Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05CANBERRA1453
2005-08-29 06:51:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Canberra
Cable title:  

AFGHAN FM VISITS AUSTRALIA: GOA MOVING TOWARD

Tags:  PREL MARR ASEC EAID XD AF NL AS 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CANBERRA 001453 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/26/2015
TAGS: PREL MARR ASEC EAID XD AF NL AS
SUBJECT: AFGHAN FM VISITS AUSTRALIA: GOA MOVING TOWARD
DECISION TO DEPLOY PRT

REF: A. CANBERRA 1193 B. IIR 6 805 0203 05 C.

CANBERRA 1098

Classified By: Polcouns Woo Lee. Reason 1.4 (B/D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CANBERRA 001453

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/26/2015
TAGS: PREL MARR ASEC EAID XD AF NL AS
SUBJECT: AFGHAN FM VISITS AUSTRALIA: GOA MOVING TOWARD
DECISION TO DEPLOY PRT

REF: A. CANBERRA 1193 B. IIR 6 805 0203 05 C.

CANBERRA 1098

Classified By: Polcouns Woo Lee. Reason 1.4 (B/D).


1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph 8.


2. (C) Summary: Australia strongly supports the process of
bringing stability and democracy to Afghanistan. During his
August 17-20 visit to open the new Afghan embassy in
Canberra, Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah lobbied GOA
officials on Australian troop deployments, additional
financial assistance, a counterterrorism memorandum of
understanding (CT MOU),and a potential Australian Embassy in
Kabul. FM Downer said Australia hoped to send a provincial
reconstruction team (PRT) to Afghanistan but would need to
work out the details first. Australia also agreed to begin
discussions on a CT MOU and announced an additional U.S. $5.3
million in aid. GOA officials seek Washington's views on the
way forward in Afghanistan -- specifically, on the post-Bonn
Agreement role of the international community and on
counter-narcotics strategy. End Summary.


3. (C) Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) India
and South Asia Director Peter Howarth told us on August 24
that treatment accorded to the Afghan Foreign Minister during
his visit demonstrated the importance the GOA placed on its
relationship with Afghanistan. FM Abdullah was treated as a
"Guest of the Government," a rare honor which he has received
twice since taking office in 2001.

GOA Likely to Send Reconstruction Team
--------------

4. (C) After adding another 40 Special Forces troops to the
150 it had committed in July, the GOA reiterated during FM
Abdullah's visit that it was also considering sending a
200-strong provincial reconstruction team (PRT) to
Afghanistan in mid-2006 for a period of up to two years
(reftels A,B). Howarth said that the Cabinet had decided in
principle on July 30 to send the team and would make a final
decision in early November. The GOA would not send an
independent team and would instead look at partnering with

the U.S., the UK, or the Netherlands, attempting to maximize
the advantages of interoperability and opportunities to use
specific Australian expertise at partner locations. Types of
troops and deployment details would be dependent on the
partner country and location selected. The Dutch need
additional troops to complete a PRT and thus are very
interested in an Australian partnership, Howarth said.

$5.3M in New Aid
--------------

5. (U) Australia announced U.S. $5.3M (A$7M) in new
assistance to Afghanistan during FM Abdullah's visit. A
$3.8M (A$5M) non-earmarked donation will go to the World
Bank-administered Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund, and $1.5M
(A$2M) will go to the UN Development Program to further
support the September National Assembly elections. Australia
contributed $83.3M (A$110M) towards Afghan reconstruction
from September 2001 through June 2005. GOA forward estimates
had allocated $19.7M (A$26M) for the 2005-06 fiscal year, of
which the $5.3M is the first installment.

CT MOU Discussions
--------------

6. (C) One of Abdullah's primary goals for the visit was to
start negotiating a counterterrorism memorandum of
understanding (CT MOU) with Australia. Howarth confided that
Australian officials had not been keen to begin discussions
on a CT MOU because they did not believe Afghanistan's
institutions were ready for substantive engagement on CT
issues. Nevertheless, PM Howard agreed to negotiate the MOU
as a symbolic gesture, and DFAT passed a draft model of its
CT MOU framework to the Afghans for consideration. Howarth
indicated that if PM Howard or FM Downer were to visit
Afghanistan in the near future, which was likely due to the
recent troop deployments, the signing of the CT MOU would
make a timely deliverable. (Note: The GOA signed its 11th
bilateral CT MOU with Pakistan during President Musharraf's
June visit (ref C).)

Political Will, But No Money for Embassy Kabul
-------------- -

7. (C) Dr. Abdullah's other major request during his visit
was that Australia establish an embassy in Kabul. FM Downer
said publicly that given the "intensity of the relationship"
Australia had with Afghanistan, the embassy was something the
GOA was considering funding in the context of next year's
budget. DFAT's Howarth, however, told us that while the
issue was "dear to Downer's heart," it was unlikely that DFAT
would be able to provide the funding needed to meet the
security requirements for an Embassy in Kabul.

Comment and Action Request
--------------

8. (C) The increased Australian commitment, both military and
political, to Afghanistan is just the latest affirmation that
the GOA continues to be one of our strongest allies in the
war on terror. When asked by the press why Australia was
sending more troops to Afghanistan, PM Howard replied, "The
Australian national interest is in making sure that the
democratic Afghanistan continues. If the democratic
experiment in Afghanistan fails then that's a huge victory
for terrorism." DFAT's Howarth was cautiously hopeful that
the upcoming elections in Afghanistan would contribute to the
stability of the country. With the elections marking the end
of the Bonn Agreement, he asked what Washington's views were
on the future structure of the relationship between the
international community and Afghanistan. Howarth also
expressed concern about the illegal narcotics situation and
asked for best practice information from the USG to assist in
establishing the GOA's own counter-narcotics policy for
Afghanistan. He was particularly interested in lessons
learned by the U.S. in Afghanistan and Colombia. Howarth
also expressed interest in USG thinking on Pakistan's "end
game" in Afghanistan, saying he found Islamabad's treatment
of the Taliban and other transnational fighters
"inconsistent." Post would appreciate Department guidance to
assist in responding to Howarth's questions.
STANTON.