Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05CANBERRA374
2005-02-28 05:36:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Canberra
Cable title:  

AUSTRALIAN VIEWS ON STRENGTHENING THE IAEA AND

Tags:  PREL KNNP AORC PARM AS IR IAEA 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CANBERRA 000374 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/ANP, NP/MNA, AND NP/RA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2015
TAGS: PREL KNNP AORC PARM AS IR IAEA
SUBJECT: AUSTRALIAN VIEWS ON STRENGTHENING THE IAEA AND
RAISING IRAN AT THE NEXT BOARD OF GOVERNORS MEETING

REF: A. STATE 21700


B. STATE 30313

C. STATE 31323

D. CANBERRA 322

E. CANBERRA 323

F. CANBERRA 341

Classified By: POLCOUNS WOO LEE FOR REASONS 1.4 (B AND D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CANBERRA 000374

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/ANP, NP/MNA, AND NP/RA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2015
TAGS: PREL KNNP AORC PARM AS IR IAEA
SUBJECT: AUSTRALIAN VIEWS ON STRENGTHENING THE IAEA AND
RAISING IRAN AT THE NEXT BOARD OF GOVERNORS MEETING

REF: A. STATE 21700


B. STATE 30313

C. STATE 31323

D. CANBERRA 322

E. CANBERRA 323

F. CANBERRA 341

Classified By: POLCOUNS WOO LEE FOR REASONS 1.4 (B AND D).


1. (C) We presented Ref A demarche on February 7 to DFAT
Arms Control Office Director David Mason and ASNO DG John
Carlson, and continued discussions during and after the visit
of NPT Envoy and CD Ambassador Jackie Sanders (Refs D - F)
about the U.S. proposals to strengthen the IAEA. Mason,
Carlson and First Assistant Secretary for International
Security David Stuart told us the GOA broadly supported the
U.S. approach to strengthening the IAEA, but wondered whether
the NAM would find it acceptable (Ref F). We raised ref B
points with Mason and NPT action officer John Page on
February 22. They appreciated the revisions to the Terms of
Reference for the IAEA Special Committee and said Australia
could accept the U.S. language as written. Mason and Page,
however, highlighted what they saw as a disconnect between
ref B talking points on the critical issue of Committee
membership and the concommitant language in the Terms of
Reference (TOR) document, as follows:

Begin excerpt from Ref B talking points:

"We are prepared to modify our position on membership. We
can agree that the committee membership shall be open ended.
This position, however, is without prejudice to our proposal
on membership that we will submit for consideration by the
Special Committee, i.e., that countries under investigation
for non-technical violations of their nuclear
nonproliferation and safeguards obligations should elect not
to participate in decisions by the IAEA Board of Governors
(BOG) or the Special Committee regarding their own cases."

Begin text from draft Terms of Reference:

"Committee Membership

The Committee should be a Committee of the Board made up of
governments in good standing with the IAEA. No states under
investigation for proliferation violations should be allowed
to serve on the new Special Committee. Any state on the
Committee that comes under investigation should recuse itself
from the Committee."


2. (C) Mason and Page explained that although the language
in the Ref B draft Board Decision language matched that in
the talking points about committee membership, they believed
the reference to "countries under investigation for
non-technical violations" needed to be repeated in the TOR
document. In addition, they were concerned about the TOR
phrase that such countries "should elect not to participate"
in decisions by the BOG. This could be viewed as
"mandatory," they said, and would therefore be unacceptable
to the NAM. Mason proposed a "less strident" phrase, such
as: "it would be expected that states under investigation for
non-technical violations .... would recuse themselves ...."
He again emphasized that the GOA itself was satisfied with
and would support the overall U.S. approach. His suggested
language was intended to help the USG make the approach
acceptable to others. Mason especially endorsed the idea of
reviving special inspections, as well as the language on
identifying the consequences of states withdrawing from the
NPT, adding that Australia would present an NPT Article X
initiative at the May 2005 NPT Review Conference (septel).


3. (C) On February 23, we presented Ref C points on the U.S.
remarks at the February 28 BOG about Iran's nuclear programs
to Mason and IAEA Iran action officer Sam Roggeveen. Mason
and Roggeveen said they were in the process of finalizing the
Australian national statement on Iran. They expressed
appreciation for the U.S. points and said elements of them
would be factored into the Australian statement as
appropriate.

STANTON