SRI LANKA: TIME FOR CO-CHAIRS TO STAND UP AGAINST

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001604

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2015
TAGS: PTER PGOV PHUM PREL CE LTTE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: TIME FOR CO-CHAIRS TO STAND UP AGAINST
LTTE VIOLENCE

REF: COLOMBO 1537

Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead for reasons 1.4 (b) and (
d).


1. (C) The co-chairs will meet in New York at a
time when the prospects for tangible progress on
the Sri Lanka peace process are underwhelming,
especially in the wake of the Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam's (LTTE) refusal to accept the latest
proposal by the Norwegian facilitators for a
cease-fire agreement (CFA) meeting at Colombo
airport (septel). In addition, the brutal August
12 assassination of Sri Lankan Foreign Minister
Kadirgamar by the LTTE; a presidential election
(and, perhaps, a parliamentary election) which at
best will turn attention away from the peace
process and at worst widen existing ethnic
tensions; and a steady drumbeat of killings on the
margins of the CFA are exerting concerted pressure
on an already faltering peace process. The co-
chairs' past practice of issuing carefully
measured statements exhorting both sides to pursue
peace has had near-negligible impact in
influencing Tiger behavior since the 2003 Tokyo
donors conference. If the co-chairs are to remain
relevant to the fast-disintegrating peace process,
it is imperative that they explore new ways to
improve Tiger behavior and push the peace process
forward. To do this, the co-chairs must stiffen
the usual pro-peace statement-which this time
should convey an unambiguous message that LTTE
terrorism will earn the Tigers international
opprobrium and isolation-with tangible immediate
actions, i.e., a crackdown on LTTE fundraising,
weapons procurement and travel to foreign
capitals.


2. (C) First, the co-chairs must unequivocally
support the GSL's laudably measured response to
Kadirgamar's murder. To its credit, the GSL,
while harshly condemning the killing, has made
clear that it remains committed to the peace
process, as illustrated by its willingness to sit
down to discuss CFA implementation with the LTTE
when the blood on the Tigers' hands was barely
dry. At the same time, the GSL has urged its
foreign partners to curb LTTE operations overseas.
This "two track" policy, if a little clumsy in
formulation and expression in the hectic days
right after Kadirgamar's murder, makes sense and
needs explicit co-chair support in New York.
Thus, the co-chairs should, both in their
discussions and statement, harshly condemn
Kadirgamar's murder, call for the world community
to squeeze LTTE operations abroad and praise GSL
willingness to stay in the peace game when it
would have been politically popular at home to
wave the bloody shirt and pull the plug on the
peace process.


3. (C) Second, the co-chairs must underscore
their support for the Norwegian facilitators and
the Scandinavian-led Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission
(SLMM),whose roles have increasingly become a
political football in Sri Lanka, especially as
election fever mounts. While UN envoy Brahimi,
during his recent visit here, scotched rumors that
the UN was going to replace the Norwegians, there
continues to be an undercurrent of ill-informed
resentment against the Norwegians. This has been
magnified by unfortunate public statements by the
likes of new FM Anura Bandanaraike, and by the
strong criticism of the Norwegians in the
electoral pact signed last week by SLFP
Presidential candidate Rajapakse with the JVP. To
their credit, the Norwegians have kept at it when
it would have been easy to walk away, as
illustrated by the effort to get the LTTE to agree
to an airport CFA implementation meeting and the
announcement that former SLMM head Tronde Furhovde
will visit soon as a Norwegian envoy. The
Norwegian and SLMM focus is to concentrate on
keeping the CFA intact during the months ahead,
especially during the election(s),so that after
the new government emerges, a basis for a return
to a tangible peace process will still exist.


4. (C) Third, and most challenging, the co-chairs
need to talk bluntly about how they should
proceed. There is a tendency by all parties in
Sri Lanka to push their country's problems onto
foreign actors. In the case of the peace process,
this means a constant refrain of wondering when
(to name a few) the co-chairs, or the Norwegians,
or the Indians will bring peace to Sri Lanka. A
good case can be made that perhaps the co-chairs
should step back a bit over the next few months
and let Sri Lankans, especially during electoral
season, sort out peace priorities for themselves.
The challenge, of course, would be to do that
without creating a sense of abandonment.
Unfortunately, the Tigers' assassination of
Foreign Minister Kadirgamar has poisoned the pre-
electoral political atmosphere by exacerbating
ethnic tensions and feeding the Sinhalese
nationalist anti-peace lobby, led by the Janatha
Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP). While co-chair
statements in the past have tried to strike a
careful balance between encouraging progress and
condemning backsliding on both sides, the Tigers'
ruthless, unprovoked killing of the Foreign
Minister has unquestionably tipped the scales, and
the co-chairs must say so explicitly or risk
becoming completely irrelevant to the foundering
peace process.


5. (C) The LTTE's outrageous behavior merits
unambiguous condemnation-tied to immediate
negative consequences-from the international
community. The co-chairs should state bluntly
that LTTE actions are intolerable and unless LTTE
behavior improves, the attitude and behaviour of
the international community towards the LTTE will
be different. The statement must reinforce this
stance with explicit actions, e.g., careful
investigation of Tiger fundraising operations
abroad; curtailing Tiger weapons procurement
efforts overseas; an indefinite moratorium on
outside visits to Kilinocchi except for Norwegian
facilitators; a ban on LTTE visits to foreign
capitals.


6. (C) While the co-chairs meeting in New York
needs to get down to practical actions rather
than focusing on the contents of a statement, it
is essential that a public pronouncement follow
the meeting. We suggest it incorporate the
following themes:

Begin text of draft statement

The co-chairs met in New York on (date) and
reviewed the situation in Sri Lanka in light of
the brutal August 12 murder of former Foreign
Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar by the Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE),the continued
killings on the margins of the cease-fire
agreement (CFA) and the impending Presidential
election in Sri Lanka. The co-chairs condemned
the murder of Minister Kadirgamar in the strongest
possible terms and called on the world community
to take action against fundraising and weapons
procurement by the LTTE. In view of the LTTE's
persistent disregard for the commitments it
undertook in the CFA, culminating in the ruthless
assassination of our respected colleague, the co-
chairs decided that, with the exception of Norway,
they will suspend any meetings with LTTE
representatives in Kilinochchi or elsewhere,
including foreign capitals. They called on other
countries to implement a similar policy. The co-
chairs also praised the Government of Sri Lanka
(GSL) for its willingness, even in the immediate
aftermath of Kadirgamar's murder, to meet in
Sri Lanka with the LTTE to discuss improvements
in CFA implementation and urged the LTTE to
accept the GSL's offer to do so. Moreover,
the co-chairs called on all parties
to dedicate themselves to maintaining the CFA in
the months ahead, especially during the upcoming
election in Sri Lanka. Finally, the co-chairs
expressed their full support for the tireless
facilitation role played by Norway and valuable
truce monitoring function performed by the Sri
Lanka Monitoring Mission.

End text of draft statement.


7. (U) Ambassador will meet with other co-chair
chiefs of Mission on Tuesday, September 13 and
will report their thoughts.
LUNSTEAD