Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05CAIRO7549
2005-09-29 14:31:00
SECRET
Embassy Cairo
Cable title:  

SCENESETTER FOR VISIT TO EGYPT OF IRAQ POLICY

Tags:  PREL PGOV PTER MOPS EG IZ OVIP 
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 007549 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/29/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER MOPS EG IZ OVIP
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR VISIT TO EGYPT OF IRAQ POLICY
COORDINATOR AMBASSADOR JEFFREY


Classified by Charge d'Affaires Stuart Jones for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 007549

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/29/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER MOPS EG IZ OVIP
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR VISIT TO EGYPT OF IRAQ POLICY
COORDINATOR AMBASSADOR JEFFREY


Classified by Charge d'Affaires Stuart Jones for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).


1. (C) Ambassador Jeffrey, we are looking forward to hosting
you and your delegation here in Cairo to pursue the first
phase of your Arab outreach strategy on Iraq. Your visit
provides an opportunity to consult with the GOE on Iraq at a
critical time. We believe you should use your visit to
encourage the GOE to press the Sunnis to participate in the
referendum and December elections and to invite senior Iraqi
officials to Cairo for discussions on furthering cooperation.



2. (C) The GOE is focused closely on Iraq's impact on
regional stability and on the Iranian element in particular.
President Mubarak and his key advisors will need to be
convinced that stepped-up GOE engagement with the GOI, so
close to the October 15 referendum and the December
elections, will have an impact, particularly given the
potential negative domestic consequences of greater
engagement. Because of the security and political situation
following the killing of Ambassador Ihab al Sherif, the GOE
is unlikely to send an Ambassador to Bahgdad now. Foreign
Minister Aboul Gheit, in particular, was stung by virulent
press criticism that, in caving to USG pressure to boost
Egypt's presence in Iraq, he had gotten one of his diplomats
killed.


3. (C) Egypt's engagement on Iraq since the start of
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) has been sporadic but
significant during key diplomatic efforts. The GOE supported
the effort to re-seat Iraq in the Arab League and elicited
international cooperation at the November, 2004 Sharm El
Sheikh conference and the Brussels conference. The GOE's
facilitation of U.S. aircraft overflights and Suez canal ship
transits is critical to OIF. Egypt was also among the few
Arab states to send an Ambassador to Baghdad and to welcome
senior Iraqis to Cairo for discussions. The GOE has also
contributed to feasibility studies regarding the possibility
of extending the unified electrical grid to Iraq and has

trained Iraqi military officers, diplomats, and civil
servants from the Inspector General's office at various sites
in Egypt.


4. (S) Although your GOE interlocutors will be polite, you
can expect them to offer straightforward advice. The
consistent message we have received from the GOE, including
from President Mubarak himself, has been that the USG should
remove U.S. soldiers from the front lines, reinstate
ex-Ba'athist officials without blood on their hands, and
engage seriously with the Sunni community. Among the GOE's
deepest concerns is that Iraq will be broken up into its
ethnic constituent parts, and that Iran will be the primary
beneficiary of the division. Soliman may suggest that USG
should open a backchannel with the Sunnis in order to
establish a dialogue and possibly persuade Sunni insurgents
to stop their attacks. Soliman will likely also urge the USG
to bolster its humanitarian support in peaceful areas in
order to improve its public image among the Iraqi people.


5. (S) You can expect Arab League Secretary General Amre
Moussa to complain that the USG's Iraq policy has increased
sectarian division in Iraq and strengthened Iran's influence
in the region. You should press Moussa and the League to
follow through on its promise to support Iraq's political
transition, to provide economic reconstruction assistance,
and to facilitate greater Arab representatation in Baghdad.
You can also remind Moussa of his pledge to make positive
statements on the Iraq consitution as soon as it is released.
Although Moussa will likely report that he is having trouble
identifying staff willing to serve in Baghdad, you should
encourage him to open the AL Baghdad office at the earliest
opportunity.


6. (S) We expect that your meeting with Directorate of
Military Intelligence (DMI) and MoD officials will allow for
a frank exchange both on areas for GOE engagement with Iraq
and on the USG's Iraq policy. MG Fouad Abdel Halim, the
Field Marshal's senior advisor, will likely offer again to
fund fully the training of Iraqi security forces here in
Egypt. He will also highlight the nature and extent of the
GOE's military support for OIF (primarily through overflights
and Suez canal transits) and will stress the importace of the
USG-GOE bilateral relationship. DMI's MG Murad Mowafy may
assert that our policy in Iraq is alienating the Sunni
population. During a recent USG-GOE intelligence exchange,
DMI officers reported that military operations such as took
place in Tel Affar are driving a wedge between the population
and the coalition. They also believe that the Sunni
leadership is too fractioned to participate effectively in
the political process and think that the USG is
overestimating the threat posed by foreign fighters in Iraq.


7. (S) Some areas of potential GOE interaction with Iraq
that you may wish to highlight during your discussions
include:

--outreach to key Sunnis to encourage participation in the
referendum and elections

--pressure on Syria to take seriously the USG's request for
cooperation on border security/counter-terrorism

--invitations to Iraqi officials to Egypt to explore
furthering cooperation (Iraqi Interior Minister Jabr would be
a candidate for such an invitation to discuss security force
training)

--invitations to Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish leaders for
meetings in Cairo to improve public understanding and promote
balanced media coverage of the new government

--positive statements on the Iraqi constitution

--holding security discussions with the GOI in preparation
for a return of Egyptian diplomats to Baghdad

--continuing discussions regarding the feasibility of
extending the unified electrical grid to Iraq

--exploring the feasibility of training Iraqis at the
Egyptian Atomic Energy Authority in techniques for safe
handling of nuclear material, and

--facilitating MOI approval of an offer from the Egyptian
Anti-Narcotics General Administration to train GOI police
officials in Cairo in October.


Visit Embassy Cairo's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/cairo

You can also access this site through the
State Department's Classified SIPRNET website.

JONES