ARAB LEAGUE'S MOUSSA TO BAGHDAD; SEEKING USG

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CAIRO 007963

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER MOPS ASEC EG IZ
SUBJECT: ARAB LEAGUE'S MOUSSA TO BAGHDAD; SEEKING USG
BACKING FOR HOLDING IRAQI NATIONAL DIALOGUE

REF: A. CAIRO 7725


B. JEDDAH 3953 (NOTAL)

C. STATE 189909

Classified by Ambassador Ricciardone for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).


1. (U) This message contains an action request. See
paragraph five.

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Summary
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2. (C) During an October 15 meeting with the Ambassador to
discuss Iraq's constitution referendum, Arab League Secretary
General Moussa outlined plans for a visit to Iraq, October
20-21 (protect dates). In Iraq, Moussa intends to seek
buy-in for League plans to host a national gathering of Iraqi
political groups (excluding terror groups, venue and date to
be determined). Moussa sought USG political support for Arab
League engagement on Iraq's political process, limited MNF-I
technical support for the visit (paragraph seven),and USG
"understanding" for what he saw as his need to entertain
discussion in general terms of the withdrawal of U.S. forces
("though not a specific timeline") from Iraq, as a means to
draw more Sunnis away from the insurgency and into the
political process. To the Ambassador's call to comment
favorably on Iraq's referendum and ongoing political process
(ref C),Moussa committed to making helpful public remarks
once referendum results are announced, as well as during his
Iraq visit. End summary.

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Arab League Secretary General to Baghdad
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3. (C) Meeting late on October 15 with the Ambassador and
poloff (notetaker),Arab League Secretary General Amre Moussa
and his Chief of Staff Hesham Youssef detailed plans for an
October 20-21 League mission to Iraq, as agreed by AL
ministers in Jeddah October 2 (ref B). Moussa said he would
lead a delegation of 8 AL officials, 11 AL security
personnel, and a group of 10 journalists to Iraq October
20-21. Moussa will fly from Cairo to Baghdad on a Bahraini
charter jet, overnight at either the Mugamma al Wuzarah
(beside the Green Zone) or at the home of FM Zebari, and
return to Cairo after a visit to meet Kurdish leader Barzani
in Irbil. Moussa requested that we keep details of his trip,
including dates, very close-hold for security reasons.


4. (C) Despite what he described as strong pressure by
professional and personal contacts to cancel the trip, Moussa
said he was committed to the visit. The armed attack on
Moussa's Arab League advance team in Baghdad raised concerns,
Moussa said, but would not deter him from executing the
decision by Arab League ministers in Jeddah October 2 for the
visit and for sponsoring a national Iraqi conference.


5. (C) Action Request: Moussa shared his request for
general political support for his mission but not loud public
praise that might feed Sunni Arab perceptions that he was
travelling at U.S. bidding. Moussa also welcomed limited and
discreet USG and Coalition technical support both to ensure
his safety and to facilitate travel within Iraq.
Specifically, he would welcome any advice or assistance to
ensure proper flight clearances and other required details
for the Bahraini charter flight that will take Moussa from
Cairo to Baghdad and from Irbil to Cairo. Moussa also
intends to contact the UN senior representative in Iraq to
request similar assistance, most likely in terms of transport
between Baghdad and Najaf. He is reluctant to accept MNF-I
helicopter lift but might be willing to do so if in some way
such airlift is clearly provided under Iraqi government
auspices, or possibly U.N. aircraft. Embassy Cairo Political
officer Chris Hegadorn can be reached via classified e-mail
(HegadornCS@state.sgov.gov) or Open Net e-mail
(HegadornCS@state.gov) for operational liaison with the
League. End action request.


6. (C) Moussa detailed his intention to meet with key Iraqi
government figures, including President Talabani, Prime
Minister Jafari, senior ministers, and key regional and
religious leaders such as al Hakim, Barzani, Adnan Duleimi,
al Dhari, and others. He was pleased to hear that Ambassador
Khalilzad had agreed to meet him (per Ricciardone-Khalilzad
e-mails),and had asked FM Zebari to make arrangements with
U.S. Embassy Bagdad. Following meetings in Baghdad and
Najaf, Moussa intends to fly to Irbil to meet Barzani before
returning directly to Cairo. He will follow up his Iraq
visit, he added, with regional consultations and visits to
Iran, Turkey, and Syria among others.

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Rationale for Arab League Involvement
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7. (C) Mousa said his trip was intended to bring the AL in
to "support the intensive political process certain to occur
between the referendum and the December elections." He
recognized that the Iraqis would be less interested, if at
all, in a "national dialogue" conference in Cairo or anywhere
outside Iraq, than in one held in Iraq itself. This might be
the ideal, if security eventually permitted; but perhaps a
"prep-con" at AL headquarters could be helpful. The
important objective, he stressed, was for the AL to "engage"
with both the Iraqis and the U.S./Coalition. "The Arabs have
to understand that there is no alternative to this process."
He specifically rejected the Arab critics' contention that
democracy in Iraq was "ir-receivable from the Americans" --
in other words, unacceptable if created by the U.S.


8. (C) Moussa rehearsed with the Ambassador arguments for AL
engagement in Iraq, the expected Baghdad visit, the national
conference proposal, and his consultations with USG/Coalition
representatives. The League's recent decision to become more
engaged on Iraq, he said, reflected a shift by key Arab
powers that was crucial in helping to overcome the ongoing
crisis in Iraq. The decision was not intended to supplant
UNSCR 1546, Moussa argued, but reflected Arab neighbors'
belief that the current political process in Iraq did not
fully capture a national consensus on how best to move
forward. Without the League's efforts in this regard, Moussa
predicted continued strong domestic Iraqi and regional
resistance to American and Coalition efforts. The principal
focus of the League was a national conference to help
overcome such internal and regional differences, he said.


9. (C) Moussa explained that he was not wedded to the word
"reconciliation (Arabic, mu-Sal-e-hah)" to which Iraqis had
objected, to describe the proposed AL-backed national
conference, and would seek Iraqis' agreement on appropriate
terminology. The wording, whether national "accord (Arabic,
wifaq)," or national "discussion (Arabic, hiwar)," was far
less important than the substance of any such gathering. The
Ambassador cautioned that some Iraqis might perceive the
title "Wifaq al Watani (National Accord)" as AL support for
former PM Allawi's political party of the same name. Moussa
noted that participation in the event would not be permitted
to terror groups such as Zarqawi's or others involved in
terror attacks.


10. (C) Moussa stressed the historic nature of such a
negotiating effort by the Arab League itself, as opposed to
key members of the League, and argued that his having
personal responsibility for the success or failure of the
conference would streamline negotiations over planning and
other technical details. The fact of the visit alone, he
added, should contribute significantly to silencing local
pessimism and negativity over Iraq. "Just making the trip at
all will be 50 percent of its success." Still, he noted,
"completely fabricated" press reports suggesting that he
would seek a meeting with Saddam Hussein highlighted the
level of disinformation surrounding his and Arab League
intentions. "We can't deal with the Iraq crisis by
complaining about it," he continued, "we have to become part
and parcel of the process. And, we Arabs must speak with the
United States about Iraq - we can not stand aside."

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Coalition "Withdrawal" on Agenda
--------------


11. (C) Repeating the argument he used with visiting Iraq
Policy Coordinator Jeffrey and delegation (ref A),Moussa
emphasized his need to "talk about talking about" the topic
of MNF withdrawal -- which he insisted had already been
broached within UNSCR 1546. "We're not trying to corner you"
with a time-line commitment, he added, but he recognized the
crucial importance to Iraqi resistance elements of this
topic. If Moussa can include this topic on the agenda for
the national dialogue, the League would be better able to
draw political opposition groups now outside the process to
participate constructively. The Ambassador cautioned Moussa
not to be drawn into discussion of specific timelines for
withdrawal of Coalition forces, nor to mistake foreign
withdrawal as the definition of success for Iraq. The USG,
the Ambassador said, was commmitted to supporting the Iraqi
government until it had established a free nation capable of
governing and defending itself.

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Demarche on Support for Constitution
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12. (C) The Ambassador stressed the importance of public AL
support for the October 15 referendum, especially in
recognizing the ongoing and successful implementation to date
of UNSCR 1546. Drawing from ref C demarche talking points,
the Ambassador noted that the Iraqi government and Washington
alike had been disappointed by the relative silence from the
League on the constitution process. Moussa listed earlier
significant help he said the League offered the Iraqi
government and pledged to comment favorably to the media once
referendum results were announced. The constitution
negotiations, he noted, had achieved positive results. He
would certainly comment favorably on the process during his
Iraq trip. Moussa also told the Ambassador that he had
telephoned Iraqi Islamic Party leader Tareq al Hashimi ahead
of the referendum, only half-jokingly "taking credit" for the
former's decision to announce his support for the last-minute
crucial amendments brokered by Embassy Baghdad.

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Comment
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13. (C) We see Moussa's trip as a sign of constructive Arab
engagement on Iraq. Notwithstanding the official "cover" of
the Jedda/AL Ministerial of October 2, Moussa appears well
out in front of Arab and AL opinion. He is showing both
personal and political courage in making the trip, and wants
at least tacit USG and allied support. He also wants at
least our tolerance for whatever he evidently fears he might
be constrained to say about "withdrawal of foreign forces" to
play up to the Iraqi and broader Arab rejectionists. The
naievete of some of Moussa's notions about dealing with
Iraqis indicates just how much he (and through him, the AL)
stands to learn from direct exposure to the complicated
ground truth in Iraq. We welcome Embassy Baghdad's
suggestions on what we can do to work with the League to
facilitate their visit. End comment.


RICCIARDONE