Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05COLOMBO1992
2005-11-23 10:13:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Colombo
Cable title:  

AVIAN AND PANDEMIC INFLUENZA INFORMATION - SRI

Tags:  TBIO ECON PREL SOCI EAGR CASC CE KSTH WHO 
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 COLOMBO 001992 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR OIE DANIEL SINGER AND REBECCA S DALEY
STATE FOR SA/INS

SENSITIVE

E.O 12958: N/A
TAGS: TBIO ECON PREL SOCI EAGR CASC CE KSTH WHO
SUBJECT: AVIAN AND PANDEMIC INFLUENZA INFORMATION - SRI
LANKA

REF: A) COLOMBO 1592, B) STATE 209622, C) COLOMBO 1849,
D) COLOMBO 1845, E) COLOMBO 1622

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 COLOMBO 001992

SIPDIS

STATE FOR OIE DANIEL SINGER AND REBECCA S DALEY
STATE FOR SA/INS

SENSITIVE

E.O 12958: N/A
TAGS: TBIO ECON PREL SOCI EAGR CASC CE KSTH WHO
SUBJECT: AVIAN AND PANDEMIC INFLUENZA INFORMATION - SRI
LANKA

REF: A) COLOMBO 1592, B) STATE 209622, C) COLOMBO 1849,
D) COLOMBO 1845, E) COLOMBO 1622


1. (U) THIS IS THE SECOND CABLE REPORTING ON
PREPARATIONS UNDERWAY TO PREVENT A HIGHLY PATHENOGENIC
AVIAN INFLUENZA (HPAI) IN SRI LANKA (REF A) AND RESPONDS
TO REF B QUESTIONS REGARDING SRI LANKA'S EFFORTS TO
CONTROL AVIAN FLU AND ITS CAPABILITY TO RESPOND TO AN
INFLUENZA PANDEMIC.

PREPAREDNESS/COMMUNICATION
--------------


2. (U) PREPAREDNESS: SRI LANKA IS STILL DEVELOPING ITS
"NATIONAL INFLUENZA PANDEMIC PREPAREDNESS PLAN"
(NATIONAL PLAN). AI PREPAREDNESS ACTIVITIES ARE BEING
ORGANIZED BY THE MINISTRY OF HEALTH (MOH) AND THE
DEPARTMENT OF ANIMAL PRODUCTION AND HEALTH (DAPH) OF THE
MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE, WHO HAVE FORMED A JOINT
STEERING COMMITTEE ON AVIAN INFLUENZA (STEERING
COMMITTEE) AND A JOINT NATIONAL TECHNICAL COMMITTEE
(TECHNICAL COMMITTEE).


3. (U) THE STEERING COMMITTEE ACTS AS THE NATIONAL BODY
RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL THE POLICY DECISIONS TAKEN ON
PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF AI IN THE COUNTRY. IT WILL
OVERSEE THE FINALIZATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
NATIONAL PLAN, WHICH IS STILL IN THE DRAFT STAGE. THE
STEERING COMMITTEE IS CO-CHAIRED BY DR. H.A.P.
KAHANDALIYANAGE, THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF HEALTH SERVICES
OF THE MOH AND DR. S.K.R. AMARASEKERA, THE DIRECTOR
GENERAL ANIMAL PRODUCTION AND HEALTH OF THE DAPH. OTHER
MEMBERS INCLUDE DR. H.M. FERNANDO, DEPUTY DIRECTOR
GENERAL PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICES (WHO IN REF E WAS ALSO
NAMED AS THE OFFICIAL POINT OF CONTACT FOR AI ISSUES),
ADDITIONAL DIRECTOR GENERAL ANIMAL PRODUCTION AND
HEALTH, CHIEF EPIDEMIOLOGIST OF EPIDEMIOLOGY UNIT MOH,
DIRECTOR GENERAL MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
REPRESENTATIVES FROM MINISTRIES OF FINANCE, MEDIA AND
TOURISM AND REPRESENTATIVES FROM WORLD HEALTH
ORGANIZATION (WHO) AND FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION
(FAO). THE STEERING COMMITTEE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR
COORDINATING THE PREVENTIVE ACTIVITIES AMONG ITS VARIOUS
MEMBER AGENCIES AND FOR MONITORING THE ACTIVITIES.



4. (SBU) ON NOVEMBER 3, SEVERAL MEMBERS OF THE STEERING
COMMITTEE BRIEFED EMBASSY OFFICIALS ON ITS EFFORTS, AND
GAVE A DRAFT COPY OF THE NATIONAL PLAN WHICH HAS NOT YET
BEEN RELEASED. WHEN THE NATIONAL PLAN IS FINALIZED, IT
SHOULD BE RETRIEVABLE AT: HTTP://WWW.EPID.GOV.LK. IT
APPEARED FROM THE BRIEFING THAT GSL OFFICIALS HAVE TAKEN
BOTH PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION NEEDS INTO ACCOUNT IN
THEIR PREPARATIONS.


5. (U) THE TECHNICAL COMMITTEE SET UP UNDER THE STEERING
COMMITTEE WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR MONITORING THE GLOBAL
AI SITUATION AND FOR IDENTIFYING HIGH-RISK AREAS AND
POPULATIONS. IT WILL AIM TO ESTABLISH AN EARLY WARNING
SYSTEM FOR SRI LANKA, RECOMMEND SUITABLE STRATEGIES TO
PREVENT ENTRY OF DISEASE TO THE COUNTRY, EVALUATE
ONGOING ANIMAL AND HUMAN SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITIES,
STRENGTHEN CAPACITY OF LABORATORIES AND FACILITATE THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NATIONAL PLAN.


6. (U) THE TECHNICAL COMMITTEE WILL BE CO-CHAIRED BY THE
ADDITIONAL DIRECTOR GENERAL ANIMAL PRODUCTION AND HEALTH
AND THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICES
OF MOH. ITS MEMBERS INCLUDE THE HEAD OF MICROBIOLOGY
DEPARTMENT - UNIVERSITY OF KELANIYA, THE DIRECTOR HEALTH
EDUCATION BUREAU, THE DIRECTOR OF ANIMAL HEALTH, THE
DIRECTOR OF VETERINARY RESEARCH, THE DIRECTOR OF THE
MEDICAL SUPPLIES DIVISION OF MOH, THE DIRECTOR OF
ENVIRONMENT AND OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH OF MOH, DIRECTOR
QUARANTINE OF MOH, THE CHIEF EPIDEMIOLOGIST,
EPIDEMIOLOGICAL UNIT OF MOH, THE CHIEF ANIMAL QUARANTINE
OFFICER, THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF POULTRY DEVELOPMENT,
THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC HEALTH - VETERINARY SERVICES,
VIROLOGISTS FROM THE MEDICAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE,
VETERINARY SURGEONS/EPIDEMIOLOGY AND VETERINARY
SURGEONS/GIS MAPPING, THE VETERINARY RESEARCH
OFFICER/VIROLOGY AND OFFICIALS FROM THE WHO AND THE FAO.

7. (SBU) ANTICIPATED TRUTHFULNESS/TRANSPARENCY: POST
EXPECTS THAT SRI LANKA WILL DISCLOSE THE APPEARANCE OF
AI FAIRLY RAPIDLY. ALTHOUGH AN OUTBREAK OF MYOCARDITIS
WAS NOT REPORTED QUICKLY TO THE WHO IN EARLY 2005(REF
A),WHO'S SEAT ON THE STEERING COMMITTEE SHOULD ENSURE
SPEEDY REPORTING. FURTHER, THE STEERING COMMITTEE
MEMBERS APPEAR EARNEST IN THEIR EFFORTS TO IDENTIFY AI
AND CONTAIN IT AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE.


8. (SBU) KEY OFFICIALS: THE GSL IS HIGHLY BUREAUCRATIC.
SPEEDY MOVEMENT ON PROJECTS DEPENDS IN PART ON THE LEVEL
OF PERSONAL CONTACT A MINISTER OR MINISTRY SECRETARY HAS
WITH THE PRESIDENT. WE ANTICIPATE THAT NIMAL SIRIPALA
DE SILVA, MINISTER OF HEALTH, NUTRITION AND WELFARE,
MINISTER OF HEALTH AND MAITHRIPALA SIRISENA, MINISTER OF
AGRICULTURE, IRRIGATION AND MAHAWELI DEVELOPMENT, BOTH
JUST NAMED TODAY, WILL BE KEY CONTACTS FOR HIGH-LEVEL
ENGAGEMENT. IN THE CASE OF AN AI OUTBREAK, THE GSL WILL
LOOK TO THE PRESIDENT FOR LEADERSHIP.


9. (SBU) PRIORITIZING AVIAN FLU: UNTIL AI HITS SRI
LANKA, WE DOUBT THAT AI PREPAREDNESS WILL TAKE PRIORITY
OVER TSUNAMI RELIEF, MAINTAINING THE CEASEFIRE WITH THE
LIBERATION TAMIL TIGERS OF EELAM (LTTE),A REVISED
NATIONAL BUDGET AND VARIOUS PROGRAMS THAT PRESIDENT
RAJAPAKSE WILL ATTEMPT TO IMPLEMENT. ADDITIONALLY,
SINCE SARS DID NOT HIT SRI LANKA DESPITE ITS PROXIMITY
TO SOUTHEAST ASIA, SRI LANKA HAS NOT FELT THE DAMAGE
THAT SUCH A PANDEMIC CAN CAUSE.


10. (SBU) BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL COOPERATION: THERE
IS A STRONG ADVISORY AND COLLABORATIVE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN THE GSL MINISTRIES/DEPARTMENTS INVOLVED IN AI
PREPAREDNESS AND THE WHO. WHO'S LOCAL OFFICER
RESPONSIBLE FOR AI ISSUES IS DR. BIPIN KUMAR VERMA. DR.
VERMA SITS ON THE STEERING COMMITTEE, AND IS CURRENTLY
ENGAGED IN ADVISING THE GSL ON VARIOUS ASPECTS OF AI
PREPAREDNESS, INCLUDING DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATIONAL
PLAN. WHO HAS ALSO BROUGHT AN EXPERT ON LABORATORIES
FROM INDIA TO ADVISE SRI LANKA ON STRENGTHENING ITS
LABORATORY SYSTEM. POST HAS HELD SEVERAL MEETINGS WITH
WHO OFFICIALS ABOUT AI AND HAS DISCUSSED THE POSSIBILITY
OF INITIATING A MULTI-LATERAL WORKING GROUP (OF
INTERESTED EMBASSIES AND MULTI-NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS)
TO COORDINATE POSSIBLE ASSISTANCE TO THE GSL AND PREPARE
FOR OUTBREAK RESPONSE.


11. (SBU) ON THE ANIMAL HEALTH SIDE, THERE APPEARS TO BE
A GROWING AI COLLABORATION BETWEEN FAO AND DAPH. DAPH
RECENTLY SUBMITTED A PROPOSAL TO FAO FOR A TECHNICAL
PROJECT INVOLVING DIAGNOSTICS AND TEST KITS, WHICH USAID
UNDERSTANDS HAS BEEN APPROVED BY FAO. FAO IS ALSO
WORKING ON A PROJECT WITH BOTH SRI LANKA AND INDIA FOR
CAPACITY BUILDING OF ANIMAL DISEASE LABORATORY WORKERS,
WHICH WILL ALSO INCLUDE DEVELOPMENT OF A REGIONAL
LABORATORY WHICH MAY BE CONSTRUCTED IN INDIA, BUT COULD
PROVIDE SUPPORT TO SRI LANKA.


12. (SBU) FLU SHOTS: NEITHER PUBLIC NOR PRIVATE
FACILITIES PROVIDE ANNUAL FLU VACCINE IN SRI LANKA.
ANNUAL FLU SHOTS HAVE NEVER BEEN ADMINISTERED HERE. AT
THIS TIME, THERE IS NO CAPACITY TO PRODUCE ANNUAL FLU
VACCINES. NO PRODUCTION OF H5N1 VACCINE IS UNDER
DEVELOPMENT IN SRI LANKA. TAMIFLU IS NOT AVAILABLE IN
SRI LANKA AND IS UNDERGOING AN EXPEDITED REGISTRATION
PROCESS REQUIRED FOR ITS IMPORT INTO THE COUNTRY. SRI
LANKA IS NOT EMPLOYING VACCINATION AS A CONTAINMENT
MEASURE FOR ANIMALS EITHER, AS ANIMAL HEALTH AUTHORITIES
ARE NOT CERTAIN OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SUCH VACCINES.
DAPH NOTES THAT DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DID NOT USE
VACCINATION, AND IMPLEMENTED MEASURES AT THE OUTSET OF
THE DISEASE TO ERADICATE IT WITHIN THEIR BORDERS.


13. (SBU) A MODERATELY INFORMED POPULATION, BUT NOT
ENOUGH INFORMATION FOR THE FARMERS: GSL OFFICIALS
DESCRIBED THE USE OF MEDIA OUTLETS AS THE MOST EFFECTIVE
METHOD OF INFORMING THE PUBLIC ABOUT AI. AS REPORTED IN
REFS B AND C, THE GOVERNMENT-OWNED MEDIA HAVE TAKEN A
SERIOUS BUT MEASURED APPROACH TO AI IN SRI LANKA, AN
APPROACH MEANT TO DISPEL PANIC AND REASSURE THE PUBLIC
THAT THINGS ARE UNDER CONTROL. ALTHOUGH THE INDEPENDENT
MEDIA HAVE PRESENTED THE AI STORIES WITH A GREATER SENSE
OF URGENCY, THEY HAVE ALSO EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE IN THE
GSL'S ABILITY TO TAKE ON THE DISEASE SHOULD IT REACH SRI
LANKA. SUCH ARTICLES HAVE OFTEN INCLUDED INFORMATION
REGARDING SYMPTOMS AND PREVENTION.


14. (SBU) SEVERAL MONTHS AGO, AN OFFICIAL FROM THE SRI
LANKA POULTRY ASSOCIATION WAS REPORTED TO SAY THAT
FARMERS ARE GENERALLY NOT KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT AI.
INDEED, THOSE HANDLING BIRDS (AS EITHER SMALL SCALE
FARMERS OR POULTRY INDUSTRY) MAY BE AT A FAIRLY LOW
LEVEL OF AWARENESS. IN AN ATTEMPT TO INCREASE
AWARENESS, LEAFLETS ARE BEING DISTRIBUTED TO FARMERS,
AND EFFORTS ARE BEING MADE BY GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS TO
INFORM THEM OF SYMPTOMS AND PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES.


SURVEILLANCE/DETECTION
--------------


15. (U) DAPH IS UNDERTAKING ACTIVITIES TO PREVENT THE
INITIAL SPREAD OF AI TO SRI LANKA AND TO IMPROVE
SURVEILLANCE. CURRENTLY, IMPORTATION OF LIVE ANIMALS
AND ANIMAL PRODUCTS FROM ALL COUNTRIES IS PROHIBITED.
DAPH IS ALSO MONITORING THE MOVEMENTS OF MIGRATORY BIRDS
PASSING THROUGH SRI LANKA AND HAS IDENTIFIED AROUND 80
MIGRATORY WATER FOWL SPECIES THAT ARE PROSPECTIVE
CARRIERS OF AI. SEVEN WILDLIFE PRESERVES AND NATIONAL
PARKS IN THE NORTH, WEST AND SOUTHEAST WHERE BIRDS
MIGRATE HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED AS VULNERABLE AREAS. THE
NORTH WESTERN PROVINCE OF THE COUNTRY IS ALSO CONSIDERED
VULNERABLE DUE TO WIDESPREAD PRACTICE OF SMALL STAKE-
HOLDER FREE-RANGE POULTRY PRODUCTION. DAPH AND
PARTNERING UNIVERSITIES ARE CARRYING OUT RANDOM BLOOD
TESTS AT DIFFERENT LOCATIONS (WITH PRIORITY ON THESE
VULNERABLE AREAS) AND SCREENING BLOOD SAMPLES FOR THE AI
VIRUS. THE PEAK MIGRATORY PERIOD IN SRI LANKA IS
SEPTEMBER THROUGH DECEMBER. THOUSANDS OF SAMPLES OF BIRD
DROPPINGS HAVE BEEN TESTED IN THE VULNERABLE AREAS; TO
DATE ALL HAVE BEEN NEGATIVE.


16. (SBU) CURRENTLY, THE DAPH HAS A NETWORK OF
APPROXIMATELY 350 ANIMAL HEALTH OFFICERS AT DISTRICT
LEVELS, 30-40 VETERINARY SURGEONS IN EACH OF THE
COUNTRY'S NINE PROVINCES, AND FIVE VETERINARY
INVESTIGATION OFFICERS (VIOS) NATIONWIDE. DAPH HAS
INSTRUCTED ALL AGRICULTURE AND VETERINARY PERSONNEL TO
BE VIGILANT FOR, AND REPORT, EVEN MINOR SYMPTOMS OF AI.
THE FIVE VIOS HAVE RESPONSIBILITY TO CONDUCT TESTING IF
ANY SYMPTOMS ARE REPORTED.


17. (SBU) WHEN A VIO RECEIVES A REPORT OF AI SYMPTOMS,
THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURES ARE PLANNED:

- A SURGEON WEARING PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT WILL COLLECT
THE BIRD AND DELIVER IT TO THE VIO.
- THE VIO WILL DELIVER A SAMPLE TO THE VETERINARY
RESEARCH INSTITUTE IN PERADENIYA (CENTRAL SRI LANKA -
KANDY DISTRICT); CURRENTLY THE ONLY FACILITY WITH
TESTING KITS FOR INITIAL INFLUENZA DIAGNOSIS.
(SRI LANKA DOES NOT HAVE CAPABILITY TO DIAGNOSE H5N1.)
- IF INITIAL LAB TESTS DO NOT ELIMINATE THE POSSIBILITY
OF H5N1 (THROUGH OBSERVING CHARACTERISTICS NOT IN
CONFORMITY WITH H5N1),THE SAMPLE MUST BE TRANSPORTED
OUT OF SRI LANKA TO LABORATORIES IN INDIA, HONG KONG,
SINGAPORE OR THE USA FOR FURTHER TESTING.


18. (SBU) DAPH AND THE MOH ACKNOWLEDGE THAT DIAGNOSTIC
ABILITIES ARE SEVERELY LIMITED IN SRI LANKA AND THEY ARE
IN NEED OF ENHANCEMENTS IN THE LABORATORY AND TESTING
CAPABILITIES. DAPH HAS REQUESTED THAT THE GSL PROCURE
ADDITIONAL TEST KITS AND EXPRESSED THAT USG ASSISTANCE
IN PROCURING TEST KITS AND TRAINING IN DETECTION OF THE
VIRUS WOULD BE GREATLY APPRECIATED.


19. (SBU) TRANSPORT OF THE SAMPLES INTERNALLY MAY ALSO
BE PROBLEMATIC AS MOST PROVINCIAL AND DISTRICT ANIMAL
HEALTH (AND HUMAN PUBLIC HEALTH) OFFICES ARE SHORT ON
VEHICLES. ONE POTENTIAL OBSTACLE TO COLLECTION AND
DIAGNOSIS MAY BE LONG ROAD DISTANCES (8-12 HOURS) TO
VULNERABLE REMOTE AREAS. MOH OFFICIALS ALSO FORESEE
POTENTIAL PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL AND PRIVATE SECTOR
PROTOCOLS TO ALLOW THE QUICK TRANSPORTATION OF
POTENTIALLY-INFECTIOUS SAMPLES OUTSIDE OF THE COUNTRY
VIA COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT. TRANSPORT OF SAMPLES OVER LONG
DISTANCES MAY ALSO RISK PROLONGED IDENTIFICATION OF THE
VIRUS. WITHIN THE PAST FEW YEARS, A SAMPLE WAS FLOWN
OUT OF THE COUNTRY FOR DIAGNOSIS, AND WAS RENDERED
UNUSABLE AT THE LAB. THE OUTBREAK WAS NEVER IDENTIFIED,
AS THE OUTBREAK ENDED BEFORE ANOTHER SAMPLE COULD BE
COLLECTED.


20. (SBU) NO COMPENSATION SCHEME IS CURRENTLY IN PLACE
FOR POULTRY FARMERS WHO SUSPECT THAT THEIR BIRDS ARE
ILL. A PROPOSED COMPENSATION MECHANISM TO REIMBURSE
POULTRY FARMERS IN THE EVENT OF AN OUTBREAK HAS BEEN
PRESENTED TO THE CABINET BY AN INTER-MINISTERIAL
COMMITTEE. THE MECHANISM WOULD INVOLVE PAYING
APPROXIMATELY USD 0.22 FOR A DAY OLD CHICK, USD 1.20 FOR
A LAYER AND USD 1.00 FOR A BROILER. THIS IS AROUND 50-
60 PERCENT OF THE MARKET VALUE OF THE ANIMALS. AROUND
USD 800,000 WILL BE REQUIRED TO COMPENSATE FOR THE
CULLING OF THE ENTIRE POULTRY POPULATION IN THE COUNTRY.
(COMMENT: THE GSL COULD BE PENNY WISE AND POUND FOOLISH
IN OFFERING BELOW-MARKET RATES FOR AI-INFECTED POULTRY.
LESS THAN USD 1 MILLION MORE INVESTED IN ERADICATION
COULD PRESUMABLY ENSURE AN END TO AI-INFECTED POULTRY BY
OFFERING FARMERS FULL MARKET VALUE FOR THEIR FLOCKS.
END COMMENT.)


RESPONSE/CONTAINMENT
--------------


21. (U) STOCKPILES: AS NOTED ABOVE, SRI LANKA HAS NO
STOCKPILE OF TAMIFLU. THE GSL HAS ANNOUNCED THAT SRI
LANKA WILL HAVE ACCESS TO THE WHO STOCKPILE SHOULD AN AI
PANDEMIC REACH SRI LANKAN TERRITORY. WE ARE STILL
TRYING TO CONFIRM THIS. NEVERTHELESS, WE UNDERSTAND
THAT TAMIFLU HAS NOT BEEN REGISTERED IN SRI LANKA (A
REQUIREMENT FOR LEGAL IMPORTATION),ALTHOUGH HEALTH
AUTHORITIES SAY THAT THEY ARE ATTEMPTING TO EXPEDITE ITS
REGISTRATION. ADDITIONALLY, HEALTH AUTHORITIES REPORT
THAT SRI LANKA DOES NOT HAVE A REASONABLE STOCKPILE OF
PERSONAL PROTECTIVE GEAR.


22. (SBU) CONTAINMENT: DAPH and MoH staff report that
plans are being drawn up for quarantine or cordoning off
areas, preventing movement of animals and products
in/out, and culling infected stocks if necessary. DAPH
notes that any quarantine would be enforced by its
Directorate and Animal Health Officers.


23. (SBU) In light of the general readiness and
operational status of Sri Lanka's security apparatus as
a result of the civil conflict, and its fast response
following the December 26, 2004 tsunami, containment
could be effectively enforced - once the outbreak is
actually diagnosed. However, the potential for a
lengthy delay from the incidence of an outbreak to
official diagnosis to political action for containment
is worrying. Further, inadequate hospital facilities
(Ref A) remain a continuing concern.


24. (SBU) COMMENT: PUBLICATION OF THE NATIONAL PLAN
REPORTEDLY WAS TO HAVE TAKEN PLACE ON NOVEMBER 1.
HOWEVER, THAT DATE CAME AND WENT WITHOUT PUBLIC COMMENT
BY THE GSL. UNTIL ELECTIONS ON NOVEMBER 17, THE COUNTRY
WAS LED BY A LAME DUCK PRESIDENT. GSL WORKING-LEVEL
OFFICIALS MAY HAVE PRUDENTLY AWAITED THE NEW
ADMINISTRATION SO THAT THEIR EFFORTS COULD BE
APPROPRIATELY REVIEWED AND PUT INTO PLAY RATHER THAN
CRITICIZED AS THE WORK OF THE PRIOR ADMINISTRATION. WE
HOPE TO SEE A SPEEDY PUBLICATION OF THE NATIONAL PLAN,
FOLLOWING THE NOVEMBER 23 NAMING OF NEW MINISTERS AND
OTHER HIGH LEVEL OFFICIALS.


25. (SBU) SRI LANKA LACKS SEVERAL CRITICAL RESOURCES -
TAMIFLU, LABORATORY EQUIPMENT, UP-TO-DATE HOSPITALS. IT
ALSO CURRENTLY LACKS HIGH LEVEL INTEREST IN MAKING AI A
PRIORITY. NEVERTHELESS, WORKING LEVEL OFFICIALS
CONTINUE DEVELOPING PLANS AND SEEKING RESOURCES TO
COMBAT A POTENTIAL PANDEMIC.

LUNSTEAD