VISIT OF AMBASSADOR JEFFREY: EGYPTIAN REACTION TO ARAB OUTREACH STRATEGY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 CAIRO 007725

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2015
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MOPS, PTER, ECON, EAID, EG, IZ, SY, OVIP
SUBJECT: VISIT OF AMBASSADOR JEFFREY: EGYPTIAN REACTION TO
ARAB OUTREACH STRATEGY


Classified by DCM Stuart Jones for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

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Summary
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1. (C) During meetings with key Egyptian leaders and Arab
League Secretary General Amre Moussa, Interagency Iraq Team
laid out the situation in Iraq, linked it with the underlying
policy approach outlined by the Secretary at Princeton
University, and urged more Eqyptian and Arab League
engagement with Iraq. Ambassador Jeffrey stressed in
particular the criticality of success in Iraq for the entire
region, the need for our Arab friends to act now to support
Iraqi democratic forces and pressure Syria, encourage
peaceful participation of Sunni Arabs in the political
process, and on the importance of such action for our
bilateral relations with Arab states. Interlocutors
displayed real concern for the situation in Iraq and a
general willingness to be helpful. However, the general
sympathy with our support for democracy in Iraq was much
dampened by concerns about the "Iranian factor," fears that
the Sunni Arabs - and more generally the Arab world ideology
of a unified (Sunni) Arab identity - would suffer as a result
of "one (wo)man one vote" in Iraq, and urgings that we focus
on regional security. Unhelpful specific ideas including
variants on the "issue an MNF-I withdrawal timetable" idea by
both Aboul Gheit and Moussa, and various suggestions for
"reconciliation gatherings" that would seemingly undercut the
political process (and democratic legitimacy of the ITG)
along "old Middle East thinking" lines. Thus, we made no
breakthroughs in the Egyptians' willingness to take major
risks to act now. (The killing of their ambassador in
Baghdad and the tactless Iraqi government reaction is much on
people's minds in Cairo.) Nevertheless, apart from general
understanding of the need for progress in Iraq, various
intelocutors did agree to expand contacts, reach out to
Sunnis, and keep pressuring Syria. Specific steps or
proposals forward include:

-- FONMIN's confirmation that the Iraqi ambassador designate
would receive agrement.

-- Defense Ministry's commitment to high level contacts,
including a possible invitation to Iraqi MINDEF Dulaymi.

-- MOD confirmation that it is willing to provide "at no
cost" training of Iraqi forces in Egypt.

-- Willingness of Interior Minister al Adly to accept a
counterpart visit.

-- Moussa's willingness to consider a trip to Iraq (announced
later sunday during a meeting of the AL Contact Group on Iraq
meeting in Jedda; unfortunately coupled with emphasis on his
idea - see below - for an Iraqi reconciliation conference).

-- Commitment by Intelligence Director (and Mubarak
confidant) Soliman to push Damascus to clearly understand USG
views and positions, as well as a possible invitation by
Soliman to Iraqi NSA Al Rubaie to visit Egypt.

-- Interest in setting up a 'back channel' with Iraqi Sunni
Arab rejectionists to lure them into the political process.

-- Willingness of Finance Minister Boutros Ghali to reach out
to Iraqi counterpart Allawi, and to push for Iraqi debt
forgiveness (the final decision on this will rest with
Mubarak). End summary.

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Egyptian General Intelligence Service discussions
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2. (S) After listing what the USG had done "wrong" in Iraq,
Egyptian General Intelligence Service (EGIS) Director Omar
Soliman told the delegation that it must embrace a three part
strategy in order to "win:" make security a priority, open a
back channel to Sunni insurgents, and bolster economic
support in quiet areas. On security, Soliman said the U.S.
erred in making border security a third or fourth priority
and in not using the professional officer corps, and should
increase the use of human intelligence.

3. (S) On the back channel proposal, Soliman stressed that
the U.S. must deal directly with Sunni insurgents because
they are responsible for 70 percent of the violence. Soliman
offered to arrange a dialogue between key insurgency leaders
and the USG and perhaps make a deal to stop their violence.
Soliman said there is a perception that the U.S. wants a Shia
controlled Iraq. He advised the U.S. to use public channels
to declare that the USG supports "the Iraqi people and not
any particular faction."

4. (S) Ambassador Jeffrey noted points of agreement but
explained that Iraq's military leaders are experienced
professionals and described USG efforts to dialogue with the
Sunnis directly and to extract compromises from other
factions to satisfy Sunni demands. Ambassador Jeffrey
underlined that the insurgents and their leaders need to
understand that there is no going back to Saddam's Iraq.

5. (S) The Ambassador asked Soliman to invite Iraq's
National Security Advisor equivalent al Rubaie to Cairo for
discussions. Soliman agreed. Soliman also observed that
relations had been good during Allawi's tenure and said he
does not understand why Ja'fari is "staying away."

6. (S) Soliman spent much time discussing with the
delegation and in a pull aside at the end the need to stop
Syrian support for the insurgency and to ensure Syria is
aware that it must act. (septel).

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Ministry of Defense and Director of Military Intelligence
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7. (C) In their October 1 meeting, the delegation, joined by
the Ambassador, discussed with the Director of Military
Intelligence MG Murad Mowafy and Advisor to the Minister of
Defense MG Fouad Abdel Halim opportunities for greater
mil-mil cooperation between Egypt and Iraq. MG Fouad
reviewed GOE support for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and
repeated the GOE offer to train more military officers and
bear all costs of such training (a point later emphasized by
FM Aboul Gheit). MG Fouad added that the GOE would explore
the possibility of inviting the Iraqi Defense Minister to
Cairo or perhaps sending a senior GOE officer to Baghdad.
(Note: MG Fouad told poloff after the meeting that it would
be highly unlikely that Field Marshal Tantawi would agree to
visit Iraq. End note.) MG Murad underscored the need to
maximize cooperation on Iraq in order to control the increase
in sectarian and ethnic divisions, the rise in extremism, and
the deterioration in the security situation.

8. (C) Ambassador Jeffrey and the Ambassador encouraged the
Generals to dialogue directly the GOI and invite Minister of
Defense Saddoun al Duleimi to Cairo and send a Defense
Attach to Baghdad. They were non-committal in response to
delegation urging that they contemplate posting a DATT in
Baghdad, but agreed to discuss with the Field Marshall. The
delegation also asked the GOE to convey to Syria that the USG
expects Syria to control the flow of foreign fighters into
Syria by tightening its borders, imposing visa requirements,
and stopping the flow of financial assistance to former
Ba'athists. Iraq issues should be of vital interest to
Syria, the delegation members stressed, because failure of
the political process will impact all of Iraq's neighbors.

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Minister of Foreign Affairs Aboul Gheit
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9. (C) With Aboul Gheit, Ambassador Jeffrey suggested how
the GOE could be helpful in bringing about the UNSCR 1546
goal of a democratic, pluralistic, federal, united Iraq,
which would include an exchange of ambassadors. Aboul Gheit
replied that Iraq had not formally named an ambassador to
Egypt, but that the GOE would accept the name if submitted
for agrement. As for Egypt's diplomatic presence in Iraq,
the Minister said that with the murder of the previous
ambassador still on people's minds, Egypt was not in a
position to increase its presence beyond the current staffing
of one administrative officer and six security guards.
(Comment: In an emotional vein, he noted that he personally
had been savaged in the press and that the wounds were still
quite fresh. End comment) He criticized the ITG for
exposing the Egyptian Ambassador to danger by publicizing
that he was Egypt's first ambassador to Iraq when he in fact
was simply replacing the retiring ambassador.

10. (C) The Minister questioned whether UNSCR 1546, even if
carried out fully, would succeed. Citing long-standing
fragmentation of Iraqi society and noting that the continuing
presence of U.S. forces feeds the insurgency, Aboul Gheit
proposed that the U.S. set a specific date for withdrawal
with the condition that there must be an Iraqi force ready to
take over. To deal with the Sunni problem, he suggested
making them feel enfranchised by including them in an
international conference focused on creating a new Iraq.
Broadening the forum beyond three factions in Iraq would
serve as an incentive for stronger Sunni engagement, he
argued. Aboul Gheit stressed that this was his personal
idea, not a formal GOE proposal.

11. (C) Continuing in the "personal vein," Aboul Gheit
stated that he agreed with the four guiding principles laid
out by Ambassador Jeffrey (i.e, the UNSCR 1546 call for a
"democratic, pluralistic, federal and united" Iraq),but that
the bottom line for what he wanted in Iraq was no civil war,
no dismemberment of the country, and no power for Iran in
Iraq's internal affairs. Jeffrey rejoined "that sounds like
what we had with Saddam." When pressed on how Egypt would
contribute to stabilizing Iraq, Aboul Gheit refused to commit
the GOE to any actions other than training of judges,
diplomats, police forces, the military and meeting with
visiting Iraqi officials. He did, however, state that he
would reassess the situation in light of the October 15
referendum in Iraq.

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Minister of Interior, al-Adly
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12. (C) Ambassador Jeffrey and delegation urged Egyptian
Interior Minister General Habib El-Adly to upgrade the GOE's
engagement on Iraq. In response to Jeffrey's presentation,
Adly described the Iraqi situation in Iraq as having serious
implications for the security of all the states in the
region. Adly recounted that he had told fellow interior
ministers, at a meeting among states neighboring Iraq, that
cooperation among them must be tangible and substantive.
This message had been particularly directed toward his
counterparts from Syria and Iran, he added. Adly agreed
that Iraq now had a very serious terrorism problem that
threatened to spill over its borders, but opined that
"Zarqawy is not able to conduct these operations on his own"
and stressed that the GOE had found no link between Zarqawy
or al-Qa'ida and terrorist attacks in Sinai in 2004 and 2005.
Nonetheless, he affirmed the Sinai attackers did share
al-Qa'ida's basic ideology and may well have been inspired by
their message and activities. Adly noted that his forces
killed in the Sinai three fugitive suspects from the July
Sharm el-Sheikh attacks and captured a fourth. Preliminary
results from the questioning of the prisoner, he said,
reinforced the GOE view that the group did not have direct
international connections. The Minister told Jeffrey he had
word of a possible visit to Cairo by the Iraqi Interior
Minister and said he would be glad to issue his counterpart a
formal invitation. The GOE had already trained a batch of
Iraqi police, Adly stated, but the Iraqi government has so
far declined to send any more.

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Arab League, Secretary General Moussa
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13. (C) Arab League Secretary General Amre Moussa began by
stressing that the League was neither an enemy of the U.S.,
nor working to undermine U.S. Iraq policy. Moussa and the
League welcomed meaningful dialogue, which he asserted had
been lacking. Such dialogue, he argued, was the only way to
bring Arab public opinion around regarding its negative views
on U.S. policy in Iraq and the region. Moussa asserted
continued AL support to the new Iraqi government, citing the
League's decision to seat the first post-Saddam government
which he argued legitimized it within the Arab community and
beyond. He argued that the AL did not oppose any part of the
political process spelled out in UNSCR 1546 (Note: this was
after Jeffrey stressed the goal of a pluralistic, democratic,
federal and united Iraq contained in that document. Moussa's
"acceptance" was grudging and legalistic, and he spent much
of the rest of the discussion defining the first three of
those adjectives in ways all but unrecognizable to an
American listener. End note.) Moussa in particular
complained that the U.S. stress on federalism in Iraq was
ill-conceived, and would result in local rule by "mafias."
Moussa sought to blame the U.S. for inciting factional,
ethnic, and religious tensions in Iraq -- a point Ambassador
Jeffrey strongly rejected.

14. (C) In order to counter the current violence and
political turmoil, Moussa argued the importance of holding in
Iraq a "national reconciliation conference" to alleviate
current political turmoil there. Jeffrey replied that we
were in Cairo to learn, and didn't want to reject any ideas.
This, however, if not done very carefully would de facto
delegitimize the democractically elected ITG and undercut the
UN-endorsed political process. Moussa also argued the
importance of the U.S. being willing to discuss a timetable
for troop removal, in the context of UNSCR 1546, and expand
the presence of the UN (Comment: a good idea in principle,
but beware Moussa's qualifier: "To take on much of the work
the U.S. is now doing. End comment). Moussa further
complained that U.S. policy had facilitated Iran's
"commanding position" in Iraq.

15. (C) Moussa spent much time talking opaquely about the
need for an "Arab safety net," which we would intepret
(perhaps unfairly) as meaning that the Arab world can be
helpful but only if its identity needs vis-a-vis Iraq ("the
heart of the Arab region") be taken into consideration. This
apparently equates to weighing in on the side of the Sunnis
as representing that identity -- and supposedly as the
bulwark against the Iranians, at the expense of democratic
principles. In essense, Moussa at least implicitly suggested
that Sunni Arabs are just more real or legitimate than the
other 80% of the population. The implications of that line
of thinking for our democratic goals in Iraq, not to speak of
the country's unity, are obvious and were made so back to
Moussa. Among his other ideas was an Arab military force for
the country. The Delegation reminded him of prior Iraqi
rejection of that idea, and said it would have to be
thoroughly discussed with both the Iraqis and the Coalition.
Moussa at first resisted commitment to travel to Iraq, citing
the death of the Egyptian ambassador, but eventually said he
would consider it. (Note: It was apparently decided at the
Arab League Iraq meeting in Jedda later that day that he
would travel to Iraq. End note.)

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Minster of Finance Boutros-Ghali
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16. (C) Finance Minister Boutros Ghali agreed to consider a
request for a public GOE announcement on restructuring
remaining Iraqi debts. Boutros Ghali expressed his
understanding that the majority of Iraq's remaining
(unserviced) debt was private but with government guarantees
that complicated matters. Nevertheless, Boutros Ghali
promised to raise the issue with President Mubarak and to
follow up directly with the Iraqi Finance Minister (Note:
Delegation members provided contacts numbers for the Iraqi
finance minister. End note.) Butros Ghali also touched upon
Egypt's offer to host a BMENA Finance Ministers meeting,
which is of interest to Iraqi counterparts. Egypt also
committed to sharing its expertise (and possibly its
software) to help create a new Iraqi banking system. Boutros
Ghali also explained that Egypt's exports to Iraq (primarily
through Iraq's neighbors) had contributed greatly to Egypt's
recent export surge.

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Iraq Deputy Foreign Minister Bayati
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17. (C) Ambassador Jeffrey's delegation and DFM Bayati
exchanged views on how to move Egypt forward on the Iraq
front. Little new to report. What was significant was
Bayati's "local color" comment. While wandering incognito
around the Cairo Souk, whenever Bayati (a senior member of
SCIRI tortured by the Ba'athists) told people he was from
Iraq, he was greeted by exclaimations of admiration for
Saddam Hussein.


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