SRI LANKAN GOVERNMENT URGES EU TERRORIST

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001547

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SA/INS, S/CT, KATRINA TASK FORCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2015
TAGS: PTER PREL EFIN EAID PGOV CE LTTE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKAN GOVERNMENT URGES EU TERRORIST
DESIGNATION FOR LTTE, INVITES UN ENVOY

REF: A. COLOMBO 1537 (NOTAL)


B. COLOMBO 1493 (NOTAL)

C. COLOMBO 1453 (NOTAL)

Classified By: CHARGE' D'AFFAIRES JAMES F. ENTWISTLE. REASON: 1.4 (B,
D)


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SUMMARY
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1. (C) In a September 2 meeting, Foreign Secretary H.M.G.S.
Palihakkara briefed Charge' on the status of Government of
Sri Lanka (GSL) efforts to persuade the European Union to
proscribe the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) as a
terrorist organization and to review possible funding flows
from EU nations to the LTTE (Refs B and C). Palihakkara said
the GSL hopes recent evidence of LTTE responsibility for the
August 12 assassination of Foreign Minister Lakshman
Kadirgamar, communicated to the UK High Commissioner
September 1, will convince EU members to designate the Tigers
at a meeting on the topic scheduled for September 7 in
Brussels. Palihakkara underscored that the upcoming visit to
Colombo of a UN official was aimed at helping the GSL review
ways to strengthen the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA)--and was not
meant as an indirect expression of GSL displeasure with
Norwegian facilitation efforts. Charge' thanked the Foreign
Secretary for the Sri Lankan offer of assistance to the

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victims of Hurricane Katrina. End summary.

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GSL SEEKING EU CONSENSUS
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2. (C) In a September 2 meeting, Foreign Secretary H.M.G.S.
Palihakkara updated Charge' on Government of Sri Lanka (GSL)
efforts to persuade the European Union to list the Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) as a terrorist organization.
Palihakkara provided Charge' with a copy of an Aide Memoire
given to the UK High Commissioner on August 29 formally
requesting the inclusion of the Tigers on the EU List of
Persons, Groups and Entities involved in Terrorist Acts. The
note states that although "the Government of Sri Lanka has
long believed that the terrorist acts engaged in by the LTTE
fully merit its inclusion in the EU List," the GSL had
desisted from urging EU action following the signing of the
Ceasefire Agreement with the LTTE in 2002 "until the heinous
murder of the late Foreign Minister of Sri Lanka on 12th
August, 2005." Palihakkara acknowledged that the August 29
note offered only circumstantial evidence of LTTE
responsibility for the assassination, e.g., previous
unsuccessful LTTE attempts on Kadirgamar's life; the arrest
of two LTTE cadres in the vicinity of Kadirgamar's residence
on July 30; previous LTTE assassinations by sniper and other
Tiger-trademark similarities to the crime; and the
"ghoulish," gloating reaction to the killing in media
sympathetic to the LTTE. The aide memoire also contains
several annexes of supplemental information on the history of
LTTE terrorist activities over the past 30 years.


3. (C) On September 1, Palihakkara reported, he had provided
the UK High Commissioner an addendum to the August 29 note (a
copy of which Palihakkara handed to Charge') containing what
the GSL believes is more conclusive evidence of LTTE guilt:
confessions obtained by police from two Tamil men, one of
whom was employed as a gardener at the next-door residence
from which the assassin's bullets were fired, implicating the
LTTE in the crime. According to the gardener's statement, in
February 2004 he was introduced to three LTTE cadres in
Colombo who demanded his "help" and brought him to LTTE
headquarters in Kilinochchi in May 2005, where he met
"Charles," the LTTE intelligence chief in charge of
operations in the south. Following that visit, the gardener
returned to Colombo, where he assisted "Vinothan," an LTTE
cadre, to perform surveillance on the late Minister's house,
obtain a key to the adjacent house and bring in materials to
construct the improvised tripod used to mount the murder
weapon. At "Vinothan's" insistence, the statement continues,
the gardener also let two unidentified Tamil men into the
house the night of August 10.

4. (C) Even Norwegian facilitators are saying in private
that they are convinced of the Tigers' guilt, the Foreign
Secretary commented. Palihakkara said the GSL hopes that

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this stronger evidence of LTTE culpability in Kadirgamar's
killing would succeed in convincing EU member nations to
designate the Tigers. He reported that a meeting of member
states' representatives "at the functional level" will
address this topic in Brussels on September 7. The GSL is
buttressing its effort with demarches in several European
capitals as well, he noted. He expressed gratitude to
Assistant Secretary for South Asian Affairs Christina Rocca
for raising the issue in her recent meetings in London, and
for US discussions with Canada. Sri Lankan Ambassador to
U.S. Bernard Goonetilleke will follow up by traveling to
Ottawa as a special envoy to press the case, Palihakkara
said. Charge' noted that the Indian High Commissioner had
told him that her government would also "lobby" UK Prime
Minister Blair to designate the Tigers at an upcoming
Indian-EU summit.

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TRO TOO?
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5. (C) In the same meeting, MFA Legal Advisor Rohan Perera
reported that ongoing GSL efforts to track the flow of
foreign funds through the LTTE-affiliated Tamil
Rehabilitation Organization (TRO) revealed that USD 9 million
had been funneled through the charity from abroad since
January. The GSL is trying to obtain a country-by-country
breakdown on the funding, as well as additional information
on individual contributors, Perera noted, adding that a
significant amount of money appears to have been come from
South Africa through Australia to TRO coffers. The LTTE is
adept at hiding money, Perera observed; funds that were
supposed to have been frozen in the UK after the British
Charity Commission de-listed the TRO as a charitable
organization August 10 have nonetheless been successfully
transferred to White Pigeon, another LTTE front. Because it
does not wish to impede ongoing post-tsunami reconstruction
and humanitarian aid in LTTE-affected areas, the GSL is not
moving to proscribe the TRO itself, Palihakkara interjected.
The GSL accepts TRO as an organization in Sri Lanka, but does
not accept that the TRO has the right to raise funds abroad
for its activities, he clarified. The GSL is thus counting
on "our friends" to take a hard look at funding sources, the
Foreign Secretary concluded.

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NO HIDDEN MESSAGE IN UN SPECIAL ENVOY VISIT
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6. (C) Raising the upcoming visit to Sri Lanka of UN
official Lakhdar Brahimi (Ref A),Charge' asked if a trip to
LTTE headquarters in Kilinochchi was scheduled for the
visitor. Palihakkara replied that Brahimi is coming as a
special envoy from UN Secretary General Annan to "review the
operation of the Ceasefire Agreement"; the human rights
situation, especially with respect to child soldiers
recruited by the LTTE; and to determine "what can the UN do"
to bolster the peace process. The UN does not envision a
role as facilitator, Palihakkara stressed. (Comment: The
Norwegians suspect that Brahimi's visit, following so closely
on recent anti-Norwegian comments from newly appointed
Foreign Minister Anura Bandaranaike, is meant to convey GSL
dissatisfaction at Oslo's facilitation efforts. End comment.)

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GSL RESPONSE TO KATRINA
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7. (SBU) Charge' expressed U.S. gratitude for the
condolences offered by President Chandrika Kumaratunga in the
wake of Hurricane Katrina and for the GSL's pledge of USD
25,000 to the American Red Cross. Palihakkara replied that
although the GSL was able to give only a "token" amount of
aid, the Sri Lankan government and people "had to do
something" to show their appreciation of U.S. generosity
after the tsunami. He added that the GSL also plans to send
a consignment of "one or two tons" of instant tea as
emergency relief; details of the shipment will be provided
next week.

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COMMENT
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8. (C) The GSL, as Palihakkara has noted to us previously,
continues to be in the unenviable "dilemma" of urging other
countries to slap a terrorist designation on an organization
that the GSL itself, in the interests of furthering the peace
process, has not proscribed. The GSL is in an obvious bind:
it can neither abandon the peace process by designating the
Tigers itself nor appear "too soft" by not coming down hard
on the Tigers. Designations by the EU and Canada would send
an unmistakable message from the international community
condemning continued LTTE terrorism.
ENTWISTLE