Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05COLOMBO1453
2005-08-18 09:13:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Colombo
Cable title:  

SRI LANKA: NORWEGIAN FACILITATORS SEND LETTER TO

Tags:  PTER PGOV NO CE LTTE 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 001453 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2015
TAGS: PTER PGOV NO CE LTTE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: NORWEGIAN FACILITATORS SEND LETTER TO
LTTE LEADER PRABHAKARAN VIA LONDON, GSL ASKS EU TO LIST
LTTE AS TERRORIST ORGANIZATION

REF: COLOMBO 1440 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Charge' d'Affaires, a.i. James F. Entwistle for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 001453

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2015
TAGS: PTER PGOV NO CE LTTE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: NORWEGIAN FACILITATORS SEND LETTER TO
LTTE LEADER PRABHAKARAN VIA LONDON, GSL ASKS EU TO LIST
LTTE AS TERRORIST ORGANIZATION

REF: COLOMBO 1440 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Charge' d'Affaires, a.i. James F. Entwistle for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary. In their August 17 meeting with LTTE
theoretician Anton Balasingham in London, Norwegian FM
Petersen and DFM Helgesen passed a letter to LTTE leader
Prabhakaran (text below). At GSL request, EU missions in
Colombo will recommend to Brussels that the EU designate
the LTTE as a terrorist organization. End Summary


2. (C) Norwegian Ambassador Hans Brattskar called on
Charge' August 18 to follow up on Norwegian Deputy Foreign
Minister Helgesen's August 16 meeting with Colombo co-chair
representatives. Brattskar confirmed that Norwegian
Foreign Minister Petersen and Helgesen had called on LTTE
theoretician Anton Balasingham August 17 in London and had
given Balasingham a letter to be passed to LTTE leader
Prabhakaran (text below).


3. (C) Brattskar noted that he was not sharing a copy of
the Prabhakaran letter with the GSL since that was not
normal practice. Moreover, the contents of Petersen and
Helgesen's Monday night meeting with President Kumaratunga
had clearly been leaked to the Colombo press ("Vidar is
hopping mad!"),so passing a copy to the GSL would be "like
giving it to the Sunday papers," Brattskar mused. He asked
that the U.S. not share the letter.


4. (C) Brattskar said that Balasingham had promised
Petersen and Helgesen he would translate and transmit the
letter to Kilinochchi immediately. Balasingham had
expressed concern over recent LTTE actions in the North and
East but had danced around the question of responsibility
for Kadirgamar's assassination (and disavowed any prior
knowledge). Balasingham, Brattskar said, had been pleased
at the prospect of receiving the Norwegian FM and at the
idea of more direct Norwegian contact with Prabhakaran
(although Balasingham said he would want to be present at
any such meetings as he usually has in the past - Brattskar
said the Norwegians have only met Prabhakaran once when
Balasingham was not present). Balasingham did not discuss

travel plans to Sri Lanka but Brattskar noted that when he
had seen Balasingham in London in July, the LTTE
theoretician had said he was thinking about travel to
Kilinochchi in October.


5. (C) Brattskar undertook to advise Charge' as soon as the
Norwegians had some reaction to the Prabhakaran letter. He
noted that as far as he knew a Petersen/Rice conversation
was still scheduled to take place this week. The
Norwegians, Brattskar concluded, continue to like the idea
of a September co-chairs meeting in New York although,
given Japanese sensitivities about their standing
invitation to host the next meeting in October, the New
York meeting should perhaps be billed as something like a
preparatory meeting.


6. (C) On a related topic, the British DCM told Charge'
August 18 that the GSL had just convoked her High
Commissioner (as holder of the EU Presidency in Colombo)
and the EC Charge' to ask that the European Union list the
LTTE as a terrorist organization (apparently there is a
mechanism through which the EU can designate terrorist
organizations on a union-wide basis in addition to whatever
procedures individual EU members states may have). The EU
missions in Colombo plan to endorse the idea strongly to
Brussels. The British DCM said she is familiarizing
herself on the details of the procedure and the potential
timeline for such listing.


7. (C) Text of Norwegian letter (please protect closely) to
Prabhakaran follows:

Begin text

Letter from Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Minister of Foreign Affairs

To
Mr. Velupillai Prabhakaran
Leader
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

Oslo, 16 August 2005

Dear Mr. Prabhakaran

As I am sure you realize, the peace process is now in a
critical situation. The killings and counter-killings over
the last few months have been watched with mounting concern
by Norway and the international community. Along with the
continued recruitment of children to the LTTE, this has
created distrust about the LTTE's intentions as regards the
peace process.

The assassination of Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar
has exacerbated the situation. It is not up to Norway to
draw conclusions about the criminal investigations now
under way in Colombo, or on any other judicial matter in
relation with the killings. However, public perception
both in Sri Lanka and internationally is that the LTTE is
responsible. This public perception is a political
reality. The LTTE needs to respond to this situation in a
way that demonstrates continued commitment to the peace
process.

I see it as my obligation to make clear to you the
political choice now facing the LTTE. If the LTTE does not
take a positive step forward at this critical juncture, the
international reaction could be severe.

Against this backdrop I would ask you urgently to consider
the following steps:

1. To accept the Norwegian Government's invitation to
participate in a review of the implementation of the
Ceasefire Agreement in order to find practical ways of
ensuring full compliance by both parties.

2. To establish direct communications between the LTTE and
the Sri Lankan Army in the east, in order to improve
security.

3. To accept without delay the Sri Lanka Monitoring
Mission proposal for transportation of LTTE cadres.

4. To collaborate in a practical way with government
initiatives to speed up reconstruction in the north and
east. The LTTE's continued commitment to the P-TOMS
agreement is vital in this regard.

5. To take effective steps to halt killings and to cease
the recruitment of underage combatants.

I trust that you appreciate the gravity of the present
situation and will take steps to demonstrate to the
international community that the LTTE is committed to the
peace process.

Yours sincerely,

Jan Petersen

End Text
ENTWISTLE