KELLER POLL: VENEZUELANS SUPPORT CHAVEZ AND THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L CARACAS 001498

SIPDIS


NSC FOR CBARTON
HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/11/2015
TAGS: PGOV MARR VE
SUBJECT: KELLER POLL: VENEZUELANS SUPPORT CHAVEZ AND THE
MILITARY BLINDLY

Classified By: ACTING POLITICAL COUNSELOR CAROLINA HIDEA FOR 1.4 (D)

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Summary
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1. (C) Respected political analyst and pollster Alfredo
Keller met with poloff May 10 to discuss his and the public's
views on the GOV and the Venezuelan military. According to
Keller's most recent (February 2005) survey, Venezuelan
President Hugo Chavez, the GOV, and the armed forces all
received high marks. Nonetheless, respondents gave these
institutions much lower marks when asked about their
performance on specific issues. Keller complained that the
opposition was not exploiting this phenomenon, which he
described as a gap between "emotional" and "rational" support
for Chavez. Turning to his personal analysis of the
military, Keller said he considered the military and not the
MVR to be the real center of power in Chavez's
administration. Keller considered Chavez's new reserve
recruitment drive an attempt to lower unemployment. An
perceptive researcher, Keller is right to note that the
opposition could benefit from highlighting Chavez's failures
to improve the country's worst problems, but most opposition
groups are unlikely to change their strategies. End summary.


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Poll and Methodology
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2. (C) Pollster and political analyst Alfredo Keller met
with poloff May 10 to share analysis on the GOV and the
Venezuelan military. Keller, a Swiss citizen, heads the
consulting firm Keller and Associates, which publishes a
survey of Venezuelan public opinion three times a year.
According to the methodology page of his latest briefing,
Keller's February 2005 poll had a sample size of 1,200
people, whose addresses were selected randomly from the
electoral registry in 67 cities. The survey was conducted in
homes and included respondents from all socioeconomic strata.
It screened out those lacking identity cards or otherwise
appeared unlikely to vote, and it controlled for the
variables of sex and age. The poll claims to have a margin
of error of 2.89 percent.

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Popular View of the Armed Forces
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3. (C) Keller's poll indicates that 74 percent of
respondents had a "favorable" opinion of the Venezuelan Armed
Forces, a return to the high public opinion levels of the
past after a drop over the past year or two. The military
received higher marks than foreign investors, the church, the
electoral watchdog NGO Sumate, and both GOV and private
television channels. Venezuelan oil company PDVSA edged the
military, although the difference between the two
institutions' ratings was within the margin of error.


4. (C) Despite the military's high ratings, only a slight
majority (52 percent) of those polled approved of the large
number of soldiers serving in civilian government positions.
According to Keller, this statistic was part of a larger
trend showing that the public supported the administration of
President Hugo Chavez for "emotional" rather than "rational"
reasons. For example, he noted that 69 percent and 78
percent of the country had a positive perception of Chavez
and his government, respectively. Yet, when the questions
turned to whether the GOV had resolved specific problems, the
ratings plummeted. In fact, Keller said an average gap of
more than 50 percentage points existed between general
perceptions of the GOV and perceptions of its performance on
the issues most important to the electorate, such as the
standard and cost of living, unemployment, poverty, and
crime. According to Keller's research, this gap has grown
throughout the Chavez administration--even as Chavez's
approval rating has increased over the last year and a half.

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Keller's Analysis of his Results
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5. (C) Keller attributed the "rational-emotional gap" to
the electorate's naivete. Keller said much of the electorate
supported Chavez without seeing standard of living
improvements because it fell for propaganda blaming powerful
scapegoats such as the US and foreign investment. Having
just returned from an international conference, Keller said
he had learned from some of his polling peers that this
phenomenon also occurred elsewhere in Latin America.


6. (C) An opponent of Chavez, Keller faulted the Venezuelan
opposition for not trying to capitalize on these trends,
which he viewed as a great opportunity. He said he did not
bother talking to the traditional political parties because
he knew they would not change their strategies. Rather,
Keller said he focused on instructing young politicians and a
few old ones with new ideas. He singled out Primero
Justicia--with the exception of its president, Julio
Borges--as an open-minded political party.

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Personal Views on the Military
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7. (C) Keller said the military--rather than the ruling
Fifth Republic Movement (MVR) party--was the true center of
power within the Chavez administration. As an example,
Keller asserted that about three years ago, Chavez threatened
to disband the MVR and replace it with the small military
group MBR-200, which had helped Chavez plot his coup attempt
in 1992. According to Keller, the most powerful government
officials were active or former military officers, with the
exception of Vice President Jose Vicente Rangel. Keller
cited Miranda Governor and former army lieutenant Diosdado
Cabello as the GOV figure closest to Chavez and most likely
to follow in his presidential footsteps.


8. (C) Keller viewed Chavez's call to create more than two
million reserves as an effort to generate employment.
Chavez, he said, recognizes unemployment is a major problem
but has few practical ideas on how to solve it. According to
Keller, the President, who has had an inflated view of the
military's power throughout his career, now relies on the
institution--coupled with billions of dollars of oil
revenue--as a panacea.

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Comment
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9. (C) Keller is a thoughtful analyst not given to the
usual hysterics and exaggerations of the Venezuelan
opposition. He is certainly correct to note that the MVR is
ancillary to Chavez's power base, which is composed of
current and former military officers. He is also correct to
recognize that the opposition could get mileage out of the
tried-and-true US campaign challenge to voters, "ask yourself
if you're better off," but as he says, most opposition
members are unlikely to adapt their campaigns to trends in
voter opinion. GOV officials probably are already posturing
to be the presidential candidate in 2012--MVR deputy Luis
Tascon was suspended from the party May 10 partly for
suggesting as much. Diosdado Cabello is certainly a powerful
figure, but whether he is next in line is an academic
question, as Chavez has vowed to remain in power until 2021.
McFarland


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2005CARACA01498 - CONFIDENTIAL