SRI LANKA: JVP DIGGING IN HEELS OVER JOINT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001033

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SA/INS
LONDON FOR BELL
USPACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2015
TAGS: PGOV PTER CE LTTE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: JVP DIGGING IN HEELS OVER JOINT
MECHANISM

REF: A. COLOMBO 1027


B. COLOMBO 1019

Classified By: AMB. JEFFREY J. LUNSTEAD. REASON: 1.4 (B,D).

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) In a June 8 conversation with poloffs, Somawansa
Amarasinghe, Leader of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP),
confirmed his party's determination to quit the United
People's Front Alliance (UPFA) if President Chandrika
Kumaratunga proceeds with plans to sign a so-called "joint
mechanism" on tsunami relief with the Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Since elections would be "disastrous"
for the country, Amarasinghe said, the JVP would join the
opposition but would continue to support the government from
the outside on "people-friendly" issues. If early elections
were called, however, he was confident that his party would
fare better than in 2004 and could be back in government as a
partner in another alliance. Citing a lack of support for
the mechanism within the President's own party, however,
Amarasinghe predicted that Kumaratunga would not sign the
agreement with the Tigers. The JVP clearly sees the
confrontation over the joint mechanism as a way to
demonstrate its leadership--and divert attention from the
President's own attempts to demonstrate leadership. End
summary.

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NO JOINT MECHANISM BEFORE NEGOTIATIONS
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2. (C) On June 8 poloffs met with Somawansa Amarasinghe,
Leader of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) partner in the
United People's Front Alliance (UPFA),and Nandana
Gunatilleke, JVP MP from Kalutara District (and UPFA
Chairman) to discuss JVP threats to leave the government if
President Chandrika Kumaratunga signs the so-called "joint
mechanism" agreement on tsunami relief with the Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Amarasinghe, noting bitterly
that no one in his party--including Cabinet Ministers--has
even seen the draft text, said that the President had briefed
his party on the salient points of the agreement on May 27.
The JVP opposes the mechanism, he said, because it puts a
terrorist organization on the same plane as a democratically
elected government. The agreement would be perceived as
rewarding the LTTE with undeserved legitimacy, he continued,
when the Tigers had done nothing to change their terrorist
tactics, renounce violence or cease child recruitment. "We
do not expect them to disarm tomorrow," but they violate the
Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) blatantly and continuously, he
charged. Before engaging with the Tigers, "we have to see
some evidence of improved behavior and willingness to enter
the democratic process," he insisted.


3. (C) The UPFA manifesto authorizes the President to
undertake peace negotiations--not to sign an agreement on a
joint mechanism, Amarasinghe continued. "We've been elected
to implement the manifesto; anything that creeps in afterward
will not be tolerated." Poloff noted that both sides seemed
to have reached an impasse over preconditions for
negotiations; could the joint mechanism not provide an avenue
to re-engage with the Tigers without preconditions? No, said
Amarasinghe. The Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) is prepared
to re-enter negotiations without preconditions with the
Tigers at any time, he added; the only thing preventing
resumed negotiations is the Tigers' own inflexibility. "The
joint mechanism cannot be a stepping stone to dialogue," he
asserted; "this cannot be the beginning." Acknowledging U.S.
concerns about Tiger ceasefire violations, poloff asked if
humanitarian concern for the welfare of innocent tsunami
victims in the north and east were not enough reason to
consider the mechanism. No, Amarasinghe responded, adding
"We don't separate politics and humanitarian work." He then
expressed appreciation for the firm U.S. stance on terror,
asserting that the JVP, like President Bush, says yes to
democracy and no to terror. He said his party was grateful
that the USG, unlike the GSL, had maintained the LTTE's
listing as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.

4. (C) Even if his party were not absolutely opposed to the
joint mechanism as a matter of principle, there are numerous
other problems as well with the assumptions underpinning the
mechanism, Amarasinghe said, and began to tick them off.
First, the LTTE controls only 49 of the over 350 grama
sevakas (the smallest unit of local administration--usually a
cluster of villages) in the north and east; why is it given
equal status with the GSL in deciding how tsunami aid in that
area will be implemented? Giving the Tigers such a prominent
role in decisions affecting areas not under their control
only reinforces the idea of a Tamil homeland of which the
Tigers are the sole representative, he complained. Second,
the overwhelming number of tsunami victims in the north and
east are Muslim; why are Tigers given a greater role--and
more representatives--in the mechanism? Third, the mechanism
is not actually needed to distribute tsunami assistance.
Tsunami aid is already reaching affected populations,

SIPDIS
including in LTTE-controlled areas, without the mechanism, he
asserted. If that were not the case, he concluded, there
would have been food riots in the welfare camps.

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LTTE UNPOPULAR IN EAST?
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5. (C) Although the Tigers continue to claim the north and
east as a traditional Tamil homeland, the LTTE is not popular
in the east, Amarasinghe said; Tamil people there support the
dissident "Karuna" group. If the ceasefire broke and
full-scale hostilities were to resume, he predicted, eastern
Tamils would come out in force in favor of Karuna. He added
that the JVP had been trying to organize better and create
linkages with civil society in the east, but those efforts
had been interrupted by the tsunami. The party plans to
resume those activities soon, he reported.

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THE FIRST ALLIANCE, BUT NOT THE LAST
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6. (C) The President has not met the JVP on the joint
mechanism since May 27, and no meetings on this controversial
issue have been scheduled since, Gunatilleke said. When
asked what the JVP would do if the President were to sign the
mechanism agreement, Amarasinghe rejoined that his party
would leave the alliance and sit with the opposition in
Parliament. He confirmed that the JVP might still support
the President on "people-friendly" issues that are consistent
with the UPFA manifesto. The party is not hoping for early
elections, he said; elections now would be "disastrous" for
the country. If elections were held, however, the JVP would
fare better than in the 2004 polls, he predicted, adding that
the party now has three times the number of district
delegates that it had in 2003. "I can't say that means we
would do three times as well" as last time, he conceded, but
he expects the party's village-level organizational prowess
would translate into an even stronger showing at the polls.
When asked if the other two large parties were undertaking
similar initiatives to improve their visibility and
popularity at the local level, Amarasinghe responded, "We
don't see them" in the villages. If elections were called,
"we can be in an alliance with anyone," Amarasinghe said,
including, he indicated, the opposition United National
Party. The UPFA is "our first alliance, but not our last";
the JVP is learning and growing all the time.


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SHOWDOWN OVER MECHANISM:
TEST OF JVP LEADERSHIP
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7. (C) "Crises are good for us" as a party and as a country,
Amarasinghe said, because crises produce leaders. As a
party, "we are demonstrating our leadership" through our
principled stand on the joint mechanism, he stated. That
said, despite all the to-and-fro in the press and the
President's much-repeated determination to sign the
mechanism, "she will not do it," Amarasinghe predicted. In
the end, she will have to back down because most of her own
Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) MPs do not support it, he
said, asserting that she can count no more than 20 SLFP MPs
in her camp. (Note: We had heard the previous day from an
SLFP source that a number of SLFP MPs had refused to meet the
President on the joint mechanism. We have been unable to
confirm that story, but it makes sense that at least some MPs
would oppose it--not necessarily on principle but out of fear
of the government falling and having to contest elections.
Also in the rumor department, June 9 newspapers carried
reports that the GSL had contacted the Election Commission
about the prospect of holding early elections. Assistant
Commissioner of Elections Rasika Pieris denied that report to
us.)


8. (SBU) Other Sinhalese nationalist parties have also
seized upon opposition to the joint mechanism as a way to
demonstrate the strength of their convictions. Ven. Omalpe
Sobitha Thero, a Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) Buddhist monk MP,
is now on the fourth day of his hunger strike, begun on June
6 at the sacred Temple of the Tooth in Kandy, to protest the
joint mechanism (Ref B). The monk, who has only one kidney,
is reportedly extremely frail and spurned an appeal from
Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapakse, who visited him in Kandy on
June 8, to talk to the President about the issue.

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COMMENT
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9. (C) Amarasinghe, who underwent heart surgery in the UK in
February, seemed much more tired, far more subdued and
considerably less confident than we have ever seen him. It
is clear to us that the stress of his party's
eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation with the President is
beginning to show. The question remains: who will blink
first? The disagreement between the President and her
alliance partner over this issue has received so much
publicity and become so vitriolic--with the President
accusing the JVP of killing her husband and hinting broadly
that her own life may be at risk on one side and the JVP
accusing her of selling out the country and the Sinhala
people on the other--that there seems little hope of finding
common ground for compromise. Worse still, the JVP seems to
have decided to make the joint mechanism the litmus test for
Sinhalese nationalism and to showcase, through its
unwavering, if ill-founded, opposition to dealing with the
Tigers that it is better equipped to safeguard national
interests than the President. Although the JVP has
threatened to leave the government countless times before, it
appears that this time the former insurgents may mean it.
LUNSTEAD