VENEZUELA CHARM OFFENSIVE -- MEETING WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L CARACAS 000878

SIPDIS


NSC FOR HADLEY
USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/23/2015
TAGS: PREL PHUM KDEM VE
SUBJECT: VENEZUELA CHARM OFFENSIVE -- MEETING WITH
COMMUNICATION MINISTER

Classified By: Amb. William R. Brownfield for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) Acting on GoV instructions, Venezuelan Minister of
Communication Andres Izarra met with the Ambassador March 23.
Izarra suggested cooperation on journalist exchanges, an
idea which the Ambassador found lacking for among other
reasons, the Minister's severe public criticism of U.S.
journalists. The Ambassador told Izarra that both sides had
to accept that we have areas of disagreement, adding that we
would state our disagreements clearly and publicly. He also
told the Minister we would not accept limited channels of
communication nor pay silence on core issues as a price for
those channels. The Izarra meeting was one more episode in
the GoV's recent, plainly tactical, mini-charm offensive. To
our advantage, it and any others that may arise will be
opportunities to highlight our willingness to discuss and
resolve issues, while blunting possible attempts by President
Hugo Chavez to claim we are unwilling to talk or to play down
fundamental differences between us. End Summary.


2. (C) The Ambassador met one-on-one for breakfast with
Minister of Communication Andres Izarra March 23. Izarra
reached out and proposed the meeting a week in advance.
Ambassador deferred on the first two proposed dates, and
accepted the third. Izarra opened by reporting that his
instructions were to establish a better channel of
communication. He suggested Ministry of Communication and
Embassy could work jointly on some journalist exchanges
between Venezuela and the U.S.


3. (C) The Ambassador agreed that communication was
important. This had been his message since arriving in
September 2004, he told Izarra. But both sides had to accept
that there were important areas where we had fundamental
disagreements, and it appeared that those disagreements were
not going to disappear. Where we differed on issues of
democracy, or foreign policy, or law, the Ambassador noted,
we would state our disagreements clearly and publicly. He
emphasized that we would not accept channels of communication
with the GOV if the price is silence on fundamental areas of
importance to the GOV. In addition, when we had military,
law enforcement, or intelligence issues to discuss, we would
only discuss them through military, law enforcement, or
intelligence channels. We would not limit all
government-government communication to the Foreign Ministry.
Izarra accepted this approach without comment.


4. (C) Izarra noted that in his previous conversation with
Ambassador (nearly four months ago),we had discussed
possibility of outreach to Venezuelan journalists and
Ministry of Communication officials to visit the U.S. Izarra
was skeptical, believing that such visits might merely be
indoctrination trips by the USG. Nevertheless, he was ready
to explore the idea, with understanding that we would invite
U.S. journalists to Venezuela for reciprocal visits to poor
Venezuelan communities where they might witness the GOV
social missions. Ambassador asked if Izarra was talking
about inviting USG officials, or private journalists; he said
journalists. Ambassador asked if Izarra envisioned directly
inviting U.S. journalists to Venezuela, or wanted the
invitations to be issued by the USG; Izarra said he wanted
them to go through the USG. Ambassador said it seemed
unusual to insert the USG in the middle of an invitation by
the GOV to U.S. journalists to visit Venezuela. We would
consider the idea, but it did not seem like a strong
possibility.


5. (C) Ambassador noted Izarra had been very severe in
public on several U.S. journalists based in and accredited to
Venezuela. GOV could criticize journalists and their
reporting. If, however, they moved to restrict their access,
control their reporting, threaten their security, or expel
them from Venezuela, then we would have a bilateral issue
between the two governments. Izarra said there was no such
intention. Several U.S. journalists, particularly the
correspondent of the Miami Herald, were consistently and
erroneously critical of the GOV and its policies, Izarra
said, and he had a duty to criticize their errors. The
Ministry of Communication, he said, was also changing the
accreditation badges of foreign journalists to make it easier


for GOV security personnel to differentiate journalists from
Ministry employees. Ambassador noted that a critical press
was an essential and fundamental element of any democratic
society, including the United States. The GOV, he told
Izarra, should start to worry about its democratic
credentials when the press ceased to be critical. The
Ambassador also noted that it was a fair point for the USG to
express an opinion in public and open debate.


6. (C) Izarra said that while we were debating, he might
mention recent stories (in El Nuevo Herald) about USG
investigations of organizations supporting the Bolivarian
cause in the U.S. Surely the GOV and its supporters had a
right to express their views in the United States?
Ambassador said there was no question of right to express
views. However, the U.S. was a sovereign nation, like
Venezuela, and advocacy organizations had to obey U.S. law.
He reminded Izarra that organizations representing a foreign
government had to register under the FARA; organizations
claiming tax-exempt status had to engage in activities
consistent with that IRS status; radio stations had to hold
valid broadcast licenses; and demonstrators on public
property had to obtain permits. Assuming all GoV supporters
were operating consistently with U.S. law, the Ambassador
said, they had nothing to worry about. If not, then they
were in violation of U.S. law. Izarra assured the Ambassador
that the Venezuela Information Office and the GoV legal
representatives in the U.S. were in strict compliance with
U.S. law.


7. (C) Izarra asked if Embassy planned to make public
comment on the current discussions between Exxon-Mobil and
the Ministry of Energy on their dispute over royalties.
Ambassador said Exxon-Mobil had asked us not to make public
comment, so we would not. If, in the future, they were to
ask us to make public comment, the Ambassador said, we
probably would. Izarra said this issue should be left in
private channels. Talking about the case publicly (COMMENT:
The local press carried a brief story on the subject that
morning) would complicate the negotiations.


8. (C) As breakfast concluded, Izarra noted again GOV
concern over recent comments on a Miami television station by
a former USG official that in GOV judgment encouraged coup
plotting in Venezuela. Ambassador said he had reviewed the
transcript of the interview. He was not a legal or
constitutional expert, he told Izarra, but he seriously
doubted that the language came anywhere near prohibited
speech in the U.S. Free speech was free speech: Sometimes
you agreed with it, and sometimes you did not. If the
language was not criminal in nature, U.S. law enforcement was
not going to restrict it. Izarra acknowledged their U.S.
legal representatives had reviewed the tape as well, and
reached the same conclusion. He noted, however, that he was
still going to comment on it in public. Ambassador said he
would be delighted to say in public what he had just said to
Izarra in private.

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COMMENT
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9. (C) The charm offensive continues. Ambassador handed
Izarra several red meat comments, and the minister did not
bite. Our judgment is still that the GOV offensive is
tactical in nature. We do not want to fall into a tactical
trap. If, after seven months of wandering in the desert,
they offer us meetings, we will accept. At each encounter,
we will emphasize the fundamental areas where we disagree,
but express willingness to discuss and resolve issues of
importance to the United States. We do not want to give
Chavez the opportunity to say that we refuse to meet with his
government, but we do not want to allow him to say that we do
not have fundamental differences and problems, either.
Brownfield


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2005CARACA00878 - CONFIDENTIAL