Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05COLOMBO1182
2005-07-07 12:24:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Colombo
Cable title:  

SRI LANKA: MUSLIM LEADER RALLYING OPPOSITION TO

Tags:  PGOV PTER CE LTTE 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001182 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SA/INS
NSC FOR DORMANDY
LONDON FOR BELL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/05/2015
TAGS: PGOV PTER CE LTTE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: MUSLIM LEADER RALLYING OPPOSITION TO
P-TOMS

REF: A. COLOMBO 1128

B. COLOMBO 1044

Classified By: AMB. JEFFREY J. LUNSTEAD. REASON: 1.4 (B,D).

-------
SUMMARY
--------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001182

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SA/INS
NSC FOR DORMANDY
LONDON FOR BELL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/05/2015
TAGS: PGOV PTER CE LTTE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: MUSLIM LEADER RALLYING OPPOSITION TO
P-TOMS

REF: A. COLOMBO 1128

B. COLOMBO 1044

Classified By: AMB. JEFFREY J. LUNSTEAD. REASON: 1.4 (B,D).

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) leader Rauff Hakeem
continues to urge members of his community to oppose the
Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure (P-TOMS),also
known as the "joint mechanism," signed by the Government of
Sri Lanka (GSL) and Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
on June 24. Hakeem sees the P-TOMS as a "precursor" to a
final resolution to the ethnic conflict that gives the LTTE
political and administrative control over the Muslim
community in the east--a "virtual trap" for Muslims he vowed
not to support. The Norwegian Charge and Peace Secretariat
Head Jayantha Dhanapala have both appealed to the Ambassador
for assistance in persuading the Muslims to participate.
Hakeem may be exploiting this for his own political purposes,
but a boycott of the joint mechanism by the very community
worst affected by the tsunami would undermine the P-TOMS'
claims to ensure equity for all tsunami victims. End summary.

--------------
SLMC: P-TOMS IS "VRTUAL TRAP"
FOR MUSLIM COMMUNITY
--------------


2. (C) In the two weeks since the Government of Sri Lanka
(GSL) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) signed
an agreement to coordinate tsunami relief, Sri Lanka Muslim
Congress (SLMC) Leader Rauff Hakeem is intensifying his
party's opposition--and attempting to consolidate his divided
community--against the Post-Tsunami Operational Management
Structure (P-TOMS),also known as the "joint mechanism."
After spearheading a series of general strikes, or "hartals,"
against the agreement in the east, Hakeem told poloff on July
7 that he is planning another set of rallies and meetings in
Batticaloa, Trincomalee and Ampara over the next few days.
The P-TOMS has "serious implications" for the political
rights of eastern Muslims, he charged, since the
administrative structures set up in the agreement,
particularly at the regional level, are a "precursor" to a
pernicious "final solution" that will allow Muslim rights to

be subsumed under LTTE domination. With their bid to gain
such power under the LTTE-proposed Interim Self-Governing
Authority (ISGA) frustrated, the Tigers are gaining
equivalent authority through the P-TOMS, Hakeem asserted,
which he described as a "virtual trap" for his community. By
combining authority for the north and east into a single
regional committee--in which LTTE representatives outnumber
Muslims and the LTTE Chair wields the deciding vote--the
P-TOMS "has made us a minority once again," Hakeem
complained, even though Muslims suffered the heaviest losses
from the tsunami of all three communities. The impetus
behind creation of the regional committee is patently
political, he continued, and no more than "a stepping stone
to ISGA," since all tsunami relief work could be adequately
handled by the district and central committees. The only
need for the regional committee, the SLMC Leader argued, was
as an "inducement to the LTTE to remain in the Ceasefire
Agreement."


3. (C) Hakeem expressed substantial outrage that Muslims
were not even consulted during a negotiating process that
dealt directly with the fate of their community; "once again
we are consigned to an insignificant minority"--even in areas
where Muslims are in the majority. That Muslims were
completely excluded from these discussions is "a serious
threshhold issue for us." For the SLMC to urge its followers
to comply with the P-TOMS would be "to compromise our
mandate" to represent the best interests of the Muslim
community. His constituents in the east are angry and
frustrated that once again the LTTE and the GSL have ignored
their interests, he claimed, raising the danger that Muslim
youth, disillusioned by the failure of democracy to fulfill
its promises of equity and justice, might turn to more
radical means--like the LTTE--to achieve their aims. The
SLMC must fill the "vacuum" created by this disaffection with
democracy lest other, more inimical forces do so, he hinted;
hence the compulsion to lead a "non-cooperation campaign"
against the agreement. President Kumaratunga told him the
day before the GSL signed the agreement that she had tried
unsuccessfully to argue for changes to the draft to
accommodate Muslim concerns, Hakeem said, adding that for the
President to "cave in" to LTTE intransigence sends the "wrong
signal" to Muslims.


4. (C) Acknowledging that the P-TOMS likely does not contain
every feature the SLMC might want included, poloff said that
the agreement nonetheless has several advantages that could
be used to advance Muslim interests. For the first time, for
example, the Tigers will have to sit across the table from
Muslim representatives to discuss and negotiate their
community's concerns. Donor observers and GSL
representatives at the regional and central levels, moreover,
could act as safeguards to protect Muslim interests. To
accept the P-TOMS is to relegate the Muslims to being "a
perpetual minority" always "subject to safeguards" from
others that are never adequately implemented, Hakeem
rejoined. He predicted that continued resistance by the
Muslim community to the joint mechanism would make the
agreement inoperable and thus force both the LTTE and GSL to
rethink their positions. "We are open for negotiations" on
the subject, he said, but the parties must be willing to
address our concerns. (He indicated that New Unity Alliance
Leader and Housing Minister Ferial Ashraff, in contrast,
seems more willing to compromise with the GSL on
participation.) "I blame the Norwegians for all of this,"
he concluded; "in attempting to solve one problem, you must
not create another."


--------------
NORWEGIANS, GSL SEEK HELP
FROM INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
--------------


5. (C) In a July 5 telephone conversation with the
Ambassador, Jayantha Dhanapala, head of the GSL Peace
Secretariat, appealed for help from the international

SIPDIS
community in persuading the Muslims to support the agreement.
In a meeting with the Ambassador the following day,
Dhanapala described the Muslim community as "angry but
divided." Amb. Jawed Yusuf, the head of the Muslim Peace
Secretariat (which would be responsible for appointing Muslim

SIPDIS
representatives to the high-level and regional committees) is
a reasonable man, Dhanapala observed, but cannot move ahead
without the consent of political leaders like Rauff Hakeem
and Housing Minister Ferial Ashraff. Dhanapala enumerated
several GSL efforts to respond to Muslim concerns. First,
Muslim numbers at the regional level could be "plussed up" by
appointing a Muslim to serve as one of two GSL
representatives. Moreover, Dhanapala commented, bilateral
and multilateral observers on the regional and high-level
committees would serve as a "moderating force" to ensure
equitable distribution of all funds. Second, the GSL was
attempting to secure LTTE agreement to changing the venue for
regional committee meetings. Dhanapala indicated that the
LTTE might be more flexible than suggested in its public
statements about having the meetings, if not the actual
P-TOMS secretariat, located outside of Kilinochchi. The GSL,
through the Norwegian facilitators, is pursuing this
possibility, he noted. Third, to address Muslim objections
at not being a signatory, the GSL could conclude a bilateral
P-TOMS-like agreement with Muslim representatives, Dhanapala
suggested, adding that "two bilaterals make a trilateral"
agreement.


6. (C) The Ambassador urged the GSL to conduct a public
relations campaign to dispel misperceptions about the P-TOMS.
He recounted for Dhanapala a July 5 meeting with members of
the Sinhalese nationalist Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) in which
the Buddhist monk MPs made plain that they believe the P-TOMS
will funnel reconstruction funding from donors directly into
LTTE coffers. (Note: The JHU representatives seemed
genuinely surprised by the Ambassador's explanation that the
funds will go to the Treasury instead. End note.) The GSL
is attempting to do just that, Dhanapala replied

7. (C) In a July 5 meeting with the Ambassador, Norwegian
Charge d'Affaires Oddvar Laegreid expressed concern that the
Muslims might boycott the P-TOMS, which he feared would
undercut the value of the entire agreement. The Norwegians
believe that pressure from the international community would
be the best way to prevent that. At the same time, like the
GSL, the Norwegians are trying to respond to some of the
concerns cited by Muslim leaders. In preliminary meetings,
Laegreid reported, LTTE Political Chief Thamilchelvan had
shown some flexibility in relocating the regional committee
meetings to the east. He has since changed that line,
Laegreid said, now maintaining that the regional committee
itself (in which the LTTE wields the casting vote) should
determine the venues. Special Envoy Erik Solheim will try to
urge the LTTE to be more flexible on this issue, Laegreid
said, adding the Norwegians may propose that meeting venues
rotate between the Wanni and the east.


8. (C) The Ambassador observed that much of the Muslim
leaders' opposition to the P-TOMS might be attributed to
their resentment at not having been adequately consulted
and/or included in the negotiating process. While conceding
this point, Laegreid said he believed the opportunism of SLMC
Leader Hakeem, who sees opposition to the P-TOMS as a
rallying point from which to unify the divided Muslim
electorate and bolster his sagging political prospects, was
the biggest stumbling block.

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


9. (C) We agree that Rauff Hakeem may be exploiting the
P-TOMS for his own political aims, hoping that the
controversy will unite the badly divided Muslim
community--preferably under his own leadership. That said,
the perception among Muslims that they have been marginalized
once again is strong; that the pretext used this time is an
agreement purporting to help tsunami victims (the majority of
whom are Muslims) only rubs salt into these old wounds. We
will continue to urge the GSL (and the LTTE, through
intermediaries) to make better and more visible efforts to
address Muslim concerns. The Ambassador will meet Muslim
leader Ferial Ashraff on July 8 the make the case for Muslim
participation in the P-TOMS.
LUNSTEAD