SRI LANKA: IMPLICATIONS OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 COLOMBO 001929

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SA/INS
USPACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/07/2015
TAGS: PGOV PTER PREL CE LTTE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: IMPLICATIONS OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
FOR US POLICY ON PEACE PROCESS

REF: A. COLOMBO 1922


B. COLOMBO 1891

C. COLOMBO 1853

D. COLOMBO 1831

E. COLOMBO 1912

Classified By: AMB. JEFFREY J. LUNSTEAD. REASON: 1.4 (B,D).

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) -- The distinct approaches to the peace process
adopted by the two main candidates in the run-up to Sri
Lanka's November 17 presidential election pose different
challenges for members of the international community,
including the U.S., who hope to promote a permanent
resolution of the ethnic conflict.

--The nationalist line adopted by Prime Minister and Sri
Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) candidate Mahinda Rajapakse
threatens to polarize ethnic communities, encourage even
greater violence in the chaotic east, and provide the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) a convenient pretext
for spurning negotiations with the Government.

-- In particular, Rajapakse's Norway-baiting, while perhaps a
crowd-pleaser on the campaign stump, could affect Oslo's
willingness to continue in its role as facilitator should he
win.

--United National Party (UNP) candidate Ranil
Wickremesinghe's apparent reliance on the old policies and
approaches of his former government, on the other hand, could
prove just as counter-productive as it fails to take into
account the deterioration of the peace process over the past
18 months.

--Both candidates will likely expect the co-chairs to help
persuade the LTTE to return to the negotiating table, but our
ability to do so successfully will largely depend on the
actions and policies adopted by the new president.

--Most important, the victor, whoever he may be, must act
early and decisively to quell the burgeoning violence in the
east--and halt any government support, tacit or otherwise, to
the Karuna faction--or risk unraveling the tattered Ceasefire
Agreement even further.

--Co-chair representatives in Sri Lanka should meet the
winner soon after inauguration to encourage decisive and
creative steps to reinvigorate the peace process.

--An early high-level U.S. visit to Sri Lanka after the
election could emphasize the importance of pragmatic efforts
to reinvigorate the peace process.

End summary.

--------------
MAHINDA'S UNITARY STATE:
CAMPAIGN CLAPTRAP OR CONVICTION?
--------------


2. (C) With one week remaining before the November 17
presidential election, the race remains too close to call.
But if the election result remains difficult to predict, the
differences between the two candidates' stances on a wide
array of issues, including the peace process, are obvious
(Ref C). Despite the apparent public hard line taken by
Prime Minister and Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) candidate
Mahinda Rajapakse, his personal views on how he would craft a
lasting settlement remain unclear, and he has done little to
elaborate. Recent discussions with his campaign advisors
(Ref C),other diplomats (Ref A) and NGO sources have
suggested that, contrary to what his manifesto indicates,
Rajapakse is not opposed to federalism and/or some
significant devolution of power to the north and east at the
provincial level. A local NGO official in contact with both
the Prime Minister and the LTTE, told us on November 7 that
Rajapakse has been in back-channel communication with the
Tigers since July and has proposed an interim authority, in
the form of a provincial council with a five-year term for
elected members, with expanded authority over police, land
titles, and the judiciary. The LTTE reputedly has not
responded to this proposal, but described Rajapakse's
approach as "practical."


3. (C) Our best guess is that Rajapakse has
well-intentioned, if somewhat naive, thoughts on the peace
process. He will be handicapped in realizing those
intentions, however, by underestimating the single-mindedness
of both the LTTE and his Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP)
allies and by overestimating the ability of the international
community to "rescue" him if re-starting negotiations proves
more difficult than anticipated. Rajapakse has no real
experience in dealing with the LTTE, despite having served as
Prime Minister for more than a year, nor has he been involved
in GSL strategizing on the peace process. The same is true
of those in his inner circle. Moreover, it is widely assumed
that President Kumaratunga's team in the Peace Secretariat,
including Ambassador Jayantha Dhanapala, would step down if
Rajapakse were elected, leaving the new administration
extremely thin on LTTE-relevant contacts and experience.
That said, Rajapakse may have a better appreciation of Tiger
realpolitik than his public comments would indicate.

--------------
THE JVP: ANTITHESIS OF THE SILENT PARTNER
--------------


4. (C) The biggest problem with Rajapakse's approach may be
that he is underestimating the JVP more than the LTTE. We
have heard from everyone, including Rajapakse, that he
expects to be able to manage his obstreperous electoral ally
once in office--either by ignoring or transforming the
party's arch-nationalism into greater openness to a
negotiated solution. Recent experience (e.g., the JVP's
decampment from Kumaratunga's government in June) indicates,
however, that the JVP is not that easily managed--especially
if it sees an opportunity to promote itself as the
last-remaining savior of Sinhalese sovereignty. For the JVP,
"firmness" on the peace process is what differentiates it
from the left-of-center SLFP--and guarantees its appeal to
the southern Sinhalese vote bank. If Rajapakse modifies his
post-electoral stance on the peace process, as some contacts
have suggested, to one more accommodating of Tiger demands
for an interim administration and/or a federal solution, the
JVP will cry foul--and paint Rajapakse and the SLFP as
sell-outs.
--------------
MAHINDA IN THE DRIVER'S SEAT:
WHAT IT COULD MEAN FOR CO-CHAIRS
--------------


5. (C) A Rajapakse victory would pose several obvious and
immediate challenges for the U.S. and other members of the
international community that hope to assist the GSL in
forging a peaceful settlement. While Rajapakse's manifesto
spoke of "frank" discussions with the co-chairs and a
re-evaluation of Norway's role as facilitator, we expect that
his own lack of experience with the LTTE and the restrictions
imposed on him by his JVP partners will leave him limited
options--and thus dependent on the international community
for heavy lifting on the peace process. If so, Rajapakse is
overestimating the interest, patience and influence of the
international community. The co-chairs' ability to persuade
the LTTE that it should re-engage with the GSL will hinge
primarily on what the GSL says and does about the peace
process, rather than our good will or influence with the
Tigers. Just as Rajapakse's dependence on JVP support may
constrain his ability to deal with the Tigers, so, too, may
it constrain our ability as co-chairs to convince the LTTE of
his sincerity in seeking a peaceful and lasting settlement.
We have stressed to Rajapakse and others that the
international community cannot remain engaged in the peace
process if the parties themselves seem unwilling to do so.
At the same time, Norway's willingness to remain the
perpetual scapegoat in Sri Lankan posturing over why the
peace process has failed is limited as well. Norwegian
Ambassador Hans Brattskar has told us on several recent
occasions that he has warned Rajapakse that his government
might do its own re-evaluation of its role should Rajapakse
continue, if elected, to blame Norway publicly for the lack
of progress toward peace (Ref A). The new Norwegian
government has stated publicly it intends to continue its
facilitation role--assuming it is wanted by both sides. But
depending on Rajapakse's public rhetoric after the election,
the possibility that Norway might step down cannot be ruled
out.

--------------
WHAT TO DO?
--------------

6. (C) If Rajapakse is elected, the U.S., along with other
co-chairs, should:

--Meet with him as soon as possible after his inauguration to
encourage him to maintain the ceasefire and urge him to spell
out next steps on the peace process and what role he
envisions for the co-chairs, including Norway;

--Urge him to clamp down on the "dirty war," including any
GSL support for the Karuna faction, on an urgent basis;

--Encourage an early and significant confidence-building
measure to re-energize the process;

--Assure him of our willingness to assist the process but
caution that our ability to do so will be affected by his
government's policies, actions and rhetoric;

--Use an early high-level visit to Sri Lanka to emphasize the
importance of pragmatic efforts to reinvigorate the peace
process while stressing U.S. support is not automatic.


--------------
WICKREMESINGHE CAMPAIGN:
"TIME-IN-A-BOTTLE"
--------------


7. (C) Wickremesinghe's three years (2001-2004) at the helm
of the peace process as Prime Minister offer a good
indication of what tack he would pursue if elected President.
Unfortunately, however, he seems to expect he can simply
pick up with the LTTE where he left off--without taking into
account any of the complicating factors that have arisen in
the interim, e.g., (apparent) GSL support of the Karuna
faction; the degradation of the CFA on a near-daily basis;
increased suspicion of southern sincerity after the tsunami
aid mechanism (aka P-TOMS) fiasco; the Tigers' assassination
of Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar and the subsequent EU
travel ban, etc. The UNP candidate may be counting too
heavily on his past relations with the Tigers to compensate
for the greater distrust of the south spawned by the Karuna
split. Wickremesinghe will be unable to pick up where he
left off with the Tigers simply because the Tigers are not
there anymore; they have moved back (along with Kumaratunga's
government) from a point where negotiations still seemed
possible to a more entrenched, less flexible position.

--------------
INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT
--------------


8. (C) One of the pillars of Wickremesinghe's peace process
was what he termed the "international safety net." The term
encompassed both the political and financial support offered
by the international community underlined by the April 2003
Tokyo meeting and Declaration with its promise of a potential
USD 4.5 billion in development assistance. On the political
side, Sri Lanka garnered hgih-level attention around the
world, and Wickremesinghe himself had two Oval Office visits
in a short time frame. Wickremesinghe may well expect that
such high-level attention and resources will automatically
reappear if he is elected, although we and others have told
him that there are many competing demands for international
attention and funding.

--------------
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT:
CHIMERA OR REALITY?
--------------

9. (C) Wickremesinghe has made public and private overtures
inviting incumbent President Kumaratunga (who turns out to be
no fan of her own party's presidential candidate) to form a
national government with him if he is elected (Ref E). The
alliance of the two largest political parties, according to
this plan, would produce the much-wished-for but
never-realized southern consensus on a peaceful settlement
that has so far eluded Sinhalese politicians. (Also part of
the deal, according to some sources: a pledge to call early
general elections so that Kumaratunga can see her one-time
JVP alliance partners lose their seats in Parliament.)
Wickremesinghe could then take the unprecedented bipartisan
support of his peace plan to the Tigers as proof of southern
sincerity and thereby win their agreement to resume
negotiations.


10. (C) A national government probably is too good to be
true. However much Kumaratunga may wish to see a peaceful
settlement (and however gratified she might be to see the JVP
go down in electoral flames),it seems unlikely to us that
she would be willing to cede to Wickremesinghe the honor and
distinction of achieving it. For Kumaratunga, a
Wickremesinghe victory would also mean a Rajapakse
defeat--and thus a chance to reclaim the SLFP leadership for
herself and her family. For Kumaratunga, Leader of the
Opposition may remain a more attractive position than playing
second fiddle--even if it is in a front-row seat--in a
Wickremesinghe government. Despite the kind words on both
sides right now, we suspect that Kumaratunga may end up
deciding against joining her old foe in a national
government, if such a deal were offered by a triumphant
Wickremesinghe.

--------------
CO-CHAIR SEATS ARE
SECURE, BUT UTILITY LIMITED
--------------


11. (C) While Rajapakse might attempt to keep the co-chairs
at arm's length (at least in public),Wickremesinghe, if
elected, can be expected to welcome our public support. Like
Rajapakse, however, he may look to the co-chairs as a bridge
to the Tigers, especially in the early days of his
administration. Our ability to be effective in this regard
will, however, be largely determined by the extent to which
Wickremesinghe demonstrates that he is not bound by the
"old-think" of his previous term and is willing to explore
fresh approaches on the peace process. If Wickremesinghe is
elected, the U.S., along with other co-chairs, should:

--Meet with Wickremesinghe soon after his inauguration to
discuss what initiatives he may be considering;

--Reassess with him the role of the co-chairs in the absence
of significant progress toward peace since the Tokyo
Conference;

--Encourage him as quickly as possible to examine how to curb
the Karuna faction and other violence in the north and east
and discuss with the LTTE how to preserve and strengthen the
CFA;

--Use an early high-level visit from the U.S. to emphasize
that we support his pragmatic approach to peace-making, but
that there are many competing demands for international (and
U.S.) attention and resources.
LUNSTEAD