RAFAH-GAZA BORDER: EGYPT STRUGGLES TO SUPPORT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 007423

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/26/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER MOPS KPAL EG IS
SUBJECT: RAFAH-GAZA BORDER: EGYPT STRUGGLES TO SUPPORT
PALESTINIANS WHILE PROTECTING ITS OWN SECURITY

REF: A. CAIRO 7418

B. CAIRO 7323

C. CAIRO 7297

D. CAIRO 7210

E. CAIRO 7158

Classified by Charge Stuart Jones for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

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Summary
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1. (C) The recent chaos on the Rafah-Gaza border laid bare
Egypt's dilemma of trying to balance its strong support for
Palestinian statehood with its efforts to prevent extremism
in Egypt. Clearly caught unprepared by the influx of people
into Egypt from Gaza, Cairo's "humanitarian" response to the
crisis averted political and security fallout that a stiffer
response might have provoked. Cairo also chose not to
publicly criticize Israel for prompting the episode with its
earlier-than-expected departure from the Philadelphi Strip.
With the border now officially closed, and Egypt's new Border
Guard Force in place, attention has reverted back to the
complex negotiations over how people and goods will transit
between Egypt and Gaza. The GOE understands that it must
work hand-in-hand with Israel as it endeavors to resolve Gaza
border issues. The GOE's primary objective throughout the
crisis has been to support and strengthen Abu Mazen
domestically, while maintaining channels of communication
with the Israelis. End summary.

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Gaza: The Sharp End of the Horn
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2. (C) Having had the sole responsibility of administering
Gaza at several points over the past half-century or so
(i.e., 1949-1956; 1957-1967),Egypt fully understands the
risks involved in trying to manage the passions and
aspirations within the world's most densely-populated piece
of real estate. Among the most daunting and complex
challenges for Egypt is the balancing act it must pursue in
leading Arab support for the eventual attainment of
Palestinian statehood, while also seeking to prevent
Palestinian extremism from seeping across its borders.

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What Happened at the Gaza-Rafah Border?
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3. (C) Israel's September 11 withdrawal from the Philadelphi
Corridor and the ensuing influx of Gazans into Egypt took the
Egyptians by surprise. The GOE expected the IDF to pull out
in conjunction with the start of its planned September 15
deployment of a new 750-man Border Guard Force (BGF). The
absence of adequate border forces on both sides of the
no-man's zone during the intervening period was the
prinicipal factor leading to the crisis. The shooting death
of a young Gazan (details remain murky) by GOE forces during
the initial confusion also was reportedly used as an excuse
by Palestinian militants to justify blowing up sections of
the Israeli-built concrete and metal barriers. A day after
Israel's September 11 withdrawal, PA and Egyptian forces
could only watch as tens of thousands of Palestinians and
Egyptians flowed freely across what had long been one of the
most tightly controlled crossing points in the region. The
meager GOE police force, we understand, was instructed to
monitor the flow of people and try to stop the most obvious
attempts to smuggle weapons and drugs across the border.

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Putting the Cork Back in the Bottle, "Humanely"
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4. (C) Once the controls along the Philadelphi zone had
collapsed, Cairo ordered its security forces at the border to
adopt a "humanitarian" approach rather than try to resist the
enormous crowds. Photos of GOE forces shooting Gazans along
the border would have damaged Egyptian and PA political
interests both at home and abroad. As thousands of Ministry
of Interior riot police were rushed to the scene, local
security elements sought to establish a presence in order to
at least visually monitor who was coming and going from Gaza.
While foodstuffs, cigarettes, and other highly sought-after
consumer goods comprised the majority of the smuggling, some
drugs and arms apparently also crossed the border during this
hectic period.


5. (C) It wasn't until the evening of September 19 that the
border was finally sealed, with numerous barricades repaired,
PA forces ensconced on their side of the border, and Egypt's
armed BGF deployed along the full 14-kilometer long zone. In
conversations with the Embassy, Egyptian officials assured us
that action would be taken to contain the situation and seal
the border. Significantly, they never over-promised, and in
a relatively methodical manner succeeded in bringing the
situation to a close. During the fracas, the MOD-controlled
BGF was careful to avoid armed confrontation with
Palestinians. However, should there again be large-scale
attempts at infiltration by throngs of Palestinian civilians,
it is not clear if the BGF would use force or continue to
respond in a "humanitarian" manner.


6. (C) On a positive note, despite strong misgivings within
the GOE over the way the IDF managed its departure from the
Philadelphi Corridor, public criticism of Israel was
carefully contained in the Egyptian media throughout the
episode. Egyptian state media essentially made a virtue of
necessity by warmly welcoming the Palestinian "brothers," who
it said had jubilantly crossed the border to reunite with
long-separated family members. Nevertheless, some opposition
papers did not shy away from emphasizing the dangers of entry
by Palestinian extremists (particularly Hamas) into Egypt.
Only with the September 23-24 exchange of violence between
Israel and Gaza militants, have Egyptian officials commented
critically on the situation in Gaza, calling for restraint on
all sides. Egypt's policy remains focused on strengthening
Abu Mazen and the PA in their struggle against Hamas and
other Islamic extremist groups.

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Whither the Rafah Terminal?
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7. (C) At present, the border between Egypt and Gaza remains
formally closed. Since September 19, however, two managed
exchanges of Gazans and Egyptians reportedly took place, with
several thousand Palestinians (with valid ID) permitted to
return to Gaza and several hundred Egyptians (also with valid
ID) returned to Sinai September 20. Similarly, another
exchange took place over 48-hours September 23/24 for Gazan
students and urgent medical cases requiring entry to Egypt,
and several hundreds of Palestinians departing Egypt for
Gaza. Stragglers on the wrong side of the border may be
stuck for some time as the priority now has turned to the
difficult negotiations between Israel, Egypt, and the PA to
determine the future of the Terminal and other border
crossings between Israel and Gaza.


8. (C) The GOE's primary objective throughout the Rafah
border crisis was to support and strengthen Abu Mazen
domestically, while maintaining channels of communication
with the Israelis. The weekend missile attacks and violence
between Israelis and Gazan militant groups underscores the
urgency of reaching agreement on all of the Gaza crossings
quickly before events spin out of control there. Israel's
recent sealing of the West Bank and Gaza following the recent
spate of violence prevented a planned September 25 GOE-PA
Ministerial meeting in Cairo and may hinder the scheduled
visit to Egypt of Abu Mazin on September 29.


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JONES