SRI LANKA: PRESIDENT'S PUBLIC STATEMENTS OFFER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 002017

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SA/INS
USPACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER CE LTTE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: PRESIDENT'S PUBLIC STATEMENTS OFFER
LITTLE INSIGHT INTO NEXT STEPS ON PEACE PROCESS; CO-CHAIRS
TO BE CONSULTED

REF: A. COLOMBO 2008

B. COLOMBO 2003

C. COLOMBO 1979

D. COLOMBO 1929

Classified By: AMB. JEFFREY J. LUNSTEAD. REASON: 1.4 (B,D).

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) In public statements made since his November 17
election, President Mahinda Rajapaksa has offered few
concrete details into how he plans to realize his oft-stated
goal of achieving a political resolution to the conflict with
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). In particular,
how he plans to bridge the sizable gaps between his policies
and the LTTE's demands remains unclear, but his affirmation
of a key role for the Co-chairs, conveyed in a November 28
address to the diplomatic community, and a separate, private
request to Norway to remain as facilitator are hopeful signs.
End summary.

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PRESIDENT READY FOR TALKS:
HOW AND WHEN UNCLEAR
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2. (SBU) In a series of public statements since his November
17 election, including his November 18 inauguration speech
(Ref C),his first address before Parliament (or the "Throne
Speech") on November 25 and a November 28 briefing to the
diplomatic corps, President Mahinda Rajapaksa has offered few
concrete details on how he plans to advance the peace
process. On each occasion he has repeated his offer to
engage in direct and immediate talks with the Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) but has given no specific
indication of how he expects to encourage the Tigers back to
the table. Indeed, his comments before Sri Lankan
audiences--the inaugural address and the policy statement
before Parliament--emphasized his commitment to a unitary Sri
Lanka, his intention to "revise" the Ceasefire Agreement and
his plan to include Muslims and all other "interested
parties" in peace talks--all non-starters for the LTTE.
Moreover, his speech before Parliament specifically
repudiated the LTTE's "concepts of traditional homelands and
self-determination" and pledged to uphold the right of any
member of any ethnic group to live anywhere in the country
"on the grounds that the entire territory is the homeland of
all communities."


3. (U) Besides talking to the Tigers, the President
undertook in his parliamentary address to include all
"political parties, pressure groups, NGOs, religious
organizations and the media" in "open discussions" aimed at
building the ever-elusive national consensus on the peace
process. At the same time, he said, the Government will
"properly organize" the facilitation services provided by the
United Nations (note: the UN has not performed a
facilitation role in the peace process) and "the
international community."

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LESS POLARIZING, MORE FORTHCOMING
WITH ENVOYS
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4. (SBU) In contrast to his remarks before Sri Lankan
audiences, Rajapaksa's November 28 briefing of the diplomatic
corps presented a more modulated, less polarizing approach.
Omitting any reference to the preservation of a unitary state
as part of a political solution, the President instead noted
only that "the people of Sri Lanka have expressed their
confidence" in his views on the peace process, and emphasized
his plans for greater inclusiveness and transparency in the
process. Rather than "revising" the Ceasefire Agreement
(which the LTTE has already made plain it will not consider),
he suggested instead "reviewing" it to improve its
implementation--something the LTTE had already agreed to do,
at least in principle, in the late days of former President
Kumaratunga's administration. In tacit acknowledgment of
international concern at possible Government involvement in
the "dirty war," he pledged to uphold the ceasefire (a point
notably absent from the considerably longer policy speech
before Parliament) and to adopt a human rights charter fully
compliant with international conventions. He also expressed
gratitude for foreign aid to support reconstruction in the
north and east and appealed for "international assistance to
ensure that peace making is not at the cost of democracy and
pluralism."


5. (C) In another marked departure from his previous
statements, in his comments to the diplomats Rajapaksa noted
the need to begin consultations on the peace process with the
four Co-chairs--Japan, US, EU and Norway--his first public
acknowledgment of the group since the campaign and his first
positive mention of Norway (albeit in its role as a Co-chair,
rather than facilitator). In the Ambassador's conversation
with Rajapaksa after the speech, the President told him that
he had inserted the reference to the Co-chairs after his
conversation with the Ambassador on November 25 (Ref B),when
the Ambassador had explicitly asked the President what he
intended with regard to the Co-chairs. In a separate
conversation on November 28, Foreign Minister Mangala
Samaraweera told the Ambassador that he planned to meet the
Co-chairs the following week. The Co-chairs have also
requested a meeting with the President, and we expect that
may also happen next week.

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QUIET OLIVE BRANCH TO NORWAY?
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6. (C) On November 28 Norwegian Ambassador Hans Brattskar
told the Ambassador that new Acting Head of the Peace
Secretariat John Gooneratne (who is replacing, at least for

SIPDIS
now, Jayantha Dhanapala, who announced his retirement on
November 10) had called in Brattskar, at the direction of
ForMin Samaraweera, on November 26 to convey that the
government wants Norway to continue in its role as
facilitator. The government was still working out the
modality and timing of publicly announcing this, however,
Gooneratne reportedly explained. Brattskar told the
Ambassador that he had replied that Norway is ready to
continue if both parties want it to do so and if Norway is
convinced it can play a positive role.


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SOME THOUGHTS ON DEVOLUTION
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7. (C) In a November 29 lunch hosted by President Rajapaksa
for visiting former President Clinton, Rajapaksa told the
Ambassador and former President Clinton that he is
considering, as an initial overture to the LTTE, offering
provincial councils in Tiger-controlled territory substantial
devolution of power, including police, land and finances.
(Note: As reported Ref D, an NGO contact had told us that
Rajapaksa, via back-channel communication with the Tigers,
had suggested a similar offer during the campaign, which he
had described as a substitute for the interim administration
the LTTE had been demanding. The LTTE's reported reaction to
this offer was that Rajapaksa was "practical" and
realistic--an assessment echoed in LTTE leader Prabhakaran's
November 27 Heroes' Day speech (Ref A). End note.)
Rajapaksa added that he would still like India to assume a
more prominent role in the peace process. The Ambassador
commented that the idea of real devolved powers may have some
merit, but the term "Provincial Councils" is likely to
trigger a negative reaction with the LTTE--just as the term
"federalism" causes a negative reaction among certain
quarters in the south. The Ambassador also suggested that it
might be useful to persuade the Indians to become more
involved in tandem with other international players, rather
than as a solo performer.

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COMMENT
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8. (C) It is all very well for Rajapaksa to declare he is
ready for talks--just as it all very well for Prabhakaran to
declare he is ready for Rajapaksa to deliver a political
solution (Ref B). Actually achieving these difficult goals
is obviously a very different matter. While it is
encouraging that Rajapaksa has begun to think about what new
offers he might put on the table, the danger remains that the
nationalist rhetoric with Sri Lankan audiences may temper his
ability to make "practical" and realistic overtures. There
is an enormous gulf between Rajapaksa's insistence on a
unitary state versus LTTE insistence on self-determination
and the ground that must be covered to get to an eventual
peace agreement. Rajapaksa's appeal to the Co-chairs (and
his less public overture to Norway) are hopeful signs that he
recognizes the important role that the international
community could play in helping bridge this gap. We plan to
consult with other Co-chair representatives in advance of the
expected meetings with the Foreign Minister and President.
LUNSTEAD