Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05CANBERRA361
2005-02-25 07:11:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Canberra
Cable title:  

MTCR: AUSTRALIA AGREES WITH USG'S SMALL GROUP

Tags:  PARM PREL AS MTCRE 
pdf how-to read a cable
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L CANBERRA 000361 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NP/CBM, EAP/ANP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2015
TAGS: PARM PREL AS MTCRE
SUBJECT: MTCR: AUSTRALIA AGREES WITH USG'S SMALL GROUP
PROPOSALS

REF: A. STATE 31851


B. CANBERRA 354

Classified By: POLCOUNS WOO LEE FOR REASONS 1.4 (B AND D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L CANBERRA 000361

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NP/CBM, EAP/ANP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2015
TAGS: PARM PREL AS MTCRE
SUBJECT: MTCR: AUSTRALIA AGREES WITH USG'S SMALL GROUP
PROPOSALS

REF: A. STATE 31851


B. CANBERRA 354

Classified By: POLCOUNS WOO LEE FOR REASONS 1.4 (B AND D).


1. (C) We presented ref A points on February 24 to
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT)
Counterproliferation Section Director Peter Sawczak,
soliciting Australian views on the three USG proposals for
the April 4 Small Group meeting of the Missile Technology
Control Regime (MTCR) and asking whether the GOA had any
proposals of its own. Sawczak said his office had been
considering some ideas, but he liked all three U.S. proposals
and agreed that those would be enough for the Small Group
countries to manage. He thought that ideas "A" (to pay
special scrutiny to North Korean-flagged or destined vessels)
and "B" (to scrutinize end-user requests for shipments
transiting through key proliferation hubs like Singapore,
Thailand and the UAE),would best be sponsored by either
Australia or Japan. He also saw a strong need for MTCR
countries to give briefings on their industries' in-house
compliance programs to non-partner countries, as described in
proposal "C".


2. (C) Sawczak noted that Australia was already engaged in
transshipment outreach similar to the "B" proposal for CW and
BW-related items controlled under the Australia Group regime,
so it would be a comfortable issue for the GOA to endorse
under the MTCR. However, he also saw merit in the GOA doing
more to pressure the DPRK (ref B) and indicated a
willingness to discuss these proposals with Japanese
counterparts. Sawczak strongly endorsed the Small Group
mechanism as a way to build -- or if necessary, get around --
the consensus necessary within the MTCR regime. He supported
the U.S. approach of pursuing two or three initiatives of
"tangible, practical counterproliferation benefit" that were
fairly apolitical, although he mentioned that South Africa
might balk at "naming the name" of North Korea.
STANTON