Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05CARACAS1666
2005-06-03 15:00:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Caracas
Cable title:  

GOV UNLIKELY TO SUPPORT DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION IN

Tags:  PREL ETRD ETTC CU VE 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L CARACAS 001666 

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/02/2015
TAGS: PREL ETRD ETTC CU VE
SUBJECT: GOV UNLIKELY TO SUPPORT DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION IN
CUBA

REF: A. SECSTATE 096300 B. CARACAS 1359

Classified By: Political Counselor Abelardo A. Arias
for reason 1.4 (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L CARACAS 001666

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/02/2015
TAGS: PREL ETRD ETTC CU VE
SUBJECT: GOV UNLIKELY TO SUPPORT DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION IN
CUBA

REF: A. SECSTATE 096300 B. CARACAS 1359

Classified By: Political Counselor Abelardo A. Arias
for reason 1.4 (d).


1. (C) President Hugo Chavez,s support for Fidel Castro and
antagonism toward the United States is well publicized and
makes GoV support for democratic transition in Cuba
improbable. The cooperation that exists between Castro and
Chavez is extensive, as evidenced by the over 10,000 Cuban
doctors and teachers working in Venezuela, the amount of
subsidized oil flowing from Venezuela to Cuba and a series of
recent economic agreements intended to strengthen trade
between the two countries.


2. (C) On April 28, Chavez and Castro signed 49 economic
agreements in Havana (Ref B). These agreements covered areas
such as energy, oil, nickel, agriculture, furniture, shoes,
textiles, toys, lingerie, tires, construction materials,
electricity, transportation, health and education. The
central focus of the agreements, however, appeared to be oil,
with the establishment of PDVSA-Cuba to coordinate oil
shipments to the Caribbean and plans to increase oil
shipments to Cuba from 53,000 barrels per day (bpd) to
between 80 and 90 thousand bpd. In addition to sending more
than USD 400 million of various products duty free to Cuba,
the GoV also plans to open an office of state-owned
commercial Venezuelan Industrial Bank (BIV) in Havana to
finance imports and exports of products between the two
countries while Cuba will open an official Banco Exterior de
Cuba in Caracas. A plan to form 11 co-state-owned companies
was part of the agreement.

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


3. (C) Chavez,s regard for Castro is deeply rooted and
unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. With personal
and economic ties strengthening between the two governments
alongside Chavez,s staunch criticism of capitalism, the more
likely scenario is that Chavez will amplify his support for
Castro,s socialist ideology while opposing any steps towards
a democratic transition in
Cuba. In the event of a sudden leadership change in Cuba, we
would expect Chavez to use the GoV's considerable resources,
as well as its influence in the hemisphere, to support Cuban
hardliners and to oppose USG initiatives.
Brownfield


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2005CARACA01666 - CONFIDENTIAL