Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05COLOMBO1151
2005-06-30 12:53:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Colombo
Cable title:  

SRI LANKA: WHAT COMES AFTER THE P-TOMS?

Tags:  PGOV PTER CE LTTE 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001151 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SA/INS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/29/2015
TAGS: PGOV PTER CE LTTE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: WHAT COMES AFTER THE P-TOMS?

REF: COLOMBO 01128

Classified By: AMB. JEFFREY J. LUNSTEAD FOR REASONS 1.4(b) and (d)

-------
SUMMARY
--------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001151

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SA/INS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/29/2015
TAGS: PGOV PTER CE LTTE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: WHAT COMES AFTER THE P-TOMS?

REF: COLOMBO 01128

Classified By: AMB. JEFFREY J. LUNSTEAD FOR REASONS 1.4(b) and (d)

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) President Chandrika Kumaratunga's decision to sign
the controversial Post-Tsunami Operational Management
Structure (P-TOMS),also known as the "joint mechanism," has
clearly surprised her political allies and enemies alike,
leaving many of them scrambling to strategize next moves. In
the short term, alliance partners New Unity Alliance (NUA),
Eelam People's Democratic Party (EPDP) and Mahajana Eksath
Peramuna (MEP) have cast their lot with the President. In
the longer term, most parties anticipate some kind of
election--whether provincial council, parliamentary or
presidential--within the next six months or so, and are
beginning to campaign accordingly. Foreign Minister
Kadirgamar, however, told the Ambassador on June 30 that the
President has "strong legal backing" to defer presidential
elections until November 2006. Both the Janatha Vimukthi
Peramuna (JVP) and United National Party (UNP) are planning
"mass movements" to canvas public support, while the Sri
Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) is continuing to hold strikes in
the east against the joint mechanism. Sri Lanka Freedom
Party (SLFP) Deputy Minister of Ports Dilan Perera, a close
ally of the President, sees the best possibility as a
deal--hypothetically brokered by members of the international
community--between the two major parties. End summary.

--------------
POST P-TOMS SIGNING:
SCRAMBLING AND STRATEGIZING
--------------


2. (C) Since the Government's June 24 signing of the
controversial Post-Tsunami Management Structure (P-TOMS)
agreement, also known as the "joint mechanism," to coordinate
tsunami relief with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

SIPDIS
(LTTE),President Chandrika Kumaratunga's friends and foes
alike have been weighing the political fall-out, scrambling
to re-position themselves advantageously following the
Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna's (JVP) June 16 defection from the
government coalition. Most interlocutors (on both sides of
the aisle) expect some kind of election--whether provincial

council, parliamentary or presidential--within the next six
months or so. Although no one has officially acknowledged
beginning campaigning, various "mass movements" planned by
individual parties seem to be thinly disguised efforts to
rally public support and test popular sentiments.


3. (SBU) Among such movements have been back-to-back
"hartals," or general strikes, called by the Sri Lanka Muslim
Congress (SLMC) to protest the P-TOMS (reftel). In addition
to the June 27 hartal in Ampara, a general strike was
observed in the Muslim area of Muttur in Trincomalee district
on June 29. SLMC leader Rauff Hakeem has also continued his
harsh public pronouncements against the agreement, charging
that it shortchanges the Muslim community. Former government
alliance partner JVP held an anti-mechanism rally in front of
City Hall in Colombo on June 29. JVP Propaganda Secretary
and MP Wimal Weerawansa had predicted a turnout of 20,000 at
the protest; observers put attendance at less than half that
number. The United National Party (UNP),meanwhile, is
organizing a "People's Power Movement," which the party is
touting as a "million-man march" from the southern district
of Matara to Colombo July 2-12. According to UNP Matara MP
Lakshman Yapa, the march will begin with 15,000 participants
in his district, gradually adding steam (and, the party
hopes, marchers) along the coastal road, culminating in
Colombo July 12 with a massive rally of one million
participants. (Comment: Although Yapa identified the theme
as a protest against the cost of living, the aim is clearly
something else--a pre-election test of the temperature of UNP
support. End comment.) In separate meetings, Yapa and
fellow UNP MP M.H. Mohamed each told poloffs that they expect
the President to dissolve Parliament and call for general
elections circa October/November--about the time she will
need a (now non-existent) majority to pass the budget.


4. (C) In a June 29 meeting, JVP MP (and former Minister of
Culture) Vijitha Herath and JVP MP Piyasiri Wijenayake told
POL FSN their party will continue to oppose the P-TOMS, which
they depicted as a worse "sell-out" of national interests
than the UNP-negotiated Ceasefire Agreement. They vowed to
continue court challenges to the legality of the agreement.
(Note: In addition to the case cited reftel, the JVP-aligned
National Bhikku (Monk) Front and the Patriotic National
Movement each filed petitions against the P-TOMS in Colombo
District Court on June 28.) Both MPs speculated that
President Kumaratunga, having lost the support of the JVP at
the local level as well, will call for provincial council
elections before August. (Note: Since the JVP walk-out, the
opposition UNP now controls all seven provincial councils.)
By doing so, her former allies suggested, the President can
check the "pulse of the people" subsequent to signing the
P-TOMS.


5. (SBU) On June 28 government alliance partners New Unity
Alliance (NUA) and the Sinhalese nationalist Mahajana Eksath
Peramuna (MEP),which had considered leaving over the
Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure (P-TOMS)
(Reftel),announced separate decisions to remain in the
coalition. Despite these decisions, however, both parties
made plain their discomfort with the joint mechanism
agreement. In a press statement following its deliberations,
the MEP Central Committee announced that the party "cannot
agree with the (P-TOMS) document . . . because it is against
the basic principles of our party." The statement went on to
cite "hand(ing) over the people of the Eastern province to
the control of Wanni LTTE"; giving LTTE "control of large
areas which are under Government control"; and "the high
security risk" posed by giving LTTE control of the 2km
stretch along the coastal belt in the north and east as
reasons for its opposition.


6. (C) NUA MP and Deputy Minister of Ports and Aviation
Cegu Issadeen told poloff on June 29 that while his party
sees the necessity for a joint mechanism with the LTTE in
principle, it "cannot face" its Muslim constituents in the
east and tell them that the P-TOMS is in their best interest.
The P-TOMS deck is stacked against the Muslims, he said,
particularly at the regional level, at the LTTE's behest. He
believes that the President tried her best to convince the
LTTE to allow a Muslim representative to sign the agreement
and to reconfigure Muslim representation at the regional
level, but the LTTE would not allow it. "We don't want to be
a hurdle to the joint mechanism," but at the same time cannot
ask "our people" in good faith to support it, Issadeen said.
He fears that most Eastern Muslims will be sympathetic to
SLMC protests against the mechanism. While NUA will not
campaign against the mechanism as the SLMC is doing, Issadeen
said, "we will ask people not to participate in it" either,
since it does not accord the Muslim community any power or
advantage. He concluded by asking the U.S. to use its "good
offices" to persuade the LTTE to allow the Muslims an
equitable role in the committees.


7. (SBU) In a June 30 meeting, Hindu Affairs Minister and
anti-LTTE Eelam People's Democratic Party (EPDP) Leader
Douglas Devananda reconfirmed to poloffs his party's
statement endorsing the joint mechanism, although he
criticized the P-TOMS as "not specific enough" about the
authority given various committees. Asserting that the LTTE
had never expected the President to sign the agreement,
Devananda speculated that the Tigers would now seek to
obstruct its smooth operation.

--------------
HOW THE SLFP SEES IT
--------------


8. (C) In a June 30 meeting with the Ambassador, Foreign
Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar said he does not expect the
President to call snap general elections. Not even the JVP
wants parliamentary elections at this time, the Foreign
Minister said, adding that the President will not dissolve
Parliament unless the budget (which comes up for a vote in
November) fails to pass twice. He emphasized that he does
not believe the JVP would try to engineer an early downfall
of the government to trigger general elections. With respect
to Presidential elections, Kadirgamar asserted that the
President has "strong legal backing" to remain as President
until November 2006. If the Election Commissioner calls for
elections earlier than that, Kadirgamar said, Kumaratunga
will ask the Supreme Court for an advisory opinion on the
matter.

9. (C) The JVP will continue to play games to stir up
nationalist sentiment against the P-TOMS, Kadirgamar
predicted, using "the reaction in the street" to gauge public
sentiment. In an apparent reference to UNP MP Peiris'
criticism of the P-TOMS as inadequately representing the
Sinhalese (Reftel),Kadirgamar accused the UNP of also
"trying to play the nationalist card." He conceded, however,
that there was "general disgust" at the Norwegians and
Nordic-sponsored Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) for
failing to enforce the ceasefire or to call the LTTE on its
frequent and severe violations of the accord. Kadirgamar
cited Norwegian/SLMM inaction after reports of an LTTE
airstrip as the most egregious example.


10. (C) SLFP MP and Deputy Minister of Ports Dilan Perera
told poloff in a June 30 conversation that he views a
compromise with the UNP as the best possible scenario.
Losing the ever-fractious JVP as a coalition partner is a
"bit of a relief," he confided, adding optimistically that
many JVP-opposed initiatives, e.g., the restructuring of the
state-owned electrical utility, could now proceed. He
dismissed the suggestion that the President would be forced
to call for provincial council elections--the UNP and JVP
cannot work together well enough to force such a
decision--and said that he does not anticipate a fight over
the budget--and thus early parliamentary elections--as long
as the Tamil National Alliance (TNA),which commands 22
seats, votes with the government.


11. (C) The joint mechanism, ideally, should open up the
possibility of unprecedented amity between the two largest
parties, Perera said, although recent comments by UNP
Spokesman G.L. Peiris (Reftel) seem to undercut that hope.
Both party leaders have made bold decisions to advance the
peace process; that common aim ought to bring them together,
he continued. He suggested that, in exchange for a guarantee
of UNP support not to try to topple the government and an
"agreement on a common program on the ethnic issue," the
President could perhaps be persuaded to move the anticipated
date for presidential elections somewhere between the UNP's
demand (November 2005) her own, more expanded timeframe
(November 2006). The President and UNP Leader Ranil
Wickremesinghe do not necessarily trust each other, he
conceded, but they can at least talk to each other and work
with each other. When asked how the two (mutually
distrustful) leaders could be persuaded to come together,
Perera responded, "They must be told to do so"--preferably by
the international community.

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


12. (C) Almost one week after the P-TOMS was signed, most
parties still seem to be weighing the repercussions of the
altered political landscape and attempting to reposition
themselves accordingly. Elections of some sort appear to be
a common assumption; questions like when, what kind, and with
which possible new alliance partners are still up in the air.
Most important, it remains unclear exactly where popular
sentiment regarding the P-TOMS lies; the scramble among
various parties to hold rallies and protests is an obvious
effort to try to shape still-amorphous public opinion. We
have heard frequent discussion of the need for the SLFP and
UNP to work together in the national interest (including from
members of both parties) in the past, but we remain skeptical
that the leaders of either party will determine it is in
their personal and political interest to do so.
LUNSTEAD