VENEZUELA: VP'S SON SOUNDS US OUT

C O N F I D E N T I A L CARACAS 000742

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/11/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV US
SUBJECT: VENEZUELA: VP'S SON SOUNDS US OUT


Classified By: DCM STEPHEN G. MCFARLAND REASON 1.4 (D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Jose Vicente Rangel Jr., mayor of Caracas'
Sucre district and son of Venezuelan Vice President Rangel,
met with DCM March 11 primarily to discuss bilateral
relations. Rangel declined to support President Chavez'
claims that the USG sought to kill him, but otherwise
defended the GOV's record. He insisted that the USG was
giving Chavez the ammunition to attack the US, and he
concluded that the opposition was feeding the USG erroneous
information about Venezuela. He asked at the end if there
was a particular message for the GOV. DCM said the message
was that the USG remained concerned about democracy, regional
issues such as the Colombian guerrillas, and conflicting
signals on oil; that the USG was convinced that the GOV had
not responded positively to USG efforts to improve bilateral
communication; that the relationship was getting steadily
worse, and that the USG concluded that the GOV wanted it that
way. Rangel listened carefully. He said that no bilateral
issue should be excluded from conversation; he asked if the
USG was going to signal some flexibility. DCM responded that
the USG had sent its signals; the issue was if the GOV was
going to respond, privately or publicly. Rangel said he
would relay this message back to the GOV (including to his
father). END SUMMARY.


2. (C) The conversation centered on USG-GOV relations. The
DCM asked Rangel point blank if he really believed that the
USG was trying to kill Chavez. Rangel, like the other two
Chavista officials DCM met with this week, avoided saying
yes. Instead, he excused the President's claim as a) a way
of pressing the USG to crack down on anti-Chavez plotters in
Miami, and b) tit for tat in response to senior USG criticism
of Chavez. DCM noted that Chavez was doing more than this;
every day brought forward a new false accusation. We had no
problem with governments who disagreed with us or even
criticized us, but false accusations indicated a lack of
interest in a serious relationship.


3. (C) Rangel made several points: first, the USG's public
statements were out of touch with reality, so much so that he
had to believe that it was the opposition that was advising
senior USG officials directly. Second, that the USG's direct
criticism of Chavez both pushed him towards a more
confrontational policy, and also boosted him outside
Venezuela. Third, that the GOV's principal challenges laid
within rather than outside Venezuela. Fourth, that the
Embassy should try to have more contact with non-opposition
elements. Rangel underscored Chavez' democratic electoral
victories, his 60 approval rating, and his uncanny ability
to connect with the poor (he observed, with a mix of
admiration and chagrin, that while he as mayor got criticism
for continued poverty, Chavez as President got none).


4. (C) The DCM countered that the GOV needed to understand
that the USG had valid concerns about democracy and human
rights; obviously our two governments disagreed on the
subjects, but the USG would continue to express its opinion
on them. In our opinion, we had not pushed Chavez towards
confrontation; rather, he had chosen that path for his own
reasons, domestic and international. Finally, we were
interested in having contact with all sectors in Venezuela,
but it was increasingly difficult to have contact with the
GOV.


5. (C) Rangel asked if there was a special message for the
GOV. The DCM said that it was:

a) the USG had serious concerns about Venezuelan democracy
and human rights, regional issues including the Colombian
guerrillas, and conflicting GOV statements about Venezuelan
oil exports to the U.S.

b) that the USG had made an effort to improve communications
with the GOV after the August 15, 2004 referendum, and the
arrival of Amb. Brownfield. Our conclusion was that while
some in the GOV, such as VP Rangel, appeared interested, the
GOV's message to the USG was that it was not interested. The
message was manifested in the reduced contact with Amb.
Brownfield, as well as in such issues as opting out of the
CNIES military/drug trafficking intel exchange system.

c) bilateral relations were bad and were getting worse.

d) in response to Rangel's query about a possible USG
statement or action to clear the air now, DCM said that we
had made our message clear; if the GOV wanted to give us a
response, in private or in public, we would listen.



6. (C) Rangel said he understood the message and would pass
it on.


7. (C) Comment: Another source told us that Vice President
Rangel knew ahead of time about the meeting. Rangel Jr. will
certainly pass the gist of the conversation on to his father.
Rangel Jr. conveyed a sense of frustration that bilateral
relations were in a downward spiral, and an interest in
seeing some improvement. Ironically, he looks to the USG to
do something about this, an attitude shared by Venezuela's
opposition, as opposed to looking to the GOV to take a
positive step. While he (and other Chavistas) do not agree
with some of the specifics of Chavez' recent accusations,
neither can they do much about them in terms of confronting
Chavez.

Brownfield


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