Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05CARACAS2258
2005-07-26 20:09:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Caracas
Cable title:  

THE CHURCH (FINALLY) STIRS IN VENEZUELA

Tags:  PREL 
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262009Z Jul 05
C O N F I D E N T I A L CARACAS 002258 

SIPDIS


FOR WHA A/S NORIEGA AND NSC SHANNON FROM BROWNFIELD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/25/2010
TAGS: PREL
SUBJECT: THE CHURCH (FINALLY) STIRS IN VENEZUELA

REF: CARACAS 02206

Classified By: WILLIAM R. BROWNFIELD FOR REASON 1.4 (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L CARACAS 002258

SIPDIS


FOR WHA A/S NORIEGA AND NSC SHANNON FROM BROWNFIELD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/25/2010
TAGS: PREL
SUBJECT: THE CHURCH (FINALLY) STIRS IN VENEZUELA

REF: CARACAS 02206

Classified By: WILLIAM R. BROWNFIELD FOR REASON 1.4 (d)


1. (U) This is an action request. See Para. 8.


2. (C) SUMMARY. After a year of relative silence, the
Venezuelan Church has come alive in challenging President
Hugo Chavez's authoritarian tendencies. Chavez has
counterattacked viciously. The Vatican in-country
representatives are not supporting the Venezuelan Church,s
recent activism. We need allies here in Venezuela, and the
Church may be the best possible choice for reaching out to
the poor communities. Ambassador recommends that we reach
out to the Church leadership in the Vatican, the Papal Nuncio
in Washington, and the U.S. Church leadership to urge public
and clear support for the Venezuelan Church in their
challenge to Chavez. END SUMMARY.


3. (C) After several years as a strong player in Venezuela,s
Chavez drama, the Catholic Church refrained from active
engagement through most of 2004 and 2005. Church leaders
made few political pronouncements, and their engagement with
us was low key. The Church,s silence was probably driven by
three factors:

- Desire to tone down the rhetoric and explore a modus
vivendi following Chavez, August 2004 recall referendum
victory.
- Concern that Chavez was undercutting Church control of
its own institutions by inserting revolutionary
representatives in their schools and social programs.
- Desire to name a new Archbishop of Caracas,
traditionally the senior prelate in Venezuela, over whose
naming Chavez holds a veto under the Vatican-Venezuela
Concordat of 1964.


4. (C) Embassy policy over the past year has been to engage
the Church as far as they are willing, but low key in
deference to their sensitivities. USAID has supported
Catholic schools, orphanages, senior centers, day care,
street children and health centers. I have visited as many
as possible on my in-country travel, emphasizing our desire
to support and work with the Church in poor communities. I
met quietly with Archbishop Baltazar Porras of Merida (head
of the Episcopal Conference) and other senior prelates
several times. I emphasized our willingness to support them
with a positive message of outreach to the Venezuelan poor.


5. (C) The former Vatican representative in Venezuela, Mons.
Dupuy (French),was tougher on Chavez than was the Venezuelan

Church. As Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, the Nuncio made no
effort to conceal his skepticism about Chavez, authoritarian
tendencies, infuriating Chavez by reading at one diplomatic
event a letter lightly suggesting some concerns. Dupuy
departed Caracas in April 2005.


6. (C) The Church came to life in June. Archbishop Porras
told me in May that he was going to be more open in his
criticism of Chavez when he crossed democracy red lines, and
he has been good to his word. Chavez supporters responded
graciously by suggesting he had stolen Church funds and
should be prosecuted. Retired Cardinal Rosalio Castillo Lara
unloaded on Chavez authoritarian tendencies in early July
(reftel). Chavez responded that he was a demon who should be
sent to Hell. Other senior Church leaders (as well as
opposition leaders and the press) came to the Cardinal,s
defense.


7. (C) After more than a year biding their time, the Church
has come to life in Venezuela. Paradoxically, the Vatican
representatives are moving in the opposite direction. The
new Nuncio, who has been at post for three months and
presented credentials, has offered no public comment in
defense of the national Church leadership. His deputy
(please protect) tells us that he arrived with instructions
to normalize relations with Chavez. The Nuncio has not
responded to my three invitations for a low profile meeting,
a clear sign that he is nervous about annoying Chavez.
Wealthy businessman and philanthropist Alberto Vollmer
(protect) told me last week that he brought a message to
Chavez from Vatican Secretary of State Cardinal Angelo Sodano
in May that the Vatican had withdrawn their previous Nuncio,
refrained from critical commentary; and proposed
noncontroversial Archbishop of Valencia Jorge Urosa Savinoas
the new Archbishop of Caracas; they now wanted Chavez,
concurrence. To be fair, Vollmer said his message also
carried an implied threat that the Vatican would abrogate the
Concordat and name the Archbishop unilaterally if Chavez did
not soon agree.


8. (C) At risk of belaboring the obvious, we could use some
allies down here. The opposition parties are in disarray,

organized labor and business are intimidated, the NGO,s are
nervous, and the media very careful. The Church is perhaps
the only institution in Venezuela today that can take on
Chavez head-to-head in the poor communities that represent
his political base. I do not want to wrap the Church in a
giant, public U.S. Government hug. I do not want to push
them into a negative posture, or go further in challenging
Chavez than they are comfortable going. But I want to make
clear to them here, in Washington, and in the Vatican that
they are not alone, and we will support them. I suggest
three steps we can take right now:

- First, reach out directly to senior Church leadership
in the Vatican at the highest possible level. Emphasize that
the GOV is showing many of the same signals to the Church
today that Cuba showed in the 1960,s. It is in the
Vatican,s interest to take clear, objective positions on
democracy, human rights, freedom of religion, and respect for
the Church. We are not suggesting that the Vatican get out
in front of the Venezuelan Church, only that it support them.

- Second, reach out to the Papal Nuncio in Washington at
the highest possible level. Same message.

- Third, engage the U.S. Church hierarchy. Archbishop
Porras is a good friend of the Archbishop of Washington. If
the Venezuelan Church is going to take on the Chavez project,
they must be certain they have support from the Vatican and
other national Church leaderships. The U.S. Church is a good
place to start. A robust exchange program and some U.S.
missions to Venezuela would be a good way to do it.
Brownfield


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2005CARACA02258 - CONFIDENTIAL