SENATOR COLEMAN'S MEETING WITH VENEZUELAN CIVIL

C O N F I D E N T I A L CARACAS 001045

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/30/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM KDEM VE
SUBJECT: SENATOR COLEMAN'S MEETING WITH VENEZUELAN CIVIL
SOCIETY LEADERS

Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ABELARDO A. ARIAS FOR
REASON 1.4 D

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Summary
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1. (C) During Senator Norm Coleman's (R-MN) visit to
Venezuela April 1-3, he met with leading Venezuelan civil
society figures at a dinner hosted by the Charge. The guests
told the Senator of their deep concerns for the future of
democratic institutions in the country. They also expressed
their worries about the militarization of the civilian
bureaucracy and the plan by Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez
to create a two million person military reserve. Finally,
they encouraged the U.S. to work with together with other
countries to put pressure on the Chavez regime and to change
the discourse from a U.S. versus Chavez debate to a
multinational expression of concern for democracy and rule of
law in Venezuela. Senator Coleman underscored the USG's
support for democracy and encouraged civil society to reach
out to counterparts in Europe and Latin America. END SUMMARY.

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Venezuelan Civil Society
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2. (C) Coordinadora Democratica's Alberto Quiroz, Sumate's
Alejandro Plaz, former Minister of Agriculture Hiram Gaviria,
and Assistant Political Editor of El Universal newspaper
Ernesto Ecarri Hung, at a dinner hosted by the Charge on
April 2, told the Senator they were concerned about
democratic institutions in Venezuela, the creation of
civilian reserves and control over the military, and what
they perceived as Chavez's unwillingness to cede or lose
power democratically. They advocated the U.S. form
international alliances, especially with Brazil, Spain,
Argentina and France, to influence Chavez's troubling
behavior in Venezuela and the region


3. (C) Plaz told the Senator that Chavez had accelerated his
attack on fundamental human rights and democratic freedoms
since the referendum. Sumate, Plaz said, was working to
prevent the further deterioration of democratic institutions.
Keeping democratic spaces open was also the most important
role the international community could play, he asserted.


4. (C) Quiroz highlighted concern about the planned creation
of a military reserve corps of some two million people headed
by a General who would report directly to Chavez. He also
noted the high number of military in civilian government
jobs. Plaz added that 6 of 22 Ministers and 9 of 23
governors were ex-military as well.


5. (C) Plaz asserted that the GOV was using preferential oil
agreements to forge alliances and neutralize enemies.
Likewise, he said, Chavez was using the threat of supporting
the radical left against governments in fragile democracies
like Bolivia. Quiroz noted that while previous governments
had automatically renewed the San Jose treaty of 1980 that
gave Caribbean and Central American countries beneficial
terms for petroleum, Chavez threatened to suspend the treaty
if he considered governments to be "unfriendly" (as he did
with the Dominican Republic and threatened to do with
Panama). Chavez also gives Cuba special petroleum terms,
Quiroz said, which it had not received under the treaty.


6. (C) Plaz pointed out the significance of the 15 Caribbean
votes in the OAS. He observed that Chile had made a
180-degree turn on Chavez, referring to Venezuela's support
of Chile's Minister of Interior Insulza to be OAS Secretary
General.


7. (C) To control the GOV and neutralize its efforts, the
U.S. should forge alliances and turn the argument into the
international community vs. Chavez, not the U.S. vs. Chavez,
Plaz said. Quiroz agreed saying the USG should play the role
of champion of democracy with others, not alone. Quiroz also
quoted leftist politician Pompeo Marquez, "The U.S. cannot
allow Chavez to be the champion of the poor" to suggest that
the USG should continue its efforts to improve the lives of
the poor while searching for international alliances against
Chavez. Plaz said that after Castro, the presidents of
Brazil, Spain, and then Argentina were most influential.
Recalling his experience as Ambassador to France, Gaviria

also mentioned France as another possible ally, saying Chavez
respected French President Jacques Chirac. Senator Coleman
agreed that the USG by itself would be less effective in
promoting democracy. He was encouraged by the recent
statements by the presidents of Brazil and Spain with regard
to Venezuela, and he thought that the USG should engage with
these two nations.


8. (C) Plaz lamented the international community's
willingness to be fooled by Chavez's democratic facade and
unwillingness to act unless there was a large number of
deaths, large numbers of political prisoners, or a picture of
a high-level Venezuelan official giving weapons to the FARC.
Plaz said during his discussions with a UN official, he was
told there would be no action from them and he might have
more luck with the OAS. Plaz said he thought other countries
were willing to let Chavez continue as long as they thought
it was contained to Venezuela and they agreed with the
Senator's evaluation that for the international community,
Chavez had not crossed any lines yet. That said, Plaz also
noted the new Latin American left realized they could be
discredited if Chavez went the way of Castro, so there was
hope. Quiroz disagreed saying Lula had trouble with this
extreme left and would be friendly with Chavez to neutralize
criticisms in Brazil.


9. (C) On oil, Quiroz, a former oil executive, said the lack
of investment in the sector would have an effect, but only in
the long term. Chavez would benefit from high prices for a
while, but quantity could be a problem in the future. He
said that PDVSA itself was producing only half what it did in
1998 and depending on foreign production to fill the gap.
The GOV, according to Quiroz, would never be able to reach
the stated production goal of 5 million barrels in 6 years
time; it would take over 10 years if Chavez started investing
now.


10. (U) This cable was not reviewed by Senator Coleman or his
staff.

Brownfield


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