CHAVEZ DECREES FORMATION OF MILITARY RESERVES

C O N F I D E N T I A L CARACAS 001038

SIPDIS


NSC FOR CBARTON
HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/2014
TAGS: PGOV MARR VE
SUBJECT: CHAVEZ DECREES FORMATION OF MILITARY RESERVES


Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ABELARDO A. ARIAS FOR 1.4 (D)

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Summary
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1. (C) Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez made official his
plans to increase military reserves and call up a civilian
militia with two decrees published April 4. On his "Alo
Presidente" program April 3, Chavez said the new military
reserves will number more than 1.5 million and the rest of
the population will be recruited to help defend the country
in guerrilla warfare. Both groups will answer to him through
the command of Maj. Gen. Julio Quintero Viloria. Referring
to Venezuela's defense restructuring, National Land Institute
director and former intelligence chief Eliecer Otaiza told a
reporter that Venezuelans need to learn to "hate gringos" in
preparation for war, a comment rejected by the Foreign
Ministry. Most opposition groups have focused their
criticism on the alleged undemocratic and illegal nature of
the reserves, issues that have little resonance with the
public.

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Clearing Up the Facts
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2. (U) Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez issued two decrees
published in the national gazette April 4 confirming he
(Chavez) would command Venezuela's planned military reserves
and direct the mobilization of civilians to help defend the
country. He designated Maj. Gen. Julio Quintero Viloria to
oversee both projects for him. The decree called for
Quintero's participation in national security planning and
gave him a voice--but not a vote--in meetings of the Defense
Ministry and the unified command. According to the decree, a
change in a line item of the presidency's budget will finance
the reserves after additional credit is authorized. Chavez
also outlined his plans for reserves and for "asymmetric"
(that is, guerrilla) warfare during his "Alo Presidente"
program broadcast from the site of the revolutionary Battle
of Las Queseras in Apure State on its 186th anniversary April

3. Chavez quoted extensively from the description of the
battle written by hero Gen. Jose Antonio Paez to show how
civilians were essential to the war effort.


3. (U) Questioned about the asymmetric doctrine, National
Land Institute director and former intelligence chief Eliecer
Otaiza told a reporter it was necessary to start "hating
gringos," since US citizens would be on the front lines of
the "asymmetric war." Otaiza added that he did not agree
with the thesis that Venezuela must confront the US President
but not the American people. (Note: Chavez has often
expressed that he has no quarrel with the American people.)
Foreign Minister Ali Rodriguez disavowed Otaiza's comments
April 6, saying only he, as the President's foreign relations
representative, can authoritatively speak about such affairs.
Countering Otaiza, the Ambassador expressed regret about the
talk of hatred while the United States was seeking to improve
bilateral relations. Offering to resign if necessary, Otaiza
then told the press he was only expressing his personal
opinion, not endorsing hatred. He brushed off further
questions, saying everyone just needed to get the "Mickey
Mouse stuff" out of their heads because it was time to talk
ideology.


4. (U) Defense Council chief Maj. Gen. Melvin Lopez
Hidalgo, for his part, tap-danced further on the issue of
whether civilians would be supplied weapons. After attending
a meeting Vice President Jose Vicente Rangel had called with
senior officers March 29, Lopez told reporters that not all
reservists would be armed. Denying both the militarization
of the civilian population and the politicization of the
military, Lopez said that "there were different ways of
defending the country." Lopez explained the purchase of
100,000 assault rifles from Russia by maintaining that the
replacement of the military's current Belgian FAL rifles was
years overdue.

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How Many Reserves Will There Be?
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5. (U) Chavez announced on "Alo Presidente" that the ranks
of military reserves would be increased to "1.5 or 2 million"
people, and that all 25 million Venezuelan citizens would be
mobilized to defend the country. At the end of the program,
Gen. Quintero told Chavez he currently had only 80,000
"passive reserves." (Note: "Passive reserves" probably
refers to military personnel who have left the armed forces
within the last five years. These soldiers are legally
obligated to return to active duty if called.) Quintero said
he had asked mayors to help raise the number to 1.4 million
by recruiting ten percent of the population. Without
elaborating further, Quintero also alluded to the possibility
of signing up 2,225,000 people.


6. (C) The current number of military reserves on the rolls
is unclear, but those who are mission ready are a small
fraction of the 80,000 cited by Quintero. According to a DAO
source, as of 2003 the reserve force was no larger than
5,000. On the March 20 Alo Presidente program, Chavez
questioned a reserve battalion commander in Barinas who said
that of 3,025 registered reserves under his command, he only
assembled about 700 for drills. An active duty colonel told
polcouns March 30 that if the military could not keep regular
troops trained, it would seem unlikely that it would be able
to prepare millions of reserves for combat.

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Why Reserves?
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7. (U) The opposition has criticized the proposed reserves
primarily by questioning their purpose. A retired military
officer and legislators from both sides of the aisle debated
the issue on an April 5 broadcast of the GOV-sponsored
television station. (The GOV is pulling out the stops to
publicize the reserves, including by running color newspaper
advertisements.) In an email advocating Chavez's overthrow,
a group calling itself the "national allied forces" described
three "threats" the GOV planned to face with reserves: the
United States, Colombia, and internal dissidents. Former
Defense Minister Fernando Ochoa Antich likened the planned
reserve force to Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega's
"dignity battalions," which quickly disintegrated after
experiencing thousands of casualties. He posited that Chavez
was beefing up reserves to create an alternate force that
would follow him blindly, especially in the event of another
military coup. Doubting that Chavez really fears a US
invasion, an editorial in an opposition-leaning newspaper
commented that the reserves would be used to counter
potential uprisings of civilian masses and military units.


8. (C) With the exception of Primero Justicia (PJ),
opposition political parties have argued against reserves by
warning of creeping authoritarianism. Christian democratic
(COPEI) secretary general Cesar Perez Vivas said the GOV
aimed to frighten the people and smother internal dissidence
with the popular reserves, according to March 29 press
reports. Movement to Socialism (MAS) secretary general
Leopoldo Puchi warned that a militia would "completely
distort democratic life." PJ officials, however, stuck to
themes more poignant to Venezuelan voters such unemployment,
poverty, and security. One PJ spokesman listed social
spending plans that could improve the living standards of
millions of people if the GOV were to redirect what it
allegedly spent on weapons.

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The Legality of Reserves
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9. (U) The opposition's objections have also focused on the
alleged illegality of creating a civilian militia. Because
the organization of the reserves must be defined by organic
law, the opposition has argued that any changes to the force
would require a two-thirds vote of the National Assembly, as
stipulated in the constitution. According to press reports,
the National Assembly's defense committee may submit a draft
of the organic law of the armed forces, which will call for
the mobilization of all willing citizens between the ages of
18 and 50 who are mentally and physically capable, to the
plenary chamber in mid-April. (Note: Pro-Chavez forces do
not have the two-thirds vote in the assembly to pass an
organic law on the military. When faced with a similar

situation regarding the judiciary, they simply did not label
the law "organic," passed a law tailored to Chavez's needs,
and packed the Supreme Court.)


10. (U) Although the constitution does not specifically
mention reserves, the opposition has also declared the
militias themselves unconstitutional. On the other hand, the
Chavez administration maintains that its initiative is in
keeping with constitutional principles. Pro-Chavez chairman
of the National Assembly's defense committee Edis Rios
pointed out that the constitution holds "all natives and
corporate bodies" in Venezuela responsible for the national
defense.

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Comment
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11. (U) The purported threats from the United States, from
popular uprisings, and from plotters within the military
probably all have influenced Chavez to increase the reserves
and make them accountable to him. He also probably plans to
use recruiting as a tool to stir up nationalistic support for
his presidency in the manner that he employed the Electoral
Battle Units so successfully before the recall referendum in
August 2004. (He is keeping the same acronym.) The
administration will not be able to train millions for combat,
but this does not mean that Chavez will not be able to
construct a corps for his "revolution." The case of Otaiza's
"hate" comments shows that whenever Chavez changes his
message towards the United States, GOV spokesmen will
inevitably take time to catch up. We will continue to
exploit the ensuing confusion.
Brownfield


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2005CARACA01038 - CONFIDENTIAL