1 and 14.) Poloff underscored the fact that the U.S.
proposal did not intend to bar a member country's
participation in Council meetings, but served to prohibit a
delinquent member country's voice during moments of decision
making as a penalty for arrears.

6. (C) Responding to the USG argument that a member country
would not be able to sponsor its own citizens for programs if
it could not pay its dues, the Secretary-General commented
that a member country might only have to pay 1,000 USD for a
citizen to attend a Colombo Plan program. In an off-line
discussion later recounted to poloff, the Secretary-General
said he discussed the issue further with the Thai
representative, underscoring that a member country in arrears
would only have to pay the partial cost -- travel and per
diem -- for one of its citizens to participate in a Colombo
Plan program. If the Thai arrears proposal was accepted by
the Council, the Colombo Plan and the host country would
still be accountable for the cost of program registration and
tuition. Coupled with his earlier comments during the
Working Group meeting, the Secretary-General meant to
emphasize to poloff that a member country could still afford
to sponsor its citizens for a program.

Consensus minus one
--------------


7. (C) At one point towards the end of the meeting, the
Secretary-General asked if there was consensus that the Thai

SIPDIS
proposal could be adopted temporarily while the Secretariat
continued to explore alternative ways to address the issue of
arrears. In response to poloff's question, the
Secretary-General confirmed that, if temporarily adopted, the

SIPDIS
Thai-proposed amendment would go into effect. Poloff replied
that the USG could not agree to that. When pressed if the
U.S. would agree to let the consensus (every other member
present agreed) proceed while noting the U.S.'s objection,
poloff responded that, with the U.S. in disagreement, there
was no consensus and the USG would not accept the approach
put forward. The discussion concluded with chair of the
meeting requesting the U.S. to revisit its position in light
of the comments expressed by the other member countries. All
other representatives present agreed with the
Secretary-General's recommendation that the Thai proposal be

SIPDIS
adopted immediately -- without the need for another meeting
-- should the U.S. change its view. Poloff assured the
Working Group that their comments would be conveyed to
Washington, but underscored that the current U.S. position
had already been the subject of much debate and consideration.

A compromise?
--------------


8. (C) After the meeting, the Pakistani representative
suggested to poloff a possible compromise between the current
U.S. and Thai proposals. He proposed that member states in
arrears could be allowed to pay for private citizens to
attend Colombo Plan programs, but that civil servants would
still be barred from participating while the country was in
arrears without an amortization plan in effect. In effect,
this would address the U.S. concern towards continued citizen
participation in Colombo Plan activities, while penalizing
the government for its arrears.

Comment
--------------


9. (C) The member states had cogent arguments in support of
the Thai proposal. The representatives also felt that the
U.S. and Thai proposals were very similar and many expressed
their approval of the amortization option in both
suggestions. Moreover, the Secretary-General (a Thai
national) has publicly supported the Thai proposal since
September 2004 -- when it was introduced at the last Working
Group meeting -- calling it "a compromise between the U.S.
proposal and the prior proposed amendment." It seems
unlikely that he will reverse his personal opinion. U.S.
officials have had several lengthy discussions with other
member states, many of which privately expressed their
concern that the U.S. proposal -- which would not allow
delinquent states a voice in decision-taking -- would be akin
to "losing face," an unthinkable situation that trumps
further consideration of the U.S. approach in this part of
the world. Given all these sentiments, suggesting
alternatives to the Thai proposal -- see Para 8 -- or
developing an entirely new U.S. approach -- not guaranteed of
success either -- appear to be the only options for moving
forward with this issue. End Comment.

LUNSTEAD