MALDIVES: DEMOCRACY STRATEGY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 001680

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR G, DRL, S/P, AND SA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/2015
TAGS: PHUM PGOV PREL EAID MALDIVES'>MV
SUBJECT: MALDIVES: DEMOCRACY STRATEGY

REF: A. STATE 169895

B. COLOMBO 1669

C. COLOMBO 1530

D. COLOMBO 1469

E. COLOMBO 1449

F. COLOMBO 1295

G. COLOMBO 1212

H. COLOMBO 1097

I. COLOMBO 997

Classified By: AMBASSADOR JEFFREY J. LUNSTEAD FOR REASONS 1.4(b) and (d
)


1. (C) Summary: Although MALDIVES was not listed as a focus
country in Reftel A, assisting MALDIVES in a peaceful
transition to multi-party democracy would serve broad USG
interests in promoting democracy and advancing human rights.
MALDIVES is a moderate Islamic country where both the
government and the citizens are favorably disposed to the US.
In the past six months, the Government of the Republic of
MALDIVES (GORM) has implemented important democratic reforms,
including codifying the establishment of a national human
rights commission, improving judicial procedures, permitting
prison visits by the International Committee of the Red
Cross, and legalizing political parties (Reftels B-G). Since
June 2, four parties have registered in MALDIVES. In
chronological order by date of party registration, they are:
the Maldivian Democratic Party (known as the MDP, it is the
major opposition party),the DRP (the government's party, the
title of which translates from the local language as
"Maldivian People's Party"),the Labor Party (which favors
democratic reforms),and the Adalath, or Justice Party (a
party made up primarily of fundamentalist Muslim clerics who
oppose democratic reforms). (Note: Despite the emergence of
four parties, most everyone in MALDIVES speaks exclusively
about "the Government" and "the Opposition," referring to the
MDP. End note.)


2. (C) Neither the GORM nor the major opposition MDP has the
political maturity or experience necessary to establish a
strongly functional multi-party democracy without some
external assistance Right now the desire for political
change of some kind is widespread in MALDIVES. The US can
play a critical role in helping ensure that this desire is
channeled productively-- toward support for democratic values
and respect for human rights rather than toward a more
fundamentalist and oppressive form of government. On
numerous occasions, GORM representatives, members of the
MALDIVES Human Rights Commission (MHRC),members of the
security forces, and Maldivian citizens have all asked
Emboffs for technical expertise in democracy building and
human rights in order to improve their own system of
government. Providing this much-needed--and
much-sought--assistance at this crucial juncture would
greatly benefit the MALDIVES while furthering our own
democracy-building objectives. End summary.


3. (C) The format of this cable is keyed to the questions
posed in Reftel A.

a. The key area of democratic deficit in MALDIVES is an acute
lack of awareness, at all levels --whether that of the
government, opposition party, the fledgling civil society, or
the general public-- as to how a multi-party democracy
functions effectively. Although the Government of the
Republic of MALDIVES (GORM) legalized political parties on
June 2, its ossified leadership, which has ruled the country
unchallenged for more than 25 years, does not yet understand
that a multi-party system must accommodate a diversity of
views and opinions-- including some opposed to the Government
(Reftel C). President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom and many of his
close advisors seem unclear on the distinction between legal
(even if obstreperous) criticism of the government, as
opposed to illegal, violent protest. It appears that Gayoom
often equates dissent with sedition, as is evidenced by the
August 12 arrest of Mohamed Nasheed, the chairperson of the
main opposition group the MALDIVES Democratic Party (MDP),on
that very charge (Reftel C). (Note: On August 12 Nasheed was
arrested for holding a peaceful sit-in. He is now awaiting
trial on one charge of terrorism and one charge of a crime
against the State, ostensibly for inciting people against
Gayoom and for his role in orchestrating pro-democracy
demonstrations August 12-14. End note.) Although the
President announced an ambitious reform agenda in mid-2004,
his obvious desire to control the process --and the
excruciatingly glacial pace of its progress-- have undermined
popular confidence in the sincerity of his commitment. The
police were formally separated from the military (known as
the National Security Service or NSS) only last year. Over
time, the NSS developed the reputation of sometimes serving
Gayoom's political purposes and being quick to use force.
That said, the NSS and the new police force clearly are eager
to improve their capabilities and to adapt to the new
atmosphere of greater respect for human rights and democratic
processes.

a. (cont.) The MDP, for its part, interprets its new role
as the major opposition party somewhat too literally, viewing
its primary function as opposing anything and everything the
President does without proposing an alternative vision of its
own. Both the GORM and the MDP lack the historical
perspective or experience to develop their respective
political parties as democratic institutions capable of
attracting popular support on the basis of principles and
programs, rather than on personalities and patronage. The
general public remain open to --even enthusiastic about--
reform, but are wary of joining political parties because
they are unsure how the bodies function or what useful
purpose they serve. Civic education remains essential in
MALDIVES, especially in light of the fact that government or
social studies classes are not/not offered in primary or
secondary schools. Within the next six to eight months,
desired outcomes in the MALDIVES would include:

--Greater public awareness of how democracies function and
the role of political parties within a democratic system;
--Adoption of a notional timeline for reform that includes
specific, verifiable benchmarks;
--Growth of political parties as democratic institutions
(development of party platforms, constitutions, a system for
selecting party leadership; public outreach; inter-party
dialogue and debate);
--Improved awareness of and respect for human rights within
both the police and NSS and continued evolution of the police
as a civilian force;
--Trials of opposition leaders detained after August 12-14
unrest proceed in a manner consistent with international
judicial standards.

b. Six-month diplomatic and programmatic strategy:

Present: Embassy urges GORM to demonstrate more convincing
commitment to reforms proposed by Gayoom in 2004; streamline
Special Majlis (the legislative body elected to consider
changes to the constitution) procedures; engage in dialogue
with MDP and other parties; ensure "safe passage" back home
to MDP activists living in self-imposed exile abroad;
monitors progress of trials of political detainees;
encourages MDP to develop its own political platform (other
than "we're against Gayoom"); continues DRL-funded program to
strengthen capacity of nascent Maldivian Human Rights
Commission; broadens inclusion of Maldivian candidates for
US-sponsored training and International Visitors Programs;
first-ever US-MALDIVES Friendship Week (September 23-27)
stresses respect for human rights, political diversity.

November-December: DRL-funded labor seminar encourages
adoption of worker rights legislation; Embassy visits to
detention facilities, monitoring of opposition trials help
ensure better treatment, more credible judicial process;
Embassy presses Gayoom to proceed with moves toward more
independent judiciary; Embassy supports speakers on judicial
reform; Department funds grant to begin civic/voter education
programs in each atoll; a group International Visitor program
for pro-government and opposition party members focuses on
party outreach activities, consensus-building.

January-March: DRL funds grant to assist in party-building
activities; parties develop internal organizations and seek
voter input into platforms and manifestos; Embassy-funded
conflict resolution specialist guides Government/opposition
consultations and consensus on timeline for reform; Embassy
engagement with Atoll Development Minister helps advance
steps to democratize appointment of atoll chiefs; Embassy
sponsors speaker program on investigative journalism to
stimulate thinking on media independence and responsibility.

c. To achieve the outcomes listed above, the following
resources would be highly beneficial:

--Department, through a grant to the National Democratic
Institute (NDI),International Republican Institute (IRI),or
a similar organization, could provide technical assistance in
helping parties strengthen and democratize their incipient
institutions. NDI visited MALDIVES in 2004 and was well
received by both Government and opposition supporters. A
grant to The Asia Foundation or a similar organization to
assist in developing a comprehensive civic education program
would also be helpful. (Note: USAID/Sri Lanka has no
program in MALDIVES and no bilateral agreement with the GORM
to permit it to conduct programs there. End note.)
--High level visits and discussions could focus on
encouraging the GORM to maintain its forward momentum in the
reform process with special emphasis on asking the GORM to
outline measurable benchmarks and a general timeline.
--Expanded slots for Maldivian International Visitor Program
and Fulbright participants would augment exposure to U.S.
society and democratic values.
--An ECA-funded workshop on investigative
journalism/professionalization of media would prompt broader
discussion of the role of the media in promoting democracy.
(Note: This could be done relatively inexpensively by
piggybacking on to an already-funded program scheduled for
Sri Lanka. End note.)
--An ECA-funded speaker program on building an independent
judicial system could help shape steps, now under
consideration, to give judicial authority greater autonomy.
--The police need training in investigative techniques and
methodologies to ensure respect for human rights. The
Department of Justice's International Criminal Investigative
Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) could branch into
MALDIVES from its current base in Sri Lanka by organizing
training sessions in Male' and by inviting Maldivian police,
security, and MHRC officials to participate in Colombo-based
training sessions. ICITAP could also provide classes such as
Community Policing, Basic Criminal Investigation, and Civil
Disorder Management courses. At the same time, the
Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) Program could provide
Critical Incident Management classes and the Senior Crisis
Management Seminar as well. Not only will these and similar
classes increase the professionalism of the police, each
class also includes training in human rights, thereby helping
the police force transition to a police service. A
well-trained police service with a firm grounding in human
and civil rights will have a strong and productive influence
on the evolution of a fully participatory democracy.

d. The major impediment to democratic progress in MALDIVES
is a lack of political maturity on the part of both the GORM
and the major opposition party, the MDP. The problem is
exacerbated by the complete absence of civic education.
While Maldivian citizens are aware of and engaged in
political debates, they lack basic knowledge about how a
party system functions or how democratic processes are
carried out (Reftel D).

e. More than 70 percent of Maldivians are under the age of
35, and the GORM is unable to provide adequate educational
and employment opportunities for its burgeoning younger
population. Because there are no institutions of higher
learning in MALDIVES, ambitious young Maldivians are either
sent to the west (primarily UK and Australia) to university
or to Saudi Arabia or Pakistan to madrassahs. GORM officials
have expressed concern that Islamic fundamentalist influences
from Saudi Arabia and Pakistan may endanger the moderate
strain of Islam indigenous to MALDIVES. One newly formed
political party, the Adalath, or Justice Party, is comprised
of Islamic scholars, and the party tends to encourage
religious fundamentalism as an alternative to democracy.
While the party appears to have garnered only minimal support
so far, GORM officials remain concerned. Dependent on
revenues from Western tourists, the GORM has generally been
responsive to pressure from the international community,
including the USG, the EU, and the Commonwealth. GORM
officials and MDP representatives have both expressed
disappointment that the South Asian Association for Regional
Cooperation (SAARC) and its member governments have not taken
a greater interest in MALDIVES.

f. The GORM has undertaken a number of democratic reforms
over the past six months, including legally recognizing and
registering political parties and codifying the MHRC (Reftels
F and B). Opposition parties were allowed to meet publicly,
albeit with prior permission from the GORM (Reftel C).
Furthermore, following a 2004 Criminal Justice Action Plan
drafted by the Attorney General's Office, the prison system
improved and a system of bail was instituted in 2005.
Moreover, the GORM permitted both visiting diplomats and the
International Committee of the Red Cross to conduct prison
visits. The GORM was fully cooperative and provided
unfettered access to all of the prisoners and detention
centers. According to ICRC, the police and NSS readily
acknowledge their need for more extensive human rights
training, and ICRC is examining ways to provide that
expertise. In addition, the International Committee of
Jurists sent an observer to opposition leader Mohamed
Nasheed's pre-trial hearing on August 25, and the GORM
provided logistical support, including a court-appointed
translator. In sum, the GORM has been more cooperative and
open to international concern about human rights in MALDIVES
than at any time in the recent past. In September, the GORM
signed the UN Optional Protocol to the Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment. Despite this progress, however, the opposition
leader is currently in jail pending charges of terrorism and
a crime against the State, raising concerns amongst human
rights groups that his prosecution is politically motivated
(Reftel C). Freedom of assembly also remains constrained, as
does press freedom, which is limited de facto by GORM control
over the only local television and radio stations.

g. Consequences of pursuing this agenda: There is a strong
sense that MALDIVES is at a crossroads, and our timely
assistance, if keyed to the critical needs mentioned before,
could make a big difference in the direction this moderate
Muslim nation decides to take. As noted above, average
Maldivians are eager for political reform but unsure how to
proceed to achieve that change. Both Government and
opposition actors have requested U.S. technical assistance in
strengthening democratic institutions. The U.S. is, in
general, favorably perceived by the GORM, the opposition, and
by average Maldivians. What we say in MALDIVES matters, and
the GORM takes seriously our recommendations. (For example,
prison conditions for detainees improved dramatically last
year after the Ambassador pressed the GORM to allow access to
legal counsel, exercise, reading materials, etc.) Moreover,
because we have no presence in MALDIVES, we do not believe
that we run the risk of "over-exposure" or being accused of
western meddling/cultural imperialism. There is some
backlash in more conservative segments of society against
GORM-proposed reforms to allow female judges and to permit a
woman to run for President. Some of our efforts, if
perceived as furthering those aims, could come in for similar
criticism on religious grounds. There is no/no religious
freedom in MALDIVES; any effort to introduce discussion of
reform in that sensitive area would not be well received by
either the GORM or the local population.



LUNSTEAD