SRI LANKA: HELGESEN BRIEFS CO-CHAIRS ON NORWEGIAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 001440

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/16/2015
TAGS: PREL PTER NO CE LTTE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: HELGESEN BRIEFS CO-CHAIRS ON NORWEGIAN
INTENTIONS IN THE WAKE OF KADIRGAMAR ASSASSINATION

REF: (A) COLOMBO 1425 (B) COLOMBO 1399

Classified By: Charge' d'Affaires, a.i. James F. Entwistle for reason 1
.4 (d).


1. (C) Summary. The Norwegian facilitators have
shared with the co-chairs a constructive plan for
putting the burden on the Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam (LTTE) for the next steps in the peace
process while also heading off rash actions by the
government (GSL). The Norwegians will give LTTE
theoretician Anton Balasingham in London August 17
five "areas of opportunity" for the LTTE to show
that it is a serious interlocutor. The Norwegians
and the GSL would welcome higher-level Balasingham
contacts from other governments as well. The
Norwegians would also welcome public statements
from capitals that make clear the LTTE is
responsible for next steps in the peace process
and express hope that the P-TOMS will be revived
soon. In her upcoming telephone conversation with
Norwegian FM Petersen, the Secretary may wish to
express support for the Norwegian plan. End
Summary


2. (C) Norwegian Deputy Foreign Minister Vidar
Helgesen, who accompanied Foreign Minister
Petersen to Colombo for assassinated Sri Lankan
Foreign Minister Kadirgamar's funeral, met with
Colombo co-chair representatives (Charge', UK High
Commissioner Evans, Japanese Ambassador Suda, EC
Charge' Wilton) August 16 to brief them on
Norwegian observations and intentions in the wake
of Kadirgamar's murder. Norwegian Ambassador
Brattskar sat in with Helgesen.

CBK "Positive and Strategic"
--------------


3. (C) Helgesen first briefed on Foreign Minister
Petersen's meeting with Sri Lankan President
Chandrika Bandanaraike Kumaratunga (CBK) the night
before, characterizing it as a "good meeting" in
which "we found her more strategic than ever.")
Helgesen said CBK walked Petersen through the
status of the investigation; she put at "70 per
cent" the likelihood that the LTTE was behind the
assassination. Clearly, Helgesen said, the GSL is
under pressure to "do something" and has "limited
room for maneuver." Norway is relieved so far to
see GSL leaders making public statements about
continued commitment to the cease-fire agreement
(CFA),etc. which CBK reiterated in her meeting
with the Norwegians. Helgesen said it is clear
from the CBK meeting that the primary GSL strategy
right now is to mobilize the international
community to increase condemnation of and pressure
on the LTTE to see if that will bring modified
behavior from the Tigers. The Norwegians had
found CBK (as well as Peace Secretariat Secgen
Jayantha Dhanapala and Foreign Secretary
Palihakkara who sat in with her) supportive of the
Norwegian strategy (see below) for the weeks
ahead. Helgesen concluded that CBK was "stepping
up to it" and "showing considerable wisdom in a
difficult period."

Norwegian Strategy: More London Contact
--------------


4. (C) Turning to Norwegian next steps, Helgesen
noted that he had seen LTTE theoretician Anton
Balasingham en route from Oslo for the funeral and
that he and FM Petersen would call on him again in
London on the way back August 17. This reflects
the Norwegian view that it is time for them to
spend more time working through Balasingham since
they have greater confidence that their messages
will get to LTTE leader Prabhakaran than through
the usual channel via political wing leader
Thamilchelvan (as reported earlier, the Norwegians
will also insist on more face time with
Prabhakaran when they do go to Kilinochchi).


5. (C) Petersen will tell Balasingham that it is
a "moment of truth" for the LTTE. Whether or not
the LTTE killed Kadirgamar, the ball is clearly in
the LTTE's court to show good faith and take the
next step in the peace process. "Politically, the
burden of proof is on the LTTE. We will tell
Balasingham that they will be measured by the
degree to which they take positive steps in the
immediate future." Petersen and Helgesen will
tell Balasingham that they see five possible
"areas of opportunity" for the LTTE to display
good faith (and might leave a memorandum on the
subject for Prabhakaran with Balasingham; they
haven't decided yet). Those five items are:

-- The LTTE should agree to meet with the GSL
and the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) to
discuss CFA implementation. Helgesen said this
is the most important of the five items and
stressed that this would not be a reopening of
the CFA terms but a meeting on how to make it
work better. Helgesen commented that if the
LTTE had not killed Kadirgamar, then they should
have even more incentive to come to such a
meeting so that they could make their case in
this regard.

-- The LTTE should accept the SLMM proposal on
arrangements for the transportation of LTTE
cadres across GSL territory. Helgesen said the
LTTE has been dragging its feet on this for
several weeks; meanwhile, he said, the
government has agreed to go back to its previous
practices which Helgesen described as "very
generous." (Brattskar interjected that SLMM
chief Haukland will be in Kilinochchi August 18
for a meeting that was scheduled to discuss the
transportation issue but now would "obviously
include many other issues.")

-- The LTTE should stop political killings and
the recruiting of child soldiers.

-- The LTTE should demonstrate willingness to
expand collaboration with the GSL on tsunami
reconstruction. The GSL, Helgesen said, is
willing to expand relief to LTTE areas and the
Tigers should take them up on this.

--The LTTE should immediately re-establish contact
with the Sri Lanka army in the East. The LTTE has
stopped its routine contact with the Army across
the board (such contacts continue only in Jaffna,
according to Helgesen),and this lack of daily
contact leads to misunderstandings and could lead
to much more. This is especially key, Helgesen
said, if in fact Sri Lanka is headed for elections
before the end of the year.

Support from the International Community
--------------


6. (C) Turning to the role of the "international
community," Helgesen noted that finding the
balance between "censoring and engaging" the LTTE
is a "continuing dilemma" for each country,
especially in the wake of the assassination. He
noted that the idea of another LTTE trip to Europe
had been dead for some time. Helgesen said that
in his visit here several weeks ago (Ref B),he
had urged more diplomatic trips to Kilinochchi.
He is backing off that position now after the
Kadirgamar murder since it would be "too
detrimental to your standing in the South."


7. (C) The best thing concerned countries can do,
Helgesen opined, is to put out public statements
which make clear that it is up to the LTTE to take
the next political steps. Helgesen said it was
none of his business what individual countries
chose to say publicly about LTTE culpability for
the Kadirgamar assassination. "What would really
help us is a fairly unified public line about LTTE
responsibility for the next steps in the peace
process."


8. (C) Helgesen said Norway would also encourage
higher level contacts with Balasingham from all
countries ("I understand the United States has its
own position on LTTE contacts," he quickly added).
He encouraged in particular the British to engage
Balasingham at a "higher level than usual" and
suggested that Japanese envoy Akashi also include
a call on Balasingham in his next trip to Europe.
Helgesen stressed that the GSL was fully on board
with the Norwegians and others having more contact
with Balasingham.

Petersen/Rice Phone Call Imminent
--------------


9. (C) Helgesen noted that FM Petersen has a
telephone call scheduled with Secretary Rice "very
soon." The main topic, Helgesen said, is
"something else," but Petersen undoubtedly would
turn briefly to Sri Lanka during the call.

Importance of P-TOMS
--------------


10. (C) Helgesen and Petersen had called on Prime
Minister Mahinda Rajapakse and on Opposition
Leader Ranil Wickremesinghe earlier on August 16.
Helgesen said they had found Rajapakse's position
"somewhere in between CBK and his funeral oration
yesterday" (the PM delivered a podium-thumping
condemnation of the LTTE at Kadirgamar's funeral).
Ranil was quite predictable, Helgesen said, but
said it was absolutely crucial that a way be found
to get the Post Tsunami Operational Management
Structure (P-TOMS),recently partially derailed by
the Supreme Court, back in action as a confidence
building measure with the LTTE. Ranil told
Helgesen he hoped the international community
would make statements to "pressure the Supreme
Court on P-TOMS."


11. (C) Helgesen said that Ranil was absolutely
right about the P-TOMS. It was important, the
Norwegian told the co-chair reps, to understand
the importance of this issue for the LTTE. Tiger
political chief Thamilchelvan in particular had
put his "internal credibility" on the line to
negotiate the P-TOMS only to see "the South," in
the LTTE view, scuttle it. "The LTTE is
incredibly angry about this," Helgesen said.
Given the fate of the P-TOMS, how can the Tigers
have any confidence that whatever political
structures or arrangements that might be created
to enable a lasting peace settlement would not be
scuttled just as quickly? Helgesen expressed hope
that public statements from capitals could support
the P-TOMS as well.

Co-chair meeting in New York?
--------------


12. (C) Helgesen said his government strongly
endorsed a September co-chairs meeting in New York
on the margins of UNGA. He hoped that co-chair
capitals could get back to the Norwegians on their
receptivity to this quickly so that it could be
set up soon. A September meeting would fit with
the Norwegian strategy. The LTTE will receive the
Norwegian list of five areas of opportunity,
buttressed by statements from concerned capitals
putting pressure on the Tigers. If there was no
discernible response over the following month,
then a September meeting would be perfectly timed
to consider further ways to ratchet up the
pressure. (Helgesen noted that the GSL is
comfortable with this strategy as well, which he
said "is much better than the government
undertaking hasty actions.")

Comment
--------------


13. (C) The assassination of FM Kadirgamar raises
very obvious and grave doubts about the LTTE's
commitment to the peace process. That said, the
President has made clear her intention to try to
rescue the peace process, and the co-chairs have
to find ways to advance that aim. The Norwegians
clearly are putting even more energy into their
facilitative duties here in the wake of the
Kadirgamar assassination. Their approach, as
presented by Helgesen, makes sense. Among other
things, it will lessen the possibility of rash GSL
action. We will forward a draft U.S. public
statement septel in the next few days. In the
meantime, Secretary Rice may wish to tell the
Norwegian FM in their telephone conversation that
we find the Norwegian plan, as outlined to the co-
chairs in Colombo, to be imaginative and
constructive and that it has full U.S. support.
End Comment
ENTWISTLE