Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05COLOMBO1940
2005-11-14 11:11:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Colombo
Cable title:  

AS ELECTION APPROACHES, AMPARA RESIDENTS ASK:

Tags:  PGOV PHUM CE LTTE 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001940 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/14/2015
TAGS: PGOV PHUM CE LTTE
SUBJECT: AS ELECTION APPROACHES, AMPARA RESIDENTS ASK:
CAN'T WE ALL JUST GET ALONG?


Classified By: DCM James F. Entwistle. Reason: 1.4 (B,D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001940

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/14/2015
TAGS: PGOV PHUM CE LTTE
SUBJECT: AS ELECTION APPROACHES, AMPARA RESIDENTS ASK:
CAN'T WE ALL JUST GET ALONG?


Classified By: DCM James F. Entwistle. Reason: 1.4 (B,D)


1. (U) Summary: The district government in the
Muslim-majority East coast district of Ampara appears to have
logistics for the November 17 presidential election in order.
Community members feel that Tamils in the district are not
taking the election seriously enough. Tamils are unconvinced
that voting will solve their issues but, if they do vote,
would overwhelmingly support Ranil Wickremesinghe. Muslims
are divided, but interlocutors in Ampara believe that more
than half will vote for Mahinda Rajapakse. All want
prosperity and peace in the North and East. End Summary.

--------------
District Government Ready for Election Day
--------------


2. (U) Poloff and pol FSN traveled to Ampara on Sri Lanka's
eastern coast November 7-9 to assess preparations for the
November 17 presidential election. The Ampara government
agent (GA) Herath Abeyweera assured poloff that all polling
procedures for the presidential election had been finalized
and that contingency plans are in place for the two
challenges he saw as most threatening to the voting:
monsoonal rains and ballot security. Intense rain would
render some areas of Ampara inaccessible by car, but the
district was prepared to transport people to and from polling
stations by tractor, boat, or Air Force-provided helicopters.
Abeyweera noted that "safehouses" near the main roads would
be available to overnight polling staff in isolated areas if
they were to feel threatened in any way, but he emphasized
that he did not expect any security issues to arise.
(Abeyweera was alluding to political party thugs intent on
rigging the election rather than interference by the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)). Polling staff are
required to man the station the night before the election,
making them potentially vulnerable to intimidation.

--------------
To Vote or Not To Vote, That Is the Question
--------------


3. (U) Community members in Ampara town, Akkaraipattu,
Kalmunai, and Pottuvil repeatedly told poloff that Tamils
and, to a lesser extent, Muslims are not taking the
presidential election as seriously as they should. The

prevailing attitude among those uninterested in the election
is that the government in Colombo has done little to help
minorities in the wake of the tsunami, lacks the political
will to forge a permanent peace settlement in the country,
and the selection of a new Sinhalese president likely would
not change the situation. Many interlocutors viewed Sri
Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) candidate and current Prime
Minister Mahinda Rajapakse and United National Party (UNP)
candidate Ranil Wickremesinghe as two sides of the same
coin--interested only in promoting the Sinhalese Buddhist
majority. Voters are more interested in replacing Ampara's
12 parliamentary seats (out of 225) with legislators willing
to speak out on behalf of the welfare of the minority
community and funnel development projects into the district.
Several interlocutors said that the district's current
representatives are useless puppets of the Tamil National
Alliance (TNA) and by implication the LTTE, but no one could
say how parliamentary elections would change this.


4. (U) Some Muslim, Tamil, and even Sinhalese community
members expressed concern that the lack of interest in the
presidential election would backfire. They predicted that a
Tamil boycott, whether official or de facto, would give
Rajapakse the edge and subject minorities to six years of
disenfranchising Sinhalese chauvinist policies. Since the
election would determine the development of Sri Lanka for the
better part of the next decade, many interlocutors stressed
that Tamils should think less about what the government has
not done for them in the past and think more about which
candidate could offer the best deal for the future.

-------------- --------------
Tamils Demand Peace, Prosperity, and Rights: A Nod for Ranil
-------------- --------------

5. (U) Tamils in Ampara clearly want improved tsunami aid,
permanent peace, an end to politically-motivated abductions
and killings, government assistance with economic and
agricultural development, and equal rights in employment and
education. Although all of poloff's contacts expressed
frustration with the pace of reconstruction and the
allocation of funds that seemingly benefits the Sinhalese
South over the North and East, each harbored the opinion that
the tsunami relief provided thus far would not be a relevant
factor in this election. Tamils instead would focus on who
is offering the most benefits for the future. Many Tamil
interlocutors said Wickremesinghe is the lesser of two evils,
given Rajapakse's alliance with the Sinhalese chauvinist
Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP).

6. (SBU) Representatives from the Peace Forum of Ampara
District wondered why the JVP, itself a party born out of
militancy, could be allowed to enter mainstream politics but
be so blatantly anti-Tamil and opposed to negotiating with
the LTTE. Other Tamil voters said that they consider
Wickremesinghe more likely to achieve a permanent settlement,
improving not only Sinhalese-Tamil relations but also
solidifying Tamil-Muslim and Muslim-Sinhalese relations.
Residents described a climate of fear in Ampara, citing three
killings in the district in the first week of November and
several abductions that have taken place since August. Most
residents blame the LTTE, but police have been unable to
prove the identities or the motivations of the perpetrators.


7. (SBU) Tamil farmers interviewed at the Peace Alliance
office in Akkaraipattu believe that Wickremesinghe would help
reduce the price of fertilizer and stabilize the price of
rice, as promised in his manifesto. (This differs from the
view of most Sinhalese farmers elsewhere in the country, who
believe that Rajapakse is the man for agricultural benefits.)
Residents of Akkaripattu, comparing previous UNP
presidencies to the current SLFP rule, said they experienced
more employment and development activities--including free
lunch in schools--under the UNP. They told poloff that the
incumbent SLFP president received 86% of the votes in the
1999 presidential election in a Tamil-dominated division in
Ampara, but her perceived failure to live up to her promises
gives the impetus for Tamils to vote UNP. Other Tamils at
the Peace Alliance and at the Maha Shakthi Foundation
expressed hope that Wickremesinghe would end
standardization--a quota system that restricts the number of
Tamils admitted to universities--and discriminatory hiring
practices. A Peace Forum representative told poloff that
over 70% of employed university graduates in the district are
Sinhalese, and they have permanent positions and set
salaries. The remaining 30% are Tamils and Muslims who are
mostly employed on a temporary basis with salary levels not
yet set.

--------------
Mahinda May Have the Advantage with Muslims
--------------


8. (U) Muslims in Ampara share Tamils' hopes for peace and
prosperity, but--like elsewhere in the country--they are both
more enthusiastic and more divided about the candidates than
Tamils are. At a lunch meeting, a group of Muslims in
Kalmunai told poloff that Muslims favor Rajapakse because
they fear attacks from the LTTE if Wickremesinghe were to
win. They pointed out that the UNP was in power in 1990 when
the LTTE forced Muslims out of Jaffna, and that
Wickremesinghe was Prime Minister in 2002 when the LTTE
attacked Muslims in Mullaittivu and Mutur (on the
northeastern coast) without government intervention. One
Muslim noted that his compatriots supported Wickremesinghe's
efforts with the Cease-Fire Agreement (CFA) in 2002 but were
now disillusioned by the accord's deterioration.
Interlocutors in Kalmunai estimated that 60-65% of Muslims in
all of the North and East would vote for Rajapakse, while
only slightly more than a third would follow Sri Lanka Muslim
Congress leader Rauff Hakeem and support Wickremesinghe.

--------------
Comment
--------------


9. (C) Discussions in Ampara district revealed that even
people who support a common goal--e.g. peace negotiations
with the LTTE or better benefits for agriculture--have
varying ideas about which candidate can best achieve that
goal. The near-monolithic UNP support expressed by Tamils in
Ampara district underscores the importance to Wickremesinghe
of getting out the Tamil vote in the North and East--a
prospect that appears increasingly tenuous (septel).
LUNSTEAD