AUSTRALIA TO SEND ADDITIONAL 450 TROOPS TO IRAQ

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CANBERRA 000342

SIPDIS

STATE FOR PM/PMAT, EAP/ANP, NEA/I, UN/IO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2015
TAGS: MOPS MARR PREL PTER PGOV IZ AS
SUBJECT: AUSTRALIA TO SEND ADDITIONAL 450 TROOPS TO IRAQ

REF: A. CANBERRA 331 (NODIS) AND PREVIOUS


B. BAGHDAD 562

Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, A.I., BILL STANTON, FOR REASONS 1.4 (
A, B AND D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Prime Minister John Howard announced
February 22 that Australia would increase its troop
contribution to Iraq by 50 percent by sending 450 additional
ground forces to protect Japanese military engineers engaged
in reconstruction efforts in Al Muthanna province. Some of
the new Australian soldiers will also be used to train Iraqi
security forces. PM Howard said he made the decision, after
receiving personal requests from Prime Ministers Blair and
Koizumi, because the situation in Iraq had changed with the
recent elections, creating an opportunity that should not be
lost. The PM also stressed the importance he placed on the
chance for Australian soldiers to work together with troops
from Japan, a "close regional partner." Opposition leader
Kim Beazley blasted the PM for breaking his election promise
not to raise the general level of Australian forces in Iraq.
In a somewhat rambling press appearance, Beazley scored the
Government for having no "exit strategy" and said, without
further explanation, that the future of Iraq needed "to be
settled by Iraqis." END SUMMARY.


2. (U) Australian Prime Minister John Howard announced
publicly on February 22 that Australia would deploy an
additional 450 Australian Defence Force (ADF) ground troops
to the Al Muthanna region of southern Iraq to provide
security for Japanese military engineers engaged in
humanitarian missions there. Some of the troops, the PM
said, would also be involved in further training of Iraqi
security forces. The deployment from the 1st Brigade based
in Darwin, Australia would begin in about 10 weeks. Howard
told the press that the request for Australia to take the
place of departing Dutch forces had come from the leaders of
both Japan and the UK: "The Prime Minister of Japan,
Junichiro Koizumi, telephoned me last Friday night and
amongst other things invited and requested this Australian
contribution...Likewise the British Prime Minister Mr. Blair
telephoned me in Auckland yesterday morning to confirm the
request that had previously been conveyed by both Jack Straw
to Alexander Downer and Geoffrey Hoon to Robert Hill, the
Defence Minister." Responding to a reporter's question, PM
Howard said the new deployment was not the result of a
request from the U.S. and stressed that in his most recent
conversation with President Bush the President had made no
request for additional Australian forces for Iraq.


3. (U) In explaining his decision to send more troops despite
his previous statements that the Government had no plans to
increase significantly the 880-920 Australian soldiers
currently deployed in the region, PM Howard indicated that
the situation in Iraq had changed for the better and that the
country was at a "tilting point" that presented an
"opportunity" to build stability that should not be missed.
He also emphasized that the operation, which would cost
A$250-300 million (US$198-237 million) a year, would offer a
chance for Australia to work "in partnership" with Japan, "a
close regional partner" that was making a valuable
contribution to Iraq's reconstruction. PM Howard said
Japanese involvement in Iraq was important both practically
and symbolically and that working alongside Japan was "very
important from Australia's point of view."


4. (C) Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
(DFAT) Iraq Task Force Director Bassim Blazey told us that PM
Howard had also talked on February 18 to Iraqi Prime Minister
Allawi, who warmly welcomed the additional troops. Australia
would seek a statement of welcome from the Iraqi Transitional
Government (ITG) as soon as it had formed, Blazey said.
Noting that some of the additional forces would be used to
train Iraqi security forces, Blazey said the ADF planned to
change its training model starting with this deployment by
placing Australian troops side-by-side with Iraqi forces
(along the lines recommended in ref. B).


5. (C) Blazey also informed us that PM Howard had called
opposition Australian Labor Party (ALP) Leader Kim Beazley
prior to making the public announcement. If by doing so the
PM was looking for understanding or even a modicum of support
from Beazley, it did not work. Addressing the press only
hours after Howard's announcement, Beazley said Australia
should have rejected the request. Noting that PM Howard had
pledged during last October's federal election not to raise
Australian troop levels in Iraq significantly, Beazley
demanded the Government explain the broken promise.
Continuing somewhat disjointedly, Beazley criticized the
Government for having "no exit strategy" for Iraq and said
the future of the country needed "to be settled by Iraqis,"
without explaining how the new deployment would thwart Iraqi
self-determination. The ALP's policy, Beazley continued, was
for Australia to be "differently engaged, not more deeply
engaged" in Iraq. He did not offer more details other than
to say that Australia had unique assets to contribute to the
counterterrorism effort in Southeast Asia.


6. (C) Comment: Prime Minister Howard acknowledged during his
announcement that the new deployment would be unpopular with
many in Australia, and there is no doubt that the Opposition
will attempt to make the most of his "broken promise" in
coming weeks. Nonetheless, by framing his decision as a
"difficult" choice based upon changed circumstances and an
opportunity to cement security and democracy in Iraq, Howard
appealed to the Australian public's pragmatism and self-image
of their country as one that does its share -- indeed more --
in the interest of the international community. The phone
calls from Koizumi and Blair were of enormous help to Howard
in this regard, as was his ability to state honestly that
this was not an American request.


7. (C) By contrast, the response from opposition leader Kim
Beazley was disappointing, even if consistent with recent
statements. On February 20 Beazley, unaware that the
Government was even then contemplating a new deployment,
argued on television that it was time for Australian troops
to begin withdrawing from the Middle East in order to focus
more on needs in Southeast Asia. We believe, however, that
this position, as well as his knee-jerk rejection of the
Government's announcement, may reflect less Beazley's
personal assessment of the requirements of the situation in
Iraq than his incomplete grip on the Labor Party. Beazley
does not yet have the political strength to force a full
reconsideration of the ALP's entrenched anti-war position.
End comment.


7. (U) BAGHDAD MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
STANTON