Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05CAIRO8111
2005-10-20 13:56:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Cairo
Cable title:  

SECRETARY'S ORAL MESSAGE TO ARAB LEAGUE AMRE

Tags:  PREL PGOV MOPS PTER EG IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 008111 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS PTER EG IZ
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S ORAL MESSAGE TO ARAB LEAGUE AMRE
MOUSSA ELICITS POSITIVE RESPONSE

REF: A. STATE 192650 (NOTAL)


B. CAIRO 8016 (NOTAL)

C. CAIRO 7982 (NOTAL) NODIS

D. CAIRO 7963 (NOTAL)

Classified by Ambassador Ricciardone for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).

-------
Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 008111

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS PTER EG IZ
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S ORAL MESSAGE TO ARAB LEAGUE AMRE
MOUSSA ELICITS POSITIVE RESPONSE

REF: A. STATE 192650 (NOTAL)


B. CAIRO 8016 (NOTAL)

C. CAIRO 7982 (NOTAL) NODIS

D. CAIRO 7963 (NOTAL)

Classified by Ambassador Ricciardone for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (C) The Ambassador delivered the Secretary's oral message
(ref A) during a meeting late October 19 with Arab League
Secretary General Amre Moussa - the eve of his departure to

SIPDIS
Iraq. Moussa received the message positively while focusing
attention on the issues of a conference venue and MNF
"withdrawal." Moussa intends to propose a "preparatory"
meeting in Cairo as a "practical necessity, not an AL
political requirement." He acknowledged that the Iraqi
Transitional Government and the majority of Iraqis themselves
might insist on meeting only in Iraq, and agreed that he
would comply with Iraqi wishes. Moussa also repeated his
expectation that he will "need" to address with Iraqis the
topic of foreign troop withdrawal, while taking aboard our
attempt to re-direct such a conversation more positively
toward helping Iraqis stand on their own. While again
commending Moussa's willingness to visit Iraq and engage
politically, the Ambassador stressed the importance of
avoiding in any way undermining either the elected Iraqi
government or the political process put in place by UNSCR
1546, including the constitution. As part of his mission to
Iraq, Moussa intends to announce the establishment in Baghdad
of an Arab League diplomatic presence at the Ambassadorial
level. End summary.

--------------
Secretary's Oral Message Reviewed

SIPDIS
--------------


2. (C) During a late October 19 meeting at the residence of
Arab League Secretary General Amre Moussa, hours before
Moussa's departure for Iraq, the Ambassador conveyed the
Secretary's oral message (ref A) on his visit and on Arab

SIPDIS
League efforts on Iraq (refs B and C). The Ambassador
underscored our fundamental concern that Moussa and the
League must convey clearly to the Iraqis and the broader

public that th AL recognized the legitimacy of both the Iraqi
Transitional Government (ITG),UNSCR 1546, and the results of
the constitution referendum and do nothing that could be
perceived as undermining them. Moussa stated that he "liked"
the Secretary's message and Ambassador Jeffrey's statement of
support for his mission.

-------------- --------------
Arab League Next Steps: Meeting Venue, Baghdad Office
-------------- --------------


3. (C) Discussing the AL proposal to host a national
conference of Iraqis, Moussa readily agreed that the Iraqis
themselves will determine whatever name such a gathering
would be given. But, Moussa underscored his interest in
first hosting a "preparatory" gathering of Iraqis in Cairo at
the Arab League "to allow the maximum number of regional
foreign ministers and others to participate." Asked if the
Cairo venue was a League political requirement, Moussa
clarified that a meeting in Cairo was not a political
objective but rather a "practical necessity" to increase
participation of Arab ministers and others who might be
unwilling to travel to Iraq due to security concerns. The
Ambassador advised that the majority of Iraqis from all walks
of life would probably want the meetings held in Iraq as a
matter of national pride. Moreover, Iraqis more readily
trust foreigners that come to them, thereby experiencing the
day-to-day living conditions faced by Iraqis. They would be
less likely to trust those who refused to visit Iraq, and
indeed may draw unfavorable contrasts between the fearful
Arab VIPs who dare not ever visit Baghdad, versus the many
westerners who both visit and stay there. Moussa took the
point, saying that he would discuss the topic at length in
Iraq.


4. (C) Moussa told the Ambassador that another outcome of
his mission would be an announcement of plans to open an Arab
League diplomatic mission in Baghdad in the near future.
Moussa explained that he was thinking of sending someone with
"Head of Mission rank with Ambassadorial title." (Note:
October 20 press reporting quotes AL sources as saying that
the League would establish an office in Baghdad: a notably
forward-leaning move on Moussa's part. End note). By
establishing an Arab League mission in Baghdad, Moussa added,
AL member states would feel compelled to follow suit.

--------------
MNF Withdrawal Still High on Moussa's Agenda
--------------


5. (C) As expected, Moussa returned to the topic of MNF
withdrawal and his need to at least discuss the issue with
the Iraqis during his visit. While asserting that he aimed
to support the UNSCR 1546 process, and certainly had no
intention to undermine it or the ITG, Moussa insisted that
additional efforts (i.e., those of the League and its member
states) were required to bring disaffected (though not
terrorist) groups into the political process and drain
support for the resistance and insurgency. The Ambassador
again cautioned Moussa to avoid taking any position that
could even be taken to imply an AL effort to establish
alternative processes to either the elected Iraqi government
or the UNSCR 1546 political process. Any discussion of
"withdrawal," in particular, should aim directly at
supporting Iraqis in building their own security forces and
taking full responsibility for their national security.
Moussa said he "understood," and did not demur.


6. (C) Moussa said he had received death threats in addition
to pleadings from friends and strangers not to make this
trip. His wife was particularly unhappy but "accepts his
responsibilities." Zarqawi and Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood
had both publicly criticized him for his trip. But, Moussa
insisted that he would not be deterred from his mission.

--------------
Additional Itinerary Details of Visit
--------------


7. (C) Moussa noted his pleasure over his expected meeting
Ambassador Khalilzad in Baghdad October 20. Moussa also
explained that President Talabani requested their meeting
take place in Sulaymaniyah on October 22, immediately before
Moussa meets with Barzani in Irbil. He extended his visit by
one day to accomodate both Kurdish leaders. Moussa expressed
personal anxieties over the possible use of helicopters to
get from Baghdad to Najaf, and from Irbil to Sulaymaniyah,
but indicated his readiness to do so if necessary. Moussa
and delegation plan to remain in Irbil overnight October 22,
departing for Cairo on October 23.


RICCIARDONE