GAINING BROAD CONSENSUS ON A TIMETABLE FOR THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L COLOMBO 000205

SIPDIS

NOFORN

PASS USAID, OFDA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/26/2015
TAGS: EAID ECON CE MALDIVES'>MV
SUBJECT: GAINING BROAD CONSENSUS ON A TIMETABLE FOR THE
WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. MILITARY ASSETS FROM THE
TSUNAMI-AFFECTED REGION: SRI LANKA/MALDIVES

SIPDIS

REF: (A) STATE 14650 (B) COLOMBO 0165

Classified By: CDA JAMES F. ENTWISTLE FOR REASONS 1.4 (D).


1. (C) We appreciate the opportunity to clarify the
situation regarding the withdrawal of the Combined
Support Group - Sri Lanka (CSG-SL) which, as noted in
reftels, will occur around the end of January. As we
noted in Ref B, the CSG-SL performance in both Sri Lanka
and MALDIVES has been superb and has been greatly
appreciated by the affected local populations. The
coordination suggested in Para 6 of Ref A has already
taken place as part of a continuous consultation process
with all "tsunami players." The Ambassador and other USG
officials have had detailed discussions with both the Sri
Lankan and Maldivian governments. We have also talked to
relevant international agencies, etc. All understand that
the military component of the U.S. tsunami effort is
getting ready to leave and have no problems with that.
There are no outstanding issues that should delay CSG
withdrawal.


2. (C) Our consistent message has been that the U.S.
commitment to tsunami recovery will continue to grow and
adapt. The phasing out of the U.S. military involvement
in the immediate relief effort reflects a shift in focus
from relief to reconstruction, not an end to U.S.
involvement. In other words, the nature of U.S. post-
tsunami assistance is changing (just as the nature of the

SIPDIS
need is changing) but U.S. engagement remains stronger
than ever.


3. (C) Thus, as we have worked out with the CSG and
will review again with LTG Blackman at the end of the
week, it is time for the CSG activity to end. In that
regard, the mid-February proposed closure of CSG
operations at Utapao will pose no difficulty for us. It
is important to note, however, the U.S. military ties to
both Sri Lanka and MALDIVES were in operation long before
the tsunami and will remain long after. Therefore, if in
the future it becomes clear that there might be a useful
role for the U.S. military in the tsunami reconstruction
process in either Sri Lanka or MALDIVES, we will work
that request through our (superb) defense attache' office
here which will liaise with PACOM and other relevant DOD
entities as appropriate. In short, the withdrawal of the
CSG does not necessarily mean that the U.S. military will
never again help out with tsunami recovery in Sri Lanka
and MALDIVES.


4. (C) Regarding para eight Ref A, we agree that the
public diplomacy angle of CSG withdrawal is crucial and
needs to be pro-active. To that end, we decided several
days ago to hold a press conference on Saturday, January
29 here in Colombo to review the overall U.S. tsunami
recovery package to Sri Lanka and make clear that CSG
withdrawal is a change in focus, not a diminution of U.S.
commitment. It is vital that the press conference occur
before the bulk of the CSG leaves, in order to forestall
the inevitable rumor-mongering when word of the
withdrawal starts making the rounds. Thus, while we of
course welcome the press guidance promised in para eight
Ref A, we believe it is essential that we go ahead as
planned on Saturday if our message here is to be timely
and effective.
ENTWISTLE