VENEZUELA: THE MILITARY IN GOVERNMENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L CARACAS 001283

SIPDIS


NS FOR C. BARTON
USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2015
TAGS: PGOV MARR KDEM VE
SUBJECT: VENEZUELA: THE MILITARY IN GOVERNMENT


Classified By: Political Counselor Abelardo A. Arias for reason 1.4 (d)
.

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SUMMARY
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1. (SBU) At least 180 military officers, both active and
retired, currently occupy positions in the Venezuelan
government. Some estimates range higher, but this figure
reflects Embassy's specific information at this time.
Seventy-nine of the 179 are/were in the Army (44%),25 the
Navy (14%),25 the Air Force (14%),and 22 the National Guard
(12%). (We have been unable to determine accurately the
remainder's service affiliation.) A fair number occupy
elected offices, but the vast majority work in executive
ministries, embassies abroad or hold key positions in state
companies. Personal ties to President Hugo Chavez seem
significant, since fully a quarter of the 180 officers
graduated with Chavez or attended the Venezuela Military
Academy while he was teaching there; many participated in the
two 1992 coup attempts. End Summary.

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MIXING MILITARY WITH THE CIVILIAN
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3. (U) President Hugo Chavez speaks often of civic-military
relations and the prominent role the military ought to play
in his Bolivarian Revolution. Post has examined a variety of
sources to discern the number and locations of active and
retired military officers in the Venezuelan government. To
date, post has knowledge of 180 such officers, though some
estimates put the number much higher (note: DAO believes
there are easily over 200 active duty and retired military
officers working as government officials). The majority of
the 180 confirmed military officers in positions of power
fall into three categories: executive ministries, Venezuelan
diplomatic missions abroad, and state companies.


4. (U) In executive ministries, 7 ministers (Defense, Food,
Popular Economy, Infrastructure, Tourism, Production &
Commerce, and Interior & Justice) and 7 vice-ministers are
military officers, as well as numerous lower-ranking
officials. Particular concentrations of military officers
are found in: the Ministry of Infrastructure, with 19, mostly
in the National Institute for Aquatic Spaces (INEA); the
Ministry of Environment, with 9, all presidents of state
institutions or directors of projects; the Ministry of
Finance, with 7, including the Director of the National
Budget Office and the President of SENIAT, the federal tax
institution; and the National Institute of Education
Cooperation (INCE),with 4, including the Secretary General.


5. (U) There are at least 18 retired military officers
working in diplomatic missions abroad as ambassadors (11) or
consuls. There is a particular concentration in South
American countries, but military officers are also in
embassies/consulates in Russia, Israel, Malaysia, the Czech
Republic, China, South Korea and the United States.


6. (U) Though their numbers are slightly lower in state
companies than in ministries, military officers do hold key
positions of power in the country's largest corporations,
including an external director and two board members of the
state oil company PDVSA; the president of CVG, the country's
second-largest corporation; the president of Corpozulia
(Zulia state development company) and Carbozulia (coal
production operation in Zulia); Director of the Industrial
Credit Fund (FONCREI),at least 5 offices in Corpovargas
(Vargas state development corporation),including the
president; and until recently, one of Citgo's top executives
(Note: DAO believes at least another 30 military officers -
mostly active duty Army - are heading PDVSA security).


7. (U) Other military officers in important positions

include 2 justices in the Venezuelan Supreme Court (including
the President of the penal chamber of the Court) and the
Director General of the National Electoral Council (CNE),and
the head of the National Defense and Security Council
(CODENA).


8. (U) Elected military Chavistas include 9 of the 23 state
governors and 8 deputies in the National Assembly (including
its 2nd vice-president). All governors and deputies that are
military officers are members of Chavez's MVR political
party. Additionally, at least four mayors are former military
officers (note: a January 11, 2005 article in the liberal
opposition newspaper "El Universal" claims more than 30
mayors are retired military officers).

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FAMILIARITY BREEDS POWER
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9. (U) Those with personal ties to Chavez through the
Venezuela Military Academy are particularly well represented.
More than a quarter (45) of known military officers in
positions of power in the Venezuelan government and state
companies graduated from the Academy either in 1975 or
between 1982-1989. (Note: Since post's information
concerning graduation years is incomplete, that percentage
could be even higher.) President Chavez graduated from the
Academy in 1975 and taught at the four-year academy from 1980
through 1984. In addition, a number of Chavez' military
supporters have worked with him since he began to plan the
overthrow the GOV back in the 1980s, and/or participated in
the coup attempts in February and November of 1992.


10. (U) An instructive example of the power of personal ties
to Chavez is General (active duty) Carlos Martinez. Martinez
graduated with Chavez in 1975, and is concurrently serving as
the President of Corpozulia, President of Carbozulia,
External Director of PDVSA, and Vice President of a bank in
the state of Zulia. Prior to this, he worked in Miraflores
Palace as Secretary to the Presidency. Others from the class
of '75 include the Minister of Defense, a Vice Minister of
Foreign Affairs, a Vice Minister of Interior and Justice, and
the Secretary of the National Defense and Security Council
(CODENA).

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COMMENT
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11. (C) The preponderance of the military in the Chavez
administration reflects his dependence on the one institution
that formed him professionally, where he developed his
closest personal relationships, and from where he launched
his 1992 coup attempts. It also fits in with his concept of a
new Bolviarian revolution. In the six years he has been in
power, Chavez has transformed loyalties and bonds into
commitments to his revolution. Giving trusted allies
authority, and in some cases control of large budgets in an
environment almost void of fiscal oversight, ensures
loyalists are on the front lines of the Bolivarian Revolution
with resources that can be used at their discretion. It also
makes it more difficult for the military to boot Chavez out.
There is even the added benefit of political enforcement as
with the tax service SENIAT - whose president, Jose Vielma,
was a student of Chavez at the Military Academy - which has
been accused of selectively targeting investigations,
including charges by the NGO Sumate of raiding companies as
retribution for their support of Sumate (reftel).


12. (C) The military presence in government also fuels
speculation about differences among Chavez supporters. The
civilian-military split was more pronounced some two or three
years ago, when the military side of the Fifth Republic
Movement were known by the civilians as the "vampires."
That, however, dissipated with the change in the composition
of the MVR's central committee favoring civilians in early


2003. The military side, with the exception of those called
upon to run for office in October 2004, has been tapped more
appointed administrative offices. For his part, Chavez is
not shy about calling on the military to participate, casting
their role as part of his civic-military vision for the
Bolivarian Revolution. This "civil-military alliance"
reflects the influence of Peru's Velasco Alvarado as well as
Cuba's Castro.


13. (C) The Venezuelan military has never had a reputation
for administrative efficiency, and even in the pre-Chavez era
was plagued by corruption and favoritism. Corpovargas, with
five military officers now in top positions, plainly
illustrates the potential for corruption. Created following
40 days of rain and devastating flooding in the state of
Vargas in 1999, Corpovargas initially had a budget of $1.4
billion. However, after just three days of rain in February
of this year caused yet more flooding in Vargas, it was
revealed that the state company has completed only four of 23
canal projects to date (their ostensible priority),never
finished a key road and changed many of the original
construction plans to use cheaper, lower-quality materials.
No accounting of the funds has yet been brought forth.
Brownfield


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2005CARACA01283 - CONFIDENTIAL