Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05COLOMBO1291
2005-07-25 11:46:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Colombo
Cable title:  

PRESIDENT SAYS GOVERNMENT WILL ABIDE BY CEASEFIRE,

Tags:  PREL PTER EAID PGOV CE NO LTTE 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 001291 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/26/2015
TAGS: PREL PTER EAID PGOV CE NO LTTE
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT SAYS GOVERNMENT WILL ABIDE BY CEASEFIRE,
ASKS FOR LTTE TO DO SAME


Classified By: AMBASSADOR JEFFREY J. LUNSTEAD FOR REASON 1.4 (D).

This cable contains an action request - see para 7.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 001291

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/26/2015
TAGS: PREL PTER EAID PGOV CE NO LTTE
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT SAYS GOVERNMENT WILL ABIDE BY CEASEFIRE,
ASKS FOR LTTE TO DO SAME


Classified By: AMBASSADOR JEFFREY J. LUNSTEAD FOR REASON 1.4 (D).

This cable contains an action request - see para 7.


1. (C) SUMMARY: Co-chairs told President Kumaratunga
ceasefire was under threat, that LTTE bore brunt of blame
for ceasefire violations, but that current upsurge of
violence in East required both sides to take steps.
Kumaratunga said she had given orders to security forces to
not attack LTTE, but that some elements might act anyway,
and Karuna forces were difficult to control. She asked
that Co-chairs also impress on LTTE need to stop killings.
END SUMMARY


2. (C) Ambassador and other Co-chair Chiefs of Mission (UK
for EU, Japan, Norway) called on President Kumaratunga July
25 to discuss ceasefire issues. Kumaratunga was
accompanied by Foreign Minister Kadirgamar, Foreign
Secretary Palihakkara, and Peace Secretariat Head

SIPDIS
Dhanapala. Ambassador began by saying that Co-chairs had
requested meeting because of concern about the ceasefire.
Co-chair Senior Officials had mentioned this concern in
their June 13 statement; Co-chairs in Colombo had repeated
the concern in their July 19 statement.


3. (c) These statements did not imply moral equivalency
between the Government and the LTTE. The LTTE were
egregious offenders and bore the brunt of the blame for
ceasefire violations. But in recent months there had been
a series of killings--especially in the East--which had
targeted people from both Government and LTTE. That
situation threatened the ceasefire, which was under severe
strain. The task now was to calm the situation down. The
Co-chairs believed the best way forward was for the GSL and
the LTTE to sit together to discuss the ceasefire.
Norwegian charge Laegried had been in Kilinocchi the
previous week and stated that to the LTTE, which had
rejected a meeting until the Government disarmed
paramilitaries such as the Karuna group. We would continue
to press this point on the LTTE. In the meantime, we hoped
that the GSL would do all it could to get control over

whoever was carrying out the killings of LTTE members.


4. (C) Kumaratunga responded that the Government definitely
"would not run with the hare and hunt with the hounds."
She saw an opportunity of engaging the LTTE in the post-
tsunami situation, and it would be foolish to "bump off"

SIPDIS
LTTE members. She had had "strong conversations" with the
security forces and given them strict instructions. She
had even taken action against some people. (Apparently a
reference to the abrupt transfer last week of the Director
General of Military Intelligence.) Still, she said, there
could be extremist elements in the armed forces who might
be acting on their own.


5. (C) Ambassador responded that we did not think that the
majority of these incidents were being committed by the
armed forces, but more likely by elements of the breakaway
Karuna faction of the LTTE. The Karuna forces seemed to
move about freely in the East, implying acquiescence by the
security forces. Kumaratunga responded that it was
difficult to control the Karuna forces in their own home
territory. Nonetheless, she said, they would try to do so
and would disarm such elements when they knew where they
were.


6. (C) Kumaratunga continued that it would be much easier
to take these actions if the LTTE would reciprocate. They
should allow elected anti-LTTE Tamil politicians to visit
their constituencies without threat, and swear off suicide
bomb attacks. Ambassador said that we agreed absolutely
that LTTE behavior was unacceptable and had to change. The
Co-chairs would certainly continue to press this point.
For right now, however, we had to lower the tempo of
violence in the East and get the ceasefire back on an even
keel. Kumaratunga said once again that they were committed
to doing that.


7. (C) Returning to issue of influencing LTTE behavior,
Kadirgamar mentioned the recent report on child recruitment
submitted to the UN Secretary General and the Secretary
General's recommendation that there should be a Security
Council Resolution on the subject with sanctions on severe
child recruitment violators. Kadirgamar thought this would
have a great impact on the LTTE, but there had been no
action in the Council. Ambassador said he did not know the
state of play, but would ask. ACTION REQUEST: Please
advise state of this issue in New York.


8. (C) Comment: The President's assurances were hedged
with caveats about the problem of controlling low-level
elements in the military and the problems of dealing with
the Karuna forces. Nonetheless, if she has given
categorical instructions to the security forces, we expect
they will be able to diminish significantly attacks by the
Karuna forces. We remain convinced that until now the
Karuna elements have been operating with at least the
acquiescence of the security forces, or even being used by
the forces in a dangerous game which threatens to get out
of hand. At the same time she is correct that LTTE
behavior has to change. The Norwegians expect either
Deputy Foreign Minister Helgesen or Special Envoy Solheim
to visit here next week. They will need to carry strong
messages to the LTTE about the imperative to engage the GSL
in talks on the ceasefire now, and the necessity to change
their own behavior.
LUNSTEAD