SRI LANKA: JVP THREATENS SHOWDOWN, PRESIDENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 001019

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SA/INS
USPACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/06/2015
TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL IN CE LTTE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: JVP THREATENS SHOWDOWN, PRESIDENT
SEEKS SUPPORT FOR JOINT MECHANISM

REF: A. COLOMBO 1004


B. COLOMBO 998

C. COLOMBO 955

Classified By: AMB. JEFFREY J. LUNSTEAD. REASON: 1.4 (B,D).

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) With coalition partner Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna
(JVP) still threatening to withdraw from the government if
President Chandrika Kumaratunga signs the "joint mechanism"
on tsunami aid with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE),Kumaratunga is seeking support for the controversial
agreement from Opposition Leader Ranil Wickremesinghe. While
the Indian government endorsed the joint mechanism during the
President's June 2-4 visit to New Delhi, Wickremesinghe's
United National Party (UNP) so far has declined to "rescue"
the President by announcing public support. In a June 7
meeting with Peace Secretariat head Jayantha Dhanapala, the
Ambassador expressed concern at the steady erosion of the
Ceasefire Agreement, underscoring the need for both sides to
respect all aspects of the Agreement. Dhanapala said that if
the President has not signed the joint mechanism agreement by
the June 13 co-chairs meeting--and indicated that she is not
expected to--a co-chairs statement endorsing the mechanism
could be counter-productive. We think a carefully crafted
statement expressing support for the principles underpinning
the joint mechanism is necessary. End summary.

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IF THE INDIANS SUPPORT IT,
CAN THE JVP BE FAR BEHIND?
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2. (SBU) President Chandrika Kumaratunga returned from her
June 2-4 visit to New Delhi with official--if not
effusive--support for the proposed "joint mechanism" on
tsunami relief with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

SIPDIS
(LTTE). (The joint communique noted that the Indian Prime
Minister "expressed understanding of and support for" efforts
to establish the mechanism, which was identified as the Post
Tsunami Operational Management Structure.) Before her

SIPDIS
departure for New Delhi, the President had indicated to a
number of western envoys the need to bring the Indians on
board before proceeding further.


3. (C) In a June 7 meeting with the Ambassador, Indian High
Commissioner Nirupama Rao said that her government's support
of the mechanism was "neither conditional nor tepid," as
indicated in some local Sri Lankan press reports. Rao
described Indian government interlocutors as impressed with
Kumaratunga's "rational," persuasive and dispassionate
arguments in support of the mechanism and emphasized that
Indian leaders, including the Prime Minister and Congress
leader Sonia Gandhi, understand that the Government of Sri
Lanka (GSL) has no option but to work with the LTTE. In a
separate meeting with the Ambassador the same day, Jayantha
Dhanapala, head of the GSL Peace Secretariat, who had
participated in many of the meetings in New Delhi, described
the Indians' reception of the mechanism proposal as "very
positive," emphasizing that even the Indian Defense Minister
had expressed support. Dhanapala added that the Indian trip
was necessary to "clear the air" of "murky rumors of Indian
opposition" to the mechanism "fabricated" by some political
actors in an "effort to change the debate by introducing
disquieting rumors."


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JVP THREATENS WALK-OUT;
JHU MONKS FASTING
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4. (U) If the President was hoping that Indian support would
help bring the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) around, her
ever-contentious coalition partner moved quickly to quash any
such expectation. On June 3 the JVP Politburo decided the
party would leave the government if Kumaratunga proceeds with
plans to sign the agreement on tsunami relief with the LTTE.
On June 5 the party followed up with a second broadside,
threatening to withdraw support from the United People's
Front Alliance (UPFA) in all seven Provincial Councils if the
mechanism were signed. The Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU),a
Sinhalese chauvinist party whose Buddhist monk MPs have also
vigorously opposed the agreement, issued an even more
sensationalist ultimatum to the government on June 6, when
JHU Secretary and MP Ven. Sobitha Thero began a
well-publicized "fast-unto-death" at the Temple of the Tooth
in Kandy, the holiest Buddhist shrine in the nation, to
protest the proposed agreement. (Not signing the mechanism
is just one of the hunger-striking monk's demands. He is
also pressing the government to issue a statement that it
will sign no agreements of any kind with the Tigers; to issue
a statement guaranteeing that Buddha statues in Trincomalee
and Jaffna will not be removed (Ref C); and to ensure
adequate security to GSL forces guarding the controversial
statue in Trincomalee, as well as to all Army and police
intelligence officers.)


5. (C) Japanese DCM Hiroshi Karube told DCM on June 7 that
JVP leaders had not wavered from their hard-line position
throughout the duration of a May 20-June 2 "study visit" to
Japan, despite official Japanese support for the joint
mechanism. In fact, he added, JVP leader Somawansa
Amarasinghe told the Japanese Ambassador on June 7 that it
was "too late" for Kumaratunga to try to win JVP support on
the issue, especially since the President had still not even
shown the text of the controversial document to her coalition
partner.

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PRESIDENT PLOTS STRATEGY;
HOPES FOR OPPOSITION SUPPORT
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6. (C) According to Health Minister and Kumaratunga
confidant Nimal Siripala de Silva, the President held a
three-hour meeting on June 6 with Prime Minister Mahinda
Rajapakse and de Silva to decide next steps if the JVP
continued its opposition. Recounting the discussion to the
Ambassador, de Silva summarized the conundrum confronting the
President: What is the good of signing the joint mechanism
if the JVP pulls out of the government, the government falls
and the joint mechanism can never be implemented? To resolve
this dilemma, de Silva reported, the President has decided to
ask Opposition Leader and former Prime Minister Ranil
Wickremesinghe to issue a statement of public support for the
mechanism before she signs it. To this end, Kumaratunga will
invite Wickremesinghe for a discussion on the topic, de Silva
said. In the meantime, the President plans to meet with
government MPs, including those from the JVP, the evening of
June 7.


7. (C) Dhanapala also briefed the Ambassador on the plan to
enlist opposition support for the mechanism, criticizing
Wickremesinghe for letting the President "stew in her own
juices" while the JVP threatened to quit. Wickremesinghe
might have done things differently, Dhanapala conceded, but
it is "irresponsible to stand on the sidelines and cheer" at
the President's difficulties on an issue of such grave
national importance. Unfortunately, Dhanapala said, the
joint mechanism has become a lightning rod for all kinds of
extremist views. If the mechanism were not signed, he
predicted, there was a "great danger of regression" and "a
huge loss of credibility for the peace process," especially
among the Tamil community. He asked if the Ambassador could
help persuade Wickremesinghe to support the proposal. Much
of the problem with similar overtures from the President to
Wickremesinghe in the past, the Ambassador responded, has
been in the way such requests were conveyed--usually in the
form of letters that were released to the press at the same
time as to Wickremesinghe. Declining to serve as a
go-between in such matters, the Ambassador said that the best
way to frame the appeal to Wickremesinghe would be to depict
the joint mechanism as helping to further the peace process
that he started.


8. (C) With respect to the June 13 co-chairs meeting in
Washington, Dhanapala said that it would be "awkward" to
address the issue of the joint mechanism in a public
statement if the agreement had not been signed by the time of
the meeting (which, he indicated, was a likely scenario).
The co-chairs would face the dilemma of how to modulate a
message of support for the mechanism without inciting the
"sometimes xenophobic reaction to well-meaning efforts" from
western donors that arises from some quarters. He asked that
co-chairs consider other ways to increase pressure on the
LTTE, including by examining funding funneled through the
Tamil diaspora and by pressing for a UN Security Council
Resolution condemning LTTE recruitment of child soldiers. He
added that disagreement within the P-5 on this issue--with
the UK reportedly "dragging its feet" while the French are
"quite keen" to pass the resolution--was apparently to blame
for the delay.


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AMBASSADOR EXPRESSES CONCERN AT VIOLENCE,
FRAGILITY OF CEASEFIRE
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9. (C) Referring to the co-chairs meeting, the Ambassador
noted to Dhanapala that if international interest in the
peace process is to be sustained, there must be an actual
peace process that can be identified. If the joint mechanism
cannot be concluded, he continued, how can the more
comprehensive agreements needed to achieve a lasting
settlement be concluded? The Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) has
become badly frayed, the Ambassador stressed, and the ensuing
violence is "detrimental to all sides." Both parties to the
CFA seem to have decided on a de facto abrogation of key
parts of the Agreement, he emphasized, undermining the
security situation and inflaming public opinion. While the
LTTE is undeniably the main culprit in violating the
ceasefire, the accelerated tit-for-tat violence is creating
an explosive situation. (Note: Two alleged LTTE
intelligence agents were killed in Colombo on June 5, for
example. End note.) When Dhanapala objected to suggestions
that the GSL shared some of the blame for the violence, the
Ambassador replied that it strained credulity to suppose that
anti-LTTE Karuna forces--some of which operate from camps
next to GSL security installations--do not at least receive
Government acquiescence. Dhanapala did not respond.

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UNP: NOT TO THE "RESCUE"
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10. (C) In a June 7 meeting with the Ambassador, Opposition
Leader Wickremesinghe said he would not release a public
statement supporting the mechanism before the President
actually signed the agreement. To do otherwise would only
serve to "rescue" the President from her own political
problems, which, he said bluntly, he was disinclined to do.
In the meantime, he said, the President should prepare a
contingency plan in case the JVP quits the government. One
of her options, he continued, is to begin to talk seriously
with his United National Party (UNP); alternatively, she
could continue to "play games" by trying to lure UNP MPs
across the aisle. Pressed by the Ambassador, he conceded
that he might agree to meet with the President if she were to
invite him. He also conceded that the UNP would have to
support the joint mechanism if it were signed.

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LTTE: STILL READY TO SIGN
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11. (C) Swiss Ambassador Bernardino Regazzoni told the
Ambassador on June 6 that he had visited LTTE headquarters in
Kilinochchi on June 2 and met with LTTE political wing leader
Thamilchelvan. According to Regazzoni, Thamilchelvan
asserted that the LTTE remains ready to sign the joint
mechanism. Regazzoni added that Thamilchelvan himself raised
the fragility of the Ceasefire Agreement, describing the CFA
as key to further progress on the peace process. Regazzoni
responded that the ongoing LTTE campaign of violence,
including the killing of Sri Lanka Army Major Muthaliff (Ref
B),was seriously undermining the ceasefire; such violations
were "devastating" for the image of the LTTE in the south and
with donors, Regazzoni stressed. Thamilchelvan neither
confirmed nor denied LTTE involvement in Muthaliff's slaying.



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COMMENT
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12. (C) Some observers had speculated that support from the
Indian government, which has studiously cultivated the
renegade JVP over the past year, could be sufficient to mute
the party's strident opposition to the mechanism. So far,
that has not proven to be the case. It is hard to tell if the
JVP, which has threatened to leave this government so many
times before, is just practicing brinkmanship or whether it
has already packed its bags. Conventional wisdom holds that
while the JVP might do even better in a fresh parliamentary
poll than it did last April, it would still not do well
enough to win anything more than a repeat performance as a
junior coalition partner in another government.
Wickremesinghe's apparent decision to sit back and watch the
President squirm may not be statesmanlike, but it is hardly
surprising, given the personal enmity between the two party
leaders. Unfortunately, their mutual antipathy is preventing
cooperation on an issue of grave national importance--while
simultaneously letting the JVP capitalize, at the expense of
both of these mainstream parties, on the stalemate. Despite
Dhanapala's concern that a co-chairs' statement on the
mechanism could be counter-productive, we believe that a
carefully crafted statement expressing support for a
structure to coordinate tsunami assistance--even if that
structure is not directly identified as a joint mechanism--is
needed.
LUNSTEAD